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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
"While liveable cities depend upon rational economics, that is just one leg ofthe
[sustainabilityJ stool. Ifour cities are to be truly sustainable and harmonious, we must
improve the lives and well-being ofeveryone, especially the urban poor. We must not
continue to consume natural resources at rates that deny opportunity to our children and
grandchildren. "~ UN Habitat Executive Director Anna Tibaijuka on World Habitat Day,
2009 (UN Habitat 201 Ob).
In Eugene, Oregon, where I have been living for the last decade, I have become
very interested in how social, economic, and environmental challenges take shape in
cities, and particularly how various actors negotiate these challenges. My own concern
for the built and natural environment in Eugene as well as achieving a high quality of life
for all people living in Eugene and elsewhere, led me to participate in various local
government processes, social movements, nonprofit organizations, my neighborhood
council, and various research projects. These experiences have motivated me to think
long and hard about how social justice, environmental sustainability, and economic
development intersect and are pursued in cities. How these important issues are
negotiated by urban actors is a concern shared by city officials and citizens around the
world today. Often, these issues are subsumed under urban sustainability programs and
policies. My own academic and personal interests, as well as the international interest in
urban sustainability, have culminated in this research project in which I identify and
explore how social equity is constructed and contested in City of Eugene Mayor Kitty
Piercy's Sustainable Business Initiative (hereinafter called the Mayor's SBI, or the SBI).
The SBI is a city-led initiative to help Eugene, OR businesses identify and implement
socially, environmentally, and economically sustainable practices.
2As environmental concerns such as climate change increase and social problems
related to jobs, health care, housing and transportation grow in the United States,
sustainability and sustainable development have emerged as a dominant framework for
addressing society's main social, environmental and economic issues. Finding solutions
that reduce one's impact on the environment, create greater social equity, and build a
healthy economy, has become a guiding light for many political leaders, policy makers
and citizens. The city-level is particularly central to sustainability efforts. Sustainability
expert, Herman Daly (1989, 1996), suggests that interest in sustainability efforts is
particularly piqued in cities because people often experience the problems of
unsustainability on a daily basis in an urban setting. What's more, urban residents have
the power to address such problems on the local level, rather than working toward
abstract global sustainability (Daly 1989, 1996). For example, urban residents along the
Hudson River in NY are unable to eat fish from the river due to water pollution; however,
urban residents can directly experience the success of collectively advocating for
sustainability as they work towards greater mobility options in their city for biking,
walking and public transit. In fact, a recent study by Living Cities (2009) found that in
more than 80% of U.S. cities, sustainability is one of their top five priorities.
Building on the momentum of urban sustainability nationwide, both as a concept
and as a movement, l and its aim to integrate social, environmental and economic goals,
Kitty Piercy, the Mayor ofEugene, OR, initiated the Mayor's SBI in 2005. Mayor Piercy
wanted to use the framework of sustainability to address some of Eugene's most
challenging issues. On the environmental front, wetlands and forests are disappearing
due to human development; the Willamette River, which runs through Eugene, is a
Superfund Toxic site in some areas; and, like all U.S. cities, the production and
consumption patterns of Eugene residents is contributing to climate change. On the social
front, Lane County (the county in which Eugene is located) as well as Oregon as a whole,
1 The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) defmition of sustainability is the
most commonly used. It defmes sustainability as "development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs" (WCED 1987).
3suffers from high unemployment, a large homeless population, a large population without
health insurance, and one of the highest child hunger rates in the nation. Compounding
these social issues, Eugene has had chronically high unemployment rates over the last
few decades (Oregon Center for Public Policy 2008). On the business side, Piercy
narrowly won the mayoral election in 2004 because she was confronted by constant
criticism that her social and environmental interests would create an anti-business climate
in Eugene. As a result, Piercy was looking for an innovative way to connect with and
assist the business community but, at the same time, advance her social and
environmental goals.
It is within this context that Mayor Piercy introduced the idea of creating a
Mayor's SBI and implemented it during her first term as Mayor. Like so many elected
officials, policy makers and citizens around the country, Mayor Piercy had high hopes for
building an initiative that would "make Eugene one of the nation's most sustainable mid-
size communities" by 2020, and "strengthen the economy by finding ways to support
businesses and expand quality jobs that use sustainable measures" (City of Eugene SBI
TF 2006:4). The Mayor formed a 16-member citizen Task Force (TF) to lead the SBI,
charging the TF to make recommendations to the "City Council, the private sector, and
other local organizations for retaining, growing, and creating Triple Bottom Line2
businesses and jobs" (City of Eugene SBI TF 2006:4).3 The SBI TF defined the triple
bottom line as "measures to simultaneously achieve economic, social and environmental
wellbeing" (City of Eugene SBI TF 2006:8). The SBI TF also described sustainability as
a three-legged stool- the three legs of the stool being social equity, economic prosperity
and environmental health - if one leg of the stool is missing, the stool collapses.
Observing the SBI process unfold and knowing Mayor Piercy had a strong commitment
to social and environmental issues, I took special interest in how the SBI TF would
2 The TF essentially used the tenus "sustainability" and "triple bottom line" interchangeably.
3 The tenu "triple-bottom-line" was coined by prominent sustainable economy thinker, Paul Hawken
(1993).
4develop recommendations that bolstered all three legs of the stool. This was an
admirable and important undertaking, not just for Mayor Piercy, but for all city officials,
policy makers and residents concerned with their cities developing in a way that creates a
healthy economy that provides broad benefits to residents and a thriving ecosystem.
Moreover, beginning in 2008 with the election of President Obama, the sustainability
discourse, largely in the form of green jobs and a green or clean energy economy, has
become widely popular on the national level. This draws even greater attention to the
idea of sustainability, the triple-bottom-line and, in essence, the balancing of social
equity, environmental health and economic prosperity.
However, my preliminary research into other sustainability initiatives in the
United States revealed that the social leg of the sustainability stool is often neglected.
The social side, also referred to as social sustainability, social equity, or social justice,
refers to the social needs and desires of urban residents. Social justice can be broadly
understood as addressing the distribution of benefits and burdens. As one author
explains, "The Commission of Social Justice highlighted several essential values of social
justice: the equal worth of all citizens, their equal right to be able to meet their basic
needs, the need to spread opportunities and life chances as widely as possible, and finally
the requirement that we reduce and where possible eliminate unjustified inequalities"
(Foley 2004:2) Under the original definition of sustainability, from the World
Commission on Environmental and Development (1987), social sustainability refers to
equity between generations (future generations should have the same or greater access to
social and environmental resources as current generations). Other sustainability theorists
take this one step further by applying social sustainability within generations - all people
of a generation have equal status, such as equal access and outcome with regard to basic
quality of life issues such as a good livelihood, housing, education, health care, childcare,
mobility, and other social securities (Agyeman 2003; Daly 1996). This more broadly
conceived definition of sustainability often refers to sustainability that is firmly rooted in
social justice concerns, otherwise known as "socially just sustainability" (Agyeman 2005;
5Ayres 1998; Bullard 2005). In Chapter II, I examine the myriad of ways sustainability is
defined, particularly social sustainability, as it is an integral part of understanding how
social equity is or is not addressed in sustainability efforts. The SBI TF chose to focus on
the sustainability of businesses and workplaces and referred to the social leg of the
sustainability stool as "providing equitable access to jobs with fair wages, benefits and
other services crucial to families" (City of Eugene SBI TF 2006). More relevant to my
research, previous studies have shown that the "social leg" of the stool is often neglected,
particularly related to gender, race, and class (Agyeman and Evans 2003; Dobson 1999;
Daley 1996). In fact, even cities that explicitly aim to create social sustainability and
address social equity often fall short of their goals. Indeed, at the end of the Mayor's SBI
process, no substantive proposals or recommendations for addressing the social equity
component of sustainability were made. Instead, the SBI TF's Final Report (2006:9)
stated that "the TF found it much easier to identify mechanisms to promote the economic
and environmental aspects of the Triple Bottom Line than the social equity
components... the TF encourages Eugene City Government and the community at large to
pursue additional actions to address social equity issues."
The final outcome of the SBI in terms of social equity demonstrates that we lack
understanding of the challenges city officials face when attempting to pursue
comprehensive urban sustainability policies and programs. Much deeper exploration of
how social, economic, and environmental interests play out in urban sustainability efforts
is needed including: examination of the main urban actors involved in these efforts,
especially identifying what their vision, goals and strategies for social equity and
sustainability are; exploration of what the role of local government is regarding
sustainability and social equity; and identification of the political economic factors that
inhibit or motivate the pursuit of comprehensive sustainability programs that address
social concerns as well as environmental and economic concerns (Portney 2003). My
study intends to do explore these factors and to offer possible solutions for other cities
that might seek to engage in sustainability efforts going forward.
6The Mayor's Sustainable Business Initiative in the Emerald City: Eugene, Oregon
Eugene, Oregon, a city of 144,000 people situated in Lane County in the southern
Willamette Valley, has been nationally recognized for its sustainability efforts and its
high levels of political activity. Eugene has been rated as one of the top "sustainable
cities" in the United States on several occasions, including being recognized as the
number one "Green City" in the United States in 2006 by National Geographic's Green
Guide.4 Eugene's Mayor Kitty Piercy signed on to the Mayor's Kyoto Protocol in 2007,
and signed an anti-Iraq war resolution in 2007 (Pittman 2007; Eugene Weekly 2007).
Eugene has a Human Rights Commission, was the first city in the nation to implement a
"toxics-right-to-know" law that requires corporations to disclose their toxics use and
discharges to the public, and opened one of the nation's first Bus Rapid Transit systems
in 2007. Also notable, Eugene implemented an urban growth boundary in 1992 that
limits development on the urban periphery in order to preserve open space and farmland
and it has more than a hundred miles of bicycle paths and routes. The City ofEugene's
government is also known for its internal sustainability policy, which includes: City staff
receive energy conservation training; 25% of city facilities rely on renewable energy;
50% of Eugene's wastewater treatment plan is powered by capturing the plant's methane
gases; traffic lights use more efficient LED lighting; 70-80% of products purchased by
the City ofEugene are from the State of Oregon; a Sustainable Buildings Resolution was
passed in 2006; by switching to hybrid vehicles the city vehicle fleet has reduced its
emissions by 10% since 2001; city employees receive a free bus pass; and six City of
Eugene parks are pesticide free (City ofEugene 2008).
4 The rating is based on surveys and information from the Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S.
Green Building Council, and other independent sources.
7Map 1. Eugene and Lane County, Oregon.
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Eugene is also nationally known for its vigorous environmental and social
movements including anti-war, anti-nuclear, forest defense, immigrant rights,
international solidarity and human rights, fair trade, food justice, alternative
transportation and land use, economic justice, and feminist and government watchdog
organizations (Register-Guard 1999). More specifically, Eugene residents' political
activism is indicated by its hosting the Public Interest Environmental Law Conference
(the largest conference of its kind in the world); being home to one of the largest cells of
the Earth Liberation Front and green anarchy devotees; having active chapters of Latin
American solidarity organizations, such as the Committee in Solidarity with Central
American People (CISCAP) and Amigos de los Sobrevivientos (a solidarity organization
for torture survivors); and an annual Take Back the Night March to protest sexual assault.
Concerning social sustainability issues, Eugene is far from immune to many of
the major social problems affecting many U.S. cities. High unemployment, sagging
8wages, lack of health insurance, and food and housing insecurity are all issues affecting
Eugene residents. While data specific to Eugene is not available for many important
social statistics, state and regional statistics give a good sense of the social issues in
Oregon. Table 1 provides basic demographic and social information about Eugene, as
well as Lane County and the United States to contextualize Eugene's statistics.
Table 1. Demographic information for Eugene, OR, Lane County, OR and the United
States.
Demographic Information for Eugene, OR, Lane County, OR
and the United States
Lane
EUl!ene County U.S.
Race*
White 88.10% 91.70% 79.80%
Black 1.30% 1.10% 12.80%
Asian 3.60% 2.90% 4.50%
Hispanic or Latino 5.00% 6.40% 15.40%
American-Indian & Alaskan Native 0.90% 1.20% 1.00%
Native Hawaiian & Other Pacific Islander 0.20% 0.20% 0.20%
Persons Reporting Two or More Races 3.70% 2.90% 1.70%
% Female 51.00% 50.80% 50.70%
% of Hil!h School Graduates (2000) 91.50% 87.50% 80.40%
% of Bachelor's Del!rees or Hil!her (2000) 37.30% 25.50% 24.40%
% Homeownership Rate (2000) 51.80% 62.30% 66.20%
Median-value of owner-occupied housinl! (2000) $152,000 $141,000 119,600
Median Household Income** $35,850 $43,614 $52,029
% of Persons Below Poverty 17.10% 15.70% 13.20%
*Race percentages for Eugene are from 2000, and for the U.S. and Lane County from
2008.
**Median Household Income for Eugene is from 2000, and for the U.S. and Lane County
is from 2008.
(U.S. Census Bureau 2010)
9Unemployment is a chronic problem in Oregon: Oregon's unemployment rate
(which was 5.5% in 2006) has only been lower than the national unemployment rate in
five of the last thirty-three years (Oregon Center for Public Policy 2006). This is in part
because Oregon has a lot of seasonal employment in natural resources, agriculture,
tourism and construction, where workers are only employed for part of a year (Oregon
Center for Public Policy 2006). It is also because, as in most areas of the country,
Oregon's manufacturing sector is declining while the number ofjobs in the service sector
is growing. For example, Oregon had 59,000 more manufacturing jobs (mostly in the
forest product industry) than service jobs in 1976. 5 By 2000, there were 187,000 more
service jobs than manufacturing jobs. In other words, the service sector grew from 16%
to 27% of the Oregon economy, while manufacturing declined from 23% to 15% in this
same time period (Oregon Center for Public Policy 2006). This is a major issue for
working families because most service sector jobs pay much less than manufacturing jobs
and often don't offer health benefits. In 2006-2007, 17.3% of Oregonians, or 649,000
individuals, did not have health insurance; this represents a 5.6% increase from 2000.
The impact of a growing low-wage sector in Oregon is also visible through a widening
income gap. For the poorest one-fifth of Oregonians, real income has decreased 17%
while for the top one-fifth, real income has increased 55% between 1979 and 2000
(Oregon Food Bank 2009).
As a result of high unemployment, lower wages and lack of access to health
insurance, Oregon has twice as many working families with children that are below the
poverty line than it did in 1979-81 (Oregon Center for Public Policy 2006). High
unemployment and the rise of low-wage jobs is compounded by the fact that buying a
home, going to college, and paying for childcare - important investments for working
families - have become less affordable over the last 20-30 years as well (Oregon Center
for Public Policy 2006:2). As of the most recent Lane County shelter count, which
includes Eugene, "approximately 1,200 men, women and children are sleeping in a
5 Here, "service jobs" refers to a job paying less than $30,000.
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homeless shelter on any given night. Because this number excludes homeless individuals
and families who are sleeping on the street, in cars, or with friends or family, the actual
Lane County count is likely two or three times higher (Shelter Care 2009).
Unfortunately, as the government has reduced spending on affordable housing, less than
30% of those who qualifY for low-income housing receive it in Lane County (Shelter
Care 2009). Food insecurity (not knowing where one's next meal will come from) is a
problem for Oregonians too. In 2005, nearly 750,000 Oregonians received food from
emergency food boxes. Moreover, for the last decade, Oregon's food insecurity and
hunger rates have been higher than the national average (Oregon Food Bank 2009).
Pursuing social sustainability in Eugene is certainly a laudable goal given the
range of serious social issues it faces, and its high number of indigent residents - 17.1%
of Eugene's population lives below the federal poverty line (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).
Some might argue that social justice is not an important facet of urban sustainability in
some places, but the state of social conditions in Eugene proves that addressing social
issues is an important part of achieving overall sustainability. Furthermore, the situation
in Eugene mirrors similar trends in other U.S. cities, where the high-wage manufacturing
sector is slipping away to the low-wage service sector, at the same time that neoliberal
policies draw funds away from critical social services.6 The result is greater social
inequality and more residents seeking good jobs, benefits, affordable housing and
transportation, and a healthy environment. Consequently, the framework of urban
sustainability, which seeks to simultaneously address social, environmental and economic
concerns, resonates greatly with residents struggling to achieve a good quality of life and
with city officials looking to build a healthy community.
Considering Eugene's history of concern for environmental, political, and social
problems, it is not surprising that Eugene Mayor Kitty Piercy pursued a sustainable
development framework to address important issues affecting Eugene's residents and the
6 I defme neoliberalism as a political movement advocating for economic liberalism as a means for
economic development. Neoliberal policies include free trade, privatization of public services, cutting
social spending and taxes, and reducing environmental and labor regulations (Harvey 2005).
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surrounding environment. One of Mayor Piercy's primary interests in creating a
sustainable business initiative was provoked by her having only narrowly won her
election against former City Councilor Nancy Nathanson. Nathanson was the Chamber
of Commerce-backed candidate, projecting herself, and being perceived as, the business-
friendly candidate (Pittman 2008). Given Piercy's desire to run for Mayor for a second
term and her need to have City Council and City Manager support while in office, Piercy
and some key supporters developed, "A Program for Jobs and a Healthy Eugene
Economy" during her 2004 Mayoral primary (Piercy, McLauchlan and Teninty 2004). It
is from this plan that the idea of a Sustainable Business Initiative (SBI) emerged.
Mayor Piercy appointed the SBI Task Force in April of2005 and it was approved
by the City Council that same month. This sixteen-member group, comprised of seven
business owners, two labor leaders, two environmental leaders, one educationalleader,~_
and four individuals representing different local nonprofit agencies from Eugene, was
charged with supporting and proposing "deliberate and thoughtful steps to strengthen the
local economy in a manner that fits the community and can make Eugene one of the
nation's most sustainable mid-size communities by 2020" (SBI TF 2006:8). The SBI TF
spent one year formulating the initiative with research and technical assistance from the
University of Oregon Resource Innovations program.
The TF met dozens oftimes throughout 2005-2006 to come up with
recommendations for how Eugene's economy, including its businesses and workplaces,
could become more sustainable. The TF was led by two co-chairs who were business
owners. In order to .come up with recommendations specifically around social equity,
economy, and environment, the TF formed three sub-committees to focus on these areas,
each of which was made ·up of three or four TF members. The TF also received
feedback on its development of the SBI recommendations through public roundtable
discussions, meetings with community organizations, web-based surveys, and a 50-
member Technical Advisory Committee.7 In the end, the outreach process for the SBI
7 See Appendix A for list of all SBI Technical Advisory Committee members.
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included 750 people (SBI TF 2006). At the end of this one-year period, the SBI TF
produced a report that outlined its recommendations for actions that the City
Government, private sector and nonprofits, and local governments and educational
institutions could adopt in order to benefit from or promote sustainable practices in
Eugene (SBI TF 2006).
The recommendations produced by the SBI TF were approved by the City
Council (2006) and were largely of an educational or incentive-based approach to
change. In other words, none of the recommendations were mandates for action or
regulatory in nature. In fact, the SBI TF mentions in its report that it consciously chose
to make 'incentive-based" recommendations, rather than "regulatory" recommendations
in order to encourage positive cooperation among the various participants. This does not
mean that the recommendations were not specific; many of the recommendations were
very specific, especially those that pertained to offering businesses procedural and
financial assistance to implement sustainable practices and related to meeting certain
environmental goals. Table 2 lists all the recommendations made by the SBI TF.
Since City Government is one of the few places to house multi-stakeholder, far-
reaching policy initiatives, the SBI was conceived of as a City Government-based
initiative and, as a result, many of the recommendations are aimed at the City
Government itself. One of the main recommendations to the City Government was to
establish an Office of Sustainability to institutionalize the practice of sustainability, as
well as a Sustainability Board or Commission to provide citizen oversight of the practice
of sustainability. Both were established in 2007 (City of Eugene City Council 2007).
Most Sustainability Commission members were identified by the Mayor and others from
those that served on the SBI TF; some Commission members were chosen through an
application process run by the Director of Sustainability. All then had to be appointed by
the City Council. Several of the other recommendations for City Government had to do
with the city supporting sustainable businesses through the city's purchasing power - by
purchasing and using sustainable practices, products and technologies, by following a
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"Triple Bottom Line" analysis for all policies and actions, and through development of a
sustainability indicators and measurement system. The final recommendation for City
Government involved educating city staff and partners (City of Eugene City Council
2006).
Table 2. SBI Task Force list of final recommendations for: Eugene City Government;
Private Sector and Nonprofits; and Local Governments and Educational Institutions.
Eugene City Government
Publicly commit to supporting businesses that use sustainable practices and/or produce sustainable
products and services.
Establish an Office of Sustainability within City Government to highlight the City's commitment to
sustainability and to champion and coordinate internal City sustainability activities.
Establish a Sustainability Board or Commission to help expand sustainability efforts within City
government and externally within the business community.
Adopt the explicit goal of becoming carbon neutral in all City owned facilities by 2020 and develop an
internal City climate action plan to achieve that goal.
Purchase and use sustainable practices, products and technologies.
Adopt sustainability criteria for decision making in all aspects of City operations, beginning with a
policy requiring staff to complete a Triple Bottom Line analysis of proposed policies or actions for city
council, and with a sustainable purchasing policy.
Adopt the explicit goal of achieving zero waste to landfills (and incinerators) from City facilities and
operations by 2020 and develop an internal City plan to achieve that goal.
Adopt sustainability indicators and a measurement system to assess internal City operations as well as
community-wide progress toward sustainability.
Education and enhance the professional skills and understanding of sustainability among City
employees.
Provide incentives and recognition for businesses using sustainable practices and remove barriers to
their use.
Form partnerships with private, public and non-profit entities in order to playa key role in the growth
of sustainability practices, products and services.
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Table 2. (continued).
Private Sector and Nonprofits
Help all interested local businesses apply or expand sustainability measures.
Commit to expanding sustainable business clusters.
Recruit new businesses that can fill niches and increase dynamism within existing sustainable clusters.
Help businesses in key sustainability sectors form local associations or networking mechanisms to
increase communication and solve common problems.
Implement campaigns to education the public and grow the local market for sustainable products and
services.
Improve access to loans, grants, and other forms of business financing.
Form a task force among business owners and organizations, workers and their representatives, non-
profits, local governments and others to discuss ways to enhance social equity among area workers.
Local Governments and Educational Institutions
Support the local consortium on sustainability in public education organized by Lane Community
College.
Develop and operate a consortium to provide sustainability education, training and technical assistance
for local businesses.
Develop a metro-area wide consortium, adopt a goal of becoming carbon neutral by 2020, and
implement a metro-area wide climate action plan to achieve that goal.
Develop a metro-area wide consortium, adopt a gaol of achieving zero waste to landfills (and
incineration) by 2020, and implement a metro-area wide zero waste strategy to achieve that goal.
(SBI TF 2006a).
For the private and nonprofit sector, the Task Force's recommendations center on
assisting local businesses and nonprofits to obtain information, tools, and financing for
implementing certain sustainable practices. It also recommends that business and
organizational networks be created among those pursuing sustainabi1ity in an effort to
support each other. Lastly, it suggests using public educational campaigns to "grow the
local market for sustainable products and services" (SBI TF 2006a:6). Recommendations
for other local governments and educational institutions mainly involve these two sectors
coordinating to provide education to the public on sustainabi1ity. Specifically, the TF
proposes that a metro-area consortium of institutions, organizations and government
agencies be created to achieve carbon neutrality and zero waste to landfills by 2020 (SBI
TF 2006a).
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The SBI TF recommendations varied in their level of specificity but, at the same
time, sent a clear message as to where the majority of city officials' efforts should be
focused - providing educational opportunities for individuals and business owners to
learn how to implement and benefit from sustainable practices, setting up specific
programs that financially support and assist businesses that adopt sustainable practices,
and having the City Government lead by example in terms of adopting 'sustainable
practices. Regarding social equity, the recommendations do not directly address any of
the workplace or community-wide social equity concerns raised by the SBI TF social
equity sub-committee. Furthermore, even though social equity is continually cited as one
of three legs of the sustainability stool, it ends up having no real presence in the final
recommendations of the TF. In the Final Report, the TF states that even though social
equity is one ofthree major components to their definition of sustainability, it was the
most difficult aspect to address:
The Task Force found it much easier to identify mechanisms to promote the
economic and environmental aspects of the Triple Bottom Line than the social
equity components ... .In the end the Task Force determined that it had just
scratched the surface on social equity issues....The SBI Task Force encourages
Eugene City Government and the community at large to pursue additional actions
to address social equity issues (SBI TF 2006a:9).
Yet no additional actions for addressing sustainability and equity issues related to the
workforce - a main ingredient of business operations - are proposed or even mentioned.
And this is despite the fact that the social equity sub-committee of the TF developed very
specific ideas for addressing equity issues such as paying at or above a living wage,
providing health and retirement benefits, offering a flexible work schedule, offering
opportunities for career advancement, and supporting workers' rights. Some SBI
members assumed the Sustainability Commission or Office of Sustainability would find a
way to address the social justice component of sustainability, but they offered no specific
plan or ideas for how these entities would do that. Members of the SBI TF social equity
sub-committee produced a separate report during the SBI process that reinforced the
importance of including social equity concerns in the SBI, which was based on focus
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group interviews with local workers who identified specific social equity indicators that
were most important to them (Bussel, Feekin and Syrett 2006).
The TF's lack of recommendations around social equity and its main conclusion
regarding social equity - for it to be studied further - coupled with other important
factors, motivated my research. Mayor Piercy was committed to a vision of sustainability
that included social equity and, more generally, the Eugene community has been
nationally recognized for being socially and environmentally driven. Given this
situation, why was Eugene unable to incorporate social equity into its SBI, given that it
was a publicly declared and pursued goal from the beginning of the initiative? Beyond
the Mayor's SBI, as hundred of cities in the United States and even the national
government undertakes sustainability initiatives and programs, how can social equity
have a meaningful role in sustainability? More specifically, did Eugene lack certain
ingredients for incorporating social equity into its vision and recommendations for
sustainability that other cities may contain and build upon to ensure that sustainability
efforts address people's critical need for good jobs, benefits, affordable housing, a
healthy environment and more? Or, are there structural barriers to incorporating social
equity into sustainability efforts that extend beyond Eugene's particular circumstance?
Beyond Cities: The State of Sustainability Programs and Policies
As a result of a significant political and economic shift that has occurred since this
research study commenced in 2005, my research has taken on much broader significance.
Not only do numerous city governments continue to take on sustainability programs and
initiatives to deal with their most pressing problems, but the sustainability discourse has
now been picked up at the national level with the election of President Obama (Living
Cities 2009).8 Yet, the ever-increasing use of a sustainability framework at various
8 City officials from more than 500 U.S. cities participate in SustainLane's program for Advancing Cross-
Sector Sustainable Development for State and Local Government (SustainLane Government 2010).
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political levels has not created corollary growth in the discussion of social equity as it
relates to sustainability. In other words, once again, a concept that has become widely
recognized for its ability to balance three major societal concerns - social equity,
economic prosperity, and environmental health - comes up short in terms of addressing
social equity concerns. In this respect, I hope that this study's research on the failure to
include social justice in the Eugene SBI helps to shed light on larger forces within the
United States that marginalize discussions of social inequity, social sustainability and the
needs and desires of working families.
Since this research study began in 2005, the use of the sustainability framework to
concurrently take up social, environmental and economic concerns has expanded from
the city level to the national level. Over the last five years, the political situation in the
United States, particularly around the issues examined herein, has changed considerably.
The public discussion of environmental issues, such as climate change, has both
expanded and deepened, bringing an awareness of the planet's beleaguered environment
to an unprecedented level across various social groups (Hawken 2007). Then, in 2007,
the financial crisis in the United States and other world markets, including the housing
market crisis, the bank "bail-outs," the fall of the "Big Two" automakers (GM and
Chrysler), and historically high unemployment and foreclosure levels, called into.
question many aspects of the U.S.'s political and economic situation. (Herbert
2008:A23). To some extent, the neoliberal policies that were introduced and maintained
by Reagan, Clinton, and the two Bush administrations, such as deregulation of markets,
economic subsidies to corporations, and tax breaks for the wealthy, are being publicly
questioned and, in fact, the effectiveness of our whole economic system is being
questioned (Krugman 2009:A19). And while Obama's response to the financial crisis
from 2008-2010, like the stimulus package and other financial recovery programs, is far
from a suite of government programs to redistribute wealth like Roosevelt's New Deal, it
still marks a major shift in the role of government vis-a.-vis regulation and concern for
working families. The adoption of sweeping health care reform- the Patient Protection
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and Affordable Care Act- has been called "the most expansive social legislation enacted
in decades" and best represents the U.S. government's shifting role (Stolberg and Pear
20l0:A19).
In 2008, U.S. voters elected President Barack Obama, who ran on a social and
economic platform distinctly different than the policies advocated by George W. Bush, or
Obama's opponent, John McCain (Republican AZ). Obama responded to the concerns of
middle-class families on issues such as jobs, mortgages, retirement, and paying for
college, the need for government to playa role in controlling the economy, the
importance of addressing environmental issues, and working with other countries to
achieve national and global goals (Organizing for America 2010). In fact, Obama took
his concern for providing jobs and meeting middle class needs, as well as addressing
environmental degradation, and deemed his economic development proposal a "Green
New Deal" or "Green Recovery" (Stolberg 2010). In essence, he combined job growth
concerns with environmental concerns to create what this study refers to as an
"alternative economic development" platform (Organizing for America 2010).9 During
his campaign for the presidency and through his first year in office, Obama has expressed
his desire to build a "clean energy economy."lO Upon being elected, Obama even signed
an executive order that sets sustainability goals for federal agencies (West 2009). This is
fascinating because when Mayor Piercy of Eugene proposed creating a Sustainable
Business Initiative in 2004, which I also categorize as an alternative economic
development program, it did not appear possible that a similar program would be
proposed at the national level any time soon given Bush's attacks on environmental
9 This study uses the phrase alternative economic development to mean a platform that prioritizes economic
health as well as community well-being and environmental health. This topic will be a central theme of
Chapters III and IV.
10 In some ways, the fmandal crisis intensified politicians calls around the world for investment in
renewable energy, energy efficiency, etc. to create "green jobs": "Meeting targets on greenhouse gas
emissions and improving energy security will require hundreds ofbillions of dollars of investment in
renewable technologies, and this opens up the attractive prospect of an explosive growth in jobs in these
new industries at a time when more traditional jobs are disappearing" (Harvey 2010).
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protection and regulation and, more importantly, his general disinterest in addressing
environmental issues.
Building on his (alternative) economic development platform, and relevant to this
study's research, Obama committed to passing domestic climate change legislation
within his first two months of office; indeed, in 2009, the House ofRepresentatives
passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act - a national climate and energy bill
(RR. 2454). In addition, Obama guided the U.S. House to sign the Bill prior to the
United Nations' Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meetings in
November 2009, so that the rest of the world would see that the United States is
committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions (CNN 2010). Obama has also
indicated that the United States is on board with the rest ofthe world to sign a new Kyoto
Protocol agreement and, while this did not happen in 2009, Obama did attend the United
Nation's Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meetings in
Copenhagen in November 2009 (CNN 2009). Obama also approved $200 billion in
funding for technology and workforce development related to renewable energy and
energy efficiency programs through his Stimulus package (Benjamin and Goldman
2009). Finally, Obama was also a major force in raising emissions and mileage standards
for automobiles and light-duty trucks (LDVs) to help reduce greenhouse gas emissions
from the U.S. vehicle fleet (Broder 2010:B1).
The creation of "green jobs" comes up almost daily in the popular media since
Obama's election, and especially in relation to creating clean energy jobs through the
stimulus packages that have been passed over the last year. Following up on his
commitment to revive the U.S. economy with green jobs - new jobs based in
environmentally sensitive or energy-saving industries, such as constructing solar panels
and building hybrid cars - Obama appointed Van Jones to the White House as the Green
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Jobs Czar (Terry 2010:A19)Y Jones chose to resign from the administration in
September 2009 due to numerous attacks on his past political positions from
conservatives (Broder 2009). Still, Jones' appointment marked significant movement in
the national discussion on the environment, social justice and the economy; not only
because it demonstrated that the Obama administration is attempting to address our dire
environmental situation, but also because Jones represents a different side of the
environmental movement than that normally involved in U.S. national politics.
The environmental movement is largely known as a white, middle and upper-class
social movement, but Jones' environmentalism has long been rooted in urban,
environmental justice issues (Bullard 2005; Speth 2008). Jones had worked for more
than a decade building a grassroots environmental and social justice movement in
Oakland, California, trying to keep poor youth of color from being incarcerated by
facilitating their training and employment in "green" jobs. In fact, Jones founded two
organizations committed to social justice, environmentalism and green jobs: The Ella
Baker Center for Human Rights and Green for All (Ella Baker Center 2010). In short,
Jones' appointment as a young, gay, black man from the environmental justice movement
to the environmental cabinet of the President's administration represents a big step from
1990, when the most prominent environmental justice (EJ) leaders in the United States
wrote a letter to the "Big 10" (the ten largest national environmental organizations in the
United States) (Matsuoka 2001). In this letter, EJ leaders criticized the Big 10
organizations for racist environmentalism, which included the absence of people of color
represented in the "Big 10" organizations, as well as the "Big 10' s" myopic focus on
protecting pristine wilderness- deemed playgrounds for mainly white, middle and upper
class people. As an alternative, EJ leaders pointed out that the Big 10 could extend their
work to environmental issues affecting low-income, communities of color around the
11 Greenjobs can be defmed as: Blue-collar employment that has been upgraded to better respect the
environment; Family-supporting, career-track, vocational, or trade-level employment in environmentally-
friendly fields. Examples: electricians who install solar panels; plumbers who install solar water heaters;
farmers engaged in organic agriculture and some bio-fuel production; and construction workers who build
energy-efficient green buildings, wind power farms, solar farms, and wave energy farms (Jones 2008).
..._--_ .._--------
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world. Jones' appointment and the explosion of the green jobs discourse are relevant to
this research study because they connect concerns for the environment with concerns for
social equity and working families, particularly with respect to job availability and
security.. Also significant to the U.S. public discussion on environmental issues is the
Obama administration's newly formed, "Sustainable communities and public
transportation" committee ofthe Housing and Urban Development Department. Through
Department of Labor grants, Obama has also rallied support for the Emerald Cities
program, a building retrofit program implemented in several U.S. cities. Emerald Cities is
a government-run energy-efficiency program that reduces energy costs for low-income
residents and, at the same time, provides jobs for the hard-hit building trades sector.
Civil Society Organizations Embrace Sustainability
Since 2005, more and more nongovernmental organizations are embracing the
concept of sustainability as well. University programs that specifically research and
instruct on sustainability are cropping up, like the City University ofNew York's
Institute for Sustainable Cities and the University of Southern California's Center for
Sustainable Cities. This means students are now earning degrees specifically in the study
of sustainability. Also at the college level, university presidents are becoming signatories
to sustainability and climate change commitments. For example, there are now 620
signatories to the American College and University Presidents Climate Commitment,
which requires universities to do an emissions inventory, take immediate steps to
decrease greenhouse gases, integrate sustainability into their curriculum and make
sustainability a part of students' overall educational experience. Fourteen universities
and colleges have signed on to this challenge in Oregon alone. Similarly, 350 university
presidents in 40 countries now belong to "University Leaders for a Sustainable Future."
This commitment requires universities to support sustainability as a critical focus of
teaching, research, operations, and outreach through publications, research and
assessment. Universities' engagement with sustainability is just one example of how
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sustainability is sweeping through political, economic and social debates in the United
States and around the world.
Many international governmental and nongovernmental institutions are
concentrating on cities and sustainability. Numerous reports over the last 20 years have
emphasized that cities need to playa leading role in achieving sustainability; these
include: 1987 Brundtland Report (World Commission on Sustainable Development),
1990 Green Paper on the Urban Environment (Commission of the European
Communities), 1998 Sustainable Urban Development in the European Union: A
Framework for Action (Commission of the European Communities), and 2004 Towards a
Thematic Strategy on the Urban Environment (Commission of the European
Communities) (Bulkeley and Betsill 2005). Recent United Nations (UN) initiatives, such
as Agenda 21 and Habitat II Agenda, which have been adopted by numerous European
cities, specifically address the problems of urban environmental degradation and urban
poverty12 (Mahadevia 2000). In 1992, 172 countries committed to the goals of Agenda
21, including social equity, environmental protection, and a stable economy (European
Commission 2004). In addition, the international community is starting to focus more on
the urban indigent, mainly women and children of color, and how they are
disproportionately burdened by environmental hazards and excluded from prosperity
(Mahadevia 2000). International organizations' attempt to simultaneously tackle social
and environmental concerns demonstrates the significance of scholars and practitioners
elucidation of the relationship between these issues.
12 Agenda 21 was created as a blueprint for the 21 st Century for sustainable development by the United
Nations (UN). It outlines policies to be adopted at the local, national, and international level by
governments, UN organizations, and other organizations. The document is over 900 pages long with four
main sections on sustainable development: social and economic dimensions; conservation and
management of resources for development; strengthening the role ofmajqr groups; and means of
implementation (United Nations 1992b). UN Habitat's twin goals are achieving sustainable cities and
adequate shelter for all. UN Habitat Agenda expands on previous UN initiatives by focusing on the
importance of including non-governmental partners in sustainable development efforts (United Nations
1992b).
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Green Capitalism: Sustainability and the Business Sector
Surprisingly, the growth in sustainability discussion and efforts may be most
evident among the business sector, where sustainability is being built into businesses'
strategic and marketing plans, and used to assuage stakeholders and consumers interested
in investing in companies that are socially and environmentally conscious as well as
financially viable. According to the Beyond Gray Pinstripes study, approximately 45%
of U.S. university-based business schools required students to take courses on
sustainability, ethics, and social responsibility in 2003, up from 34% in 2000 O\Jachrnan-
Hunt 2005). Furthermore, this study also identified 36 graduate business schools in
different parts of the world that are specializing in offering students an education in the
''triple bottom line."
The membership of the World Business Council on Sustainable Development
(WBCSD), an organization run by over 200 business leaders focused on business and
sustainable development, has been steadily growing since it was formed in the early
1990s (WBCSD 2005). Focused on the important role businesses and business leaders
can play in achieving sustainability, WBCSD has more than 1,000 members from more
than 35 countries and 20 major industrial sectors. They focus on a range of social and
environmental sustainability issues including assisting businesses to meet the emissions-
reduction targets of the Kyoto Protocol and the United Nation's Millennium
Development Goals around income, health, and education (WBCSD 2010).
Over the last ten to fifteen years, many business owners have begun to instruct
their businesses not only on the financial bottom line but also on how their business'
contribute socially and environmentally - "this more conscience-led capitalism seeks to
synergize environmental restoration, social justice, and financial sustainability. Triple-
bottom-line management recognizes that yes, businesses need to make a profit, but those
profits should not corne at the expense of people or the planet" (Danaher, Biggs and Mark
2007:202). In the United States, the Co-op America Business Network provides a good
gauge of business owners' increasing interest in using their businesses to create social
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and environmental change; the network includes more than 3,000 businesses committed
to harnessing "economic power - the strength of consumers, investors, businesses, and
the marketplace - to create a socially just and environmentally sustainable society
(Green America 2010). There are over 100 businesses in Oregon that are included in the
Co-op America Business Network of which more than a dozen businesses are from
Eugene, OR.
Also a huge part of businesses' interest in sustainability and the triple bottom line
is its marketing potential. This kind of engagement with sustainability from the business
sector has led to the rise ofthe term "greenwashing," indicating a business' attempt to
exude environmental and social sustainability values without actually making their
business less environmentally or socially destructive; in other words, greenwashing can
be applied to anyone who makes false or disingenuous environmental claims. "When
environmentalism went mainstream, green (both the color and the word) was hijacked by
businesses as a visual clue to suggest that this, that or the other product was ecologically
sound" (Rawsthorn 2010). At any rate, either as a marketing strategy or because of a
genuine interest in running a more environmentally and socially sensitive business,
businesses have become very involved in sustainability practices and policy
development.
Conclusion
In terms ofthis study, the emergence ofa strong green economy, green jobs
discussion at the local, state and national levels of politics makes my research more
important and timely. While there is a more vibrant discussion of environmental issues
occurring because of President Obama's attention to rebuilding our economy through
green industry and jobs, the discourse is not firmly rooted in a concern for justice and
equity. This study focuses on the integration of environmental and social equity issues as
integral to the particular time and place in which we reside, which is marked by an
opening ofpolitical, social, and cultural opportunity.
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These shifts in rhetoric and action have two main affects on this research study.
On the one hand, they affect my research because city politics are very much connected
to national politics and Eugene, my case study, is bound to feel the impact of this change
at the national level. On the other hand, because the current discourse on "green
economies" and "sustainability" has attained a more prominent position on the U.S.
national stage, the findings of this research study appear to suddenly have farther reach.
This farther reach is forecast, both because I believe the sustainability discussion
will expand and deepen even more than it has since 2005, and because my curiosity in
how social justice is reflected in sustainability may now play out on the national stage.
Moreover, due to a lack of inaction at the national level during most ofthe first decade of
the Twentieth Century, cities often addressed sustainability issues more actively than did
the national government. Therefore, this study's research at the urban level focuses on
the roots of what is now a national political discourse on sustainability. Understanding
the challenges cities face in addressing social equity in their sustainability initiatives will
inform the ensuing national dialogue.
While the shift in sustainability discussion at the national level may affect how
cities address sustainability in the future, I do not think the increased attention to
sustainability at the national level will make this study's urban-based findings any less
relevant for several reasons. First, in many ways, cities are a microcosm of national level
politics and the forces at play at the urban level are similar to those at play at the national
level. Second, regardless of their bad reputation in the United States, historically, cities
have been incubators of social, economic and cultural change. In other words, political
struggles at the city level often precede struggles at the state and national levels, and
blaze the path for similar changes to occur at the national level. Third, the current case
study is focused on a city that has been highly recognized for its sustainability work and,
generally, its progressive politics; if Eugene cannot develop a comprehensive
sustainability program, then other cities must engage in a thorough and honest discussion
about the possibilities in their own cities.
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In conclusion, the expansion of the sustainability and alternative economic
development discourse, including a general broadening and deepening of environmental
concerns and their connection to reviving the economy, makes this research study
extremely timely. Understanding the reasons for the inclusion or exclusion of social
justice concerns in sustainability (or alternative economic development) programs is
essential to understanding how the United States can move forward in a way that reduces
our impact on the environment and improves quality of life, especially for those with the
greatest social needs.
Research Questions
How is social equity constructed, contested and acted upon in Eugene's SBI?
There have been numerous studies on the practical challenges cities face in
implementing sustainability policies, but those are not the focus of this study. This study
concentrates on the broader social, political and economic forces shaping urban
sustainability efforts including the role of key actors, and the social and political struggles
that mark how sustainability is conceived and defined. Studies of the technical issues
related to sustainability, such as traffic management, architectural design, institutional
restructuring, green technologies, etc. often view each city as dislocated from other cities,
nation-states, and the international context (Dobson 1999). I think the technical issues
posing barriers to achieving sustainability can be overcome; while the political issues
surrounding sustainability and social equity that are the real challenge to achieving
sustainability.
This study begins with the assumption that broader political, economic, and social
processes at different levels of government and community create a dynamic interaction
whereby sustainability discourse and action, including its relation to social equity, is
shaped and determined (Dobson 1999). A few processes stand out. The local impacts of
neoliberal economic policies, such as government investment in private economic
development while divesting in public services, has created a political and economic
---------------
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dynamic in which cities want to provide for their citizens but are limited by the need to
support and attract business through deregulation of business activities. The emergence
of citizen-led decision making processes in which governments facilitate citizen boards to
oversee government activities or to propose policy has allowed for more civic
participation, but often such participation is not facilitated properly, and an unequal
power imbalance among citizen groups leads to faulty decisions. Lastly, sustainability as
a concept vague enough on its face to gamer broad support, and as a movement capable
of bringing together broad coalitions to move policies for greater sustainability, creates
somewhat of a counter-weight to the larger process of neoliberalism, generating the
terrain for significant political struggle. More specifically, this study closely examines the
political contest over social equity that occurred between the major players in the
Mayor's SBL This research identifies and explains the political challenges and
opportunities in addressing social equity in City Government-based sustainability efforts,
specifically honing in on the tensions felt by a Mayor when bringing multiple interest
groups together around a common issue, the power brought to bear on such a process by
interest groups and individual personalities, and the possibility of building a more unified
community as well as a new green economy in the process.
How is social equity framed in the Mayor's SBI? How does this compare to how it is
framed in other sustainability efforts?
How social equity is framed in sustainability efforts reveals a great deal about
how social equity will be addressed in sustainability efforts. Unlike other concepts that
may be well-defined or have broad agreement regarding their meaning, the concept of
sustainability lacks clarity. Despite (or perhaps because of) its popularity, the conception
and definition of sustainability is highly contested (Hallsmith 2003; Agyeman and Evans
2003). In Blueprint for a Green Economy, Pearce, Markandya, and Barbier (1989) quote
24 different definitions of sustainable development - and many more exist. Despite the
widespread support that exists for sustainability, there remains continued obscurity of the
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concept. Chapter II identifies the range of ways sustainability is conceptualized and
defined in relation to social equity. When examining various conceptualizations of
sustainability, including the Mayor's SBI, this study examines how the three legs of the .
sustainability stool - social, economic, and environmental - are defined, contested, and
prioritized in relation to each other. In addition, this study asks what comprises the
competing definitions of sustainability, and the nature of the relationship between the
social, economic, and environmental components in each definition? For example, is
social equity on equal footing with the environmental and economic aspects of
sustainability or is social equity considered a core concern of sustainability efforts? Or,
how does the conceptualization of one component impact the realization of the other
components?
The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) definition of
sustainability is the most commonly used. It defines sustainability as "development that
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their needs" (WCED 1987; Agyeman and Evans 2003). This definition does not
explicitly refer to social justice or equity. In fact, most definitions of sustainability do not
include such references. In an analysis of 579 applications to the Environmental
Protection Agency's 1996 Sustainable Development Challenge Grant Program, the
Environmental Law Institute (ELI) found that less than 5% of the applications listed
equity as a goal of their project (ELI, 1999).
To better understand why economics and the environment have overshadowed
social equity concerns in sustainability efforts, a closer examination of the relationship
between the "three legs of the sustainability stool"- economy, environment and social
concerns - is necessary (Dobson 1999). Of particular interest are the different economic
rationales that inform the concept of sustainability. These differing economic rationales
shape our understanding of what it means to have a healthy economy, which in tum alters
our definition of sustainability, resulting in a distinct vision of the proper relationship
between economics, environment, and society in sustainability initiatives (Daly 1996).
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The sustainability literature has generally categorized various definitions as strong
or weak. Those definitions that do address social equity are referred to as "strong", not
just because oftheir strong orientation to social justice, but also because "strong"
definitions assume that a paradigm shift is necessary to achieve complete sustainability
(Haughton and Hunter 1994). "Weak" definitions of sustainability, such as the WeED
definition (1987), assume increased economic growth is still the main goal, regardless of
environmental and social concerns, and that small tweaks to the current system will be
enough to reach environmental, economic, and social sustainability (Haughton and
Hunter 1994).
The main characteristic of weak definitions of sustainability is that economic
growth is the main priority for urban policies. It is assumed that environmental and
social improvements will follow from vigorous economic growth (Bugliarello 2006).
Strong definitions of sustainability, arising from the more radical Deep Green or Deep
Ecology backgrounds, view economic growth as the cause of social inequality and
environmental degradation (Daly 1996; Haughton and Hunter 1994; Seabrook 1990).
Following this argument, weak sustainability efforts are critiqued for their unwillingness
to introduce measures that might reduce the rate of economic growth. In addition,
approaches that propose increased economic growth and technological innovation to
reach sustainability take a reactionary approach to environmental crisis, rather than
prioritizing the prevention of environmental crisis (Daly 1996; Haughton and Hunter
1994; Seabrook 1990).
Prominent sustainability thinker, Herman Daly in his book "Beyond Growth"
(1996), also brings attention to the role of economic growth in sustainability. As
economic growth relates to addressing environmental problems, Daly critiques
individuals and institutions, such as the World Bank (WB), that argue that increased
economic growth leads to an improved environment and a reduction in poverty (Daly
1996). For Daly, the economy exists within a finite natural environment. While the WB
advocates for increased economic growth in the Global North to address environmental
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degradation and poverty, Daly argues that the North's economic growth actually leads to
less resources and ecological space on a global level, creating increased global income
inequality and political tensions (1996). Clearly, thinkers such as Daly and the WB have
drastically different approaches to addressing social, environmental, and economic
problems, yet both lay claim to the concept of sustainability. On this point, Daly argues
that maintaining a vague definition of sustainability is a strategic tactic for the WB and
others who rely on increased economic growth, because it allows them "to continue
business as usual" (1996:9). Consequently, Daly's attention to the different approaches
to economic growth in sustainability sheds light on the "triple bottom line" definition of
sustainability, the one used by the Mayor's SBI: social, environmental and economic
health should be mutually reinforcing goals, but if economic growth is defined solely as a
quantitative increase in the size of the economy (such as measured by Gross National
Product rather than a more qualitative measurement such as the Human Development
Index) then the social, economic, and environmental components are sure to conflict
(Daly 1996: 13).
Defining sustainability is not a straightforward process for Daly, however, as he
believes appropriate definitions will arise out of particular social, political and cultural
contexts that create their own definitions - "it is subject to multiple conceptions and
continuous revision, the very stuff of politics" (1996:7). Yet, Daly offers his example of
a strong definition of sustainability: "sustainability is the scope, quality, richness, and
benignity of human culture, the biosphere and the economic life we make from them, and
the distribution of those benefits, both now and over time" (1996:8). These varying
explanations of the role of economic growth in achieving sustainability indicate the
importance of this research project's goal of uncovering how the three components of
sustainability - the economic, environmental, and social - are conceived of, framed, and
ultimately prioritized in relation to each other by the main participants in the SBI's
formulation.
------ --------------
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In short, this section on the competing definitions of sustainability demonstrates
that the concept of urban sustainability hasn't been fully developed. More specifically,
the relationship between the social, economic, and environmental components of
sustainability have not been comprehensively theorized (Bugliarello 2006). Moreover,
some scholars have argued that it is at the urban level that environmental problems are
more experientally obvious because resources are being consumed en masse and
environmental degradation is centralized in the city (Daly 1989; Daly 1996). However,
Haughton and Hunter (1994) point out that cities, particularly in the United States, have
been viewed with disdain for quite some time despite the fact that there is a high level of
urbanization- 80% of U.S. residents live in cities.
Cities have been characterized as unnatural places to live, and a return to rural
forms of living posited as the best solution to environmental degradation (Dunlap and
Michelson 2002). Today, however, after years of continual urbanization, the need to
focus on how cities can be designed in a way that addresses environmental and social
issues is paramount (Haughton and Hunter 1994; Bugliarello 2006). New York Times
architectural critic, Nicolai Ouroussoff, uniquely describes the convergence of
sustainability and attention on cities: "The country has fallen on hard times, but those of
us who love cities know we have been living in the dark ages for a while now" (2009).
Ouroussoff was referring to the fact that cities in the United States are finally being
recognized as places of opportunity - for individuals looking for a high quality oflife
that has less impact on the natural environment. In short, a comprehensive examination
of urban sustainability is necessary, including a better understanding of the relationship
between social, environmental, and economic needs as well as the ways in which
definitions of the different components of sustainability will affect the achievement and
implementation of the other components.
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Who are the main actors or interest groups involved in the Mayor's SEl? What are their
visions, goals and strategyfor social equity and sustainability with respect to the
Mayor's SEl?
Deeply interconnected with the question of how social equity is framed in
sustainability efforts, is who is involved in the efforts? Identifying the main actors and/or
interest groups engaged in sustainability efforts, such as the SBI, facilitates the process of
understanding the competing visions, goals and strategies being pursued by actors within
the initiative. As explained above, because the concept of sustainability is widely
supported but lacks clear definition, a situation has emerged in which there is ample
space for various urban interest groups to support sustainability efforts by defining
sustainability in a way that best suits their own interests. In essence, the term
sustainability has become extremely malleable politically and, thus, highly contested.
The political contest regarding sustainability becomes particularly heated when it takes
place in the context of economic development (how to attract and foster businesses with
good jobs that use sustainable practices and produce sustainable products), as it did with
the Mayor's SBI. Over the past ten to twenty years, interest groups, such as the
traditional business community, have invested a lot politically and financially into
influencing city-based policies. As a result, they have a deep stake in the policy
recommendations and outcomes that emerge from processes such as the SBI. The
Mayor's SBI in Eugene represents one specific context in which this broader political and
social contest occurred regarding the concept of sustainability.
This study's research on the SBI examined the roles of city officials, businesses
and business associations, labor unions, environmental groups and some social justice
organizations in forming and producing the final recommendations of the SBI. These
groups were the main players in the political contest that occurred around social justice
and sustainability in the Mayor's SBI. Each interest group (and even individuals within
these groups) had its own way of defining sustainability, understanding the relationship
between the social, economic, and environmental components of sustainability, and its
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own formulation for incorporating, or not incorporating, social equity into the Final
Recommendations of the SBI.
Several schools of theory shed light on the individuals and interest groups
involved in the SBI, what their stakes in the SBI were, and the strategies they used to
pursue their goals for the SBI. According to growth machine theorists, such as Logan
and Molotch (1987), local elites and business coalitions have a deep stake in the growth
of the local economy and are powerful actors shaping city policy (Dunlap and Michelson
2002; Molotch 1976). As a business initiative, there was significant involvement in the
SBI by the business community, both by individual business owners and by business
coalition members, but how were they able to influence a process initiated by the Mayor,
a known social justice and environmental advocate? These coalitions of local elites are
often adept at influencing local policy by equating economic growth to job growth-
"growth creates jobs!" (Dunlap and Michelson 2002; Molotch 1976). Job creation was a
central component of the SBI, and thus was necessarily coupled with economic growth.
The Los Angeles School (LA School) views the government as largely serving the
interests of local elites and businesses, although the LA School focuses more on the
fragmentation taking place in today's cities as a result of globalization, economic
restructuring, fragmentation by race, class, gender and sexuality, and the rise of minority
populations. The LA School refers to city government as a "shadow government" - a
privatized proto-government - that is rarely accountable to the public and responsible
primarily to wealth (Dear 2002: 17). The LA School also calls attention to the effects of
neoliberal policies on cities, especially the deregulation of the economy and the reduction
in non-market entitlements, such as public amenities like parks, beaches, libraries, and
playgrounds. Mike Davis calls it a "de facto disinvestment in traditional public space and
recreation" and a redirection of monies to "corporate-defined redevelopment priorities"
(2002:325). The LA School perspective offers insight into the approach the SBI TF takes
regarding the role of government in addressing social equity and sustainability. What
role will the city government have in implementing sustainability policies in Eugene?
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Will government regulation or incentivization drive the effort to create a more sustainable
Eugene? Will there be public accountability built into the SBI recommendations? And
what will the funding priorities be with respect to addressing social equity and
sustainability?
Moreover, a person or group's purpose in engaging sustainability has vast
implications for how social equity efforts are addressed. For example, will sustainability
goals be implemented through incentivization or regulation? This depends largely on
who or what one identifies as the drivers of change toward a more sustainable city - for
example, is it businesses driving economic growth as the Chamber of Commerce argues
or is it action from the citizens most affected by development, as leaders of labor-
community coalitions for regional equity argue?
The role of race, class, gender and educational attainment is another important
dimension of exploring who the main actors of the SBI are. Since this study is
specifically exploring how social equity is addressed in the SBI, it is important to identify
which social groups are involved in the process. Diaz, a scholar of urban planning
processes, argues that it is imperative that socially disadvantaged residents are involved
in city processes that will have a direct impact upon them (2005). However, socially
disadvantaged residents are often left out of these processes (Diaz 2005; Hsiao and Liu
2002; DeFillippis and North 2004). I consider the composition of the SBI TF, TAC and
the public outreach meetings to be an important dimension ofhow social equity is
addressed in the SBI.
As part of this research question, which identifies and examines the key actors
and their goals, visions and strategies for the SBI, this study explores how the Mayor's
SBI experience compares to urban sustainability efforts in other U.S. cities. Does the
composition of those involved with the SBI, business owners and business associations,
labor unions, environmental groups, city officials and social justice advocates, look the
same or different in other U.S. sustainability efforts? Is the relative power of these
different actors and interest groups in influencing the process the same or different in
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other U.S. urban sustainability efforts? And, finally, does the social makeup ofthose
involved differ from the Eugene experience?
How does the current urban political-economic context shape the ways in which city
officials, interest groups, and citizens make use ofthe concept ofsustainability and, more
importantly, what are the implications ofthis for socially just sustainability?
In my analysis of the Mayor's SBI and social equity, urban political-economic
forces set the stage for how urban sustainability efforts like the SBI emerge. Several
major political-economic factors are currently shaping urban processes in significant
ways. These include the decisions that city officials make regarding economic and/or
sustainable development and the demands that citizens and interest groups make upon
city government. Some ofthe factors that have come to light in the process of studying
the SBI and which have been examined more closely to better understand how they
impact the Mayor's SBI and its addressing social equity are: the decline of the
manufacturing sector and the subsequent rise of the low-wage, service sector economy;
the intensification of urbanization and the increase in the gap between the urban rich and
poor; the shifting role of city governance toward a more expanded and perforated
structure; a lack of funding at the city level; and the expectation that city governments
will be more entrepreneurial. All of these political-economic forces indicate why various
individuals and interest groups were involved with the SBI, their goals and strategies for
the SBI, and what they hoped to achieve through the SBI.
A concurrent decline in manufacturing and rise in the service sector has created a
highly unequal economy in many cities (Sassen 1990, 2001), including Eugene, as
manufacturing jobs in the timber industry have drastically declined and a growing high-
tech industry has not produced a proportionate number ofjobs. A growing service sector
creates new wealth, but not for all people; women, immigrants, and people of color are
often excluded from the benefits of a growing service sector and they are instead
marginalized to low-wage, part-time and contingent work within the service industry
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(Sassen 1990,2001). The shift to a service sector economy has led to a vision for U.S.
cities that focuses on the needs and desires of privileged residents, rather than the needs
and desires of the majority of urban residents - those who are less wealthy (Bayat 2000;
Ruben 2001). An emphasis on real estate development also often accompanies a growing
service sector economy, thereby increasing the cost ofliving and, as a consequence,
exacerbating low-income residents' economic insecurity (Ruben 2001).
Saskia Sassen (2001) points out, however, that economic processes still include
fixed assets and the necessary resources of specific locales: this means that not all capital
is mobile and is thus dependent, in some ways, on specific locals. This dependency gives
city governments and citizens leverage when dealing with global economic forces such as
neoliberal policies, privatization and restructuring. This perspective suggests that cities
are not just shaped by global economic forces; local citizen groups also have the power to
shape these forces. In some cases, local citizen groups, such as the labor-community
coalitions I discuss in Chapter V, demand that social and environmental concerns be
addressed in the process of urban development largely driven by local elites, corporations
and business coalitions (Sassen 2001). In the case of the SBI, are advocates of
environmentalism and social justice able to influence the discourse around social equity
and sustainability? Is the push for economic growth kept in check by parallel forces for
social justice, environmental sustainability and broader benefits for the community?
In addition to a growing gap between the urban rich and poor, U.S. cities have
also experienced changes in their urban governance. Over the last two to three decades,
the roles and responsibilities of local governments have expanded (Beaumont and
Nicholls 2004). According to Beaumont and Nicholls, more administrative and service
provision by local governments, a shift towards consolidating local governments into
metropolitan level governing bodies, and an increase in interest group involvement in city
politics, have led to "an expanded and more perforated urban political opportunity
structure" (2004:123). This transformation in local governments spurs urban interest
groups and movements to organize and make demands of city government (Beaumont
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and Nicholls 2004). As a result, many cities today face contradictory forces that greatly
influence and shape their policies and actions.
Following neoliberal thought, the decentralization of power towards local
governments has not been accompanied by a corresponding decentralization of funds
towards local governments. This means more of a burden is placed on city government
to maintain the economic health of the city with little assistance through federal and state
funding (Logan and Molotch 1987). At the same time, various urban stakeholders and
social movements recognize the political opportunity structure in city governments and,
therefore, force city governments to be more responsive to their demands, including
protecting the urban environment and addressing urban social problems (Agyeman and
Evans 2003). In short, city governments are charged with being good "entrepreneurial
cities" in a globalized world, as well as regulating environmental and social health. And
these social, environmental and economic challenges that city officials face will only
increase as more and more people move to cities, like Eugene, where the population has
grown by 8.9% since 2000 (City Data 2010)
It is within the context of being "charged with being good entrepreneurial cities"
and "regulating environmental and social health" that Mayor Piercy proposed the SBI.
And thus her interest, as well as that of many other actors involved in the SBI, including
the other city officials, traditional business interests, environmental groups and social
justice advocates, is connected to major political-economic issues: declining federal
spending to urban areas; the rise of low-wage, service sector jobs; increased pressure on
city governments to regulate social and environmental concerns; and an increasing urban
population marked by growing social inequality.
To sum up, the SBI is embedded in difficult conversations occurring in cities
around how to develop. In the case of the SBI, this study argues that the Mayor was
using the SBI as a type of alternative economic development tool that focused on
attracting and maintaining businesses and jobs, but also used social and environmental
criteria to evaluate businesses. These conversations are highly political and involve
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many different urban actors and interest groups with varying needs and desires, including
some very powerful interest groups, such as traditional business coalitions, which have a
high stake in the policy outcomes of the discussion. Examining these political-economic
forces is key to understanding the motivations and dynamics behind the SBI, including
the interests and desires of the individuals and groups involved and, ultimately, it is
essential to understanding the political contest that occurred around addressing social
equity in the SBI.
How does a city-based or city-housed initiative limit or expand the ways in which social
equity is addressed in sustainability efforts, like the SBI?
Given the complex financial, demographic and political forces molding the
actions of city government today, this study concludes by asking, what are the limitations
and opportunities involved in initiating and basing a sustainability policy or program in
city government? There are few other institutions that can house a policy that will allow
for such broad-reaching effects, yet having the policy based in city government also
means it is constrained by the myriad commitments that the city government must meet.
For example, Cox and Mair (1988) point out that elected officials of city government
have a dual commitment to their constituency as well as to bringing in the necessary
funds to cover the city budget. As a result, these officials are pushed into situations in
which they must consider what constitutes the most fiscally responsible decision for the
city (such as increasing the city tax base through implementation of new taxes or ending
tax breaks to businesses) and what decision will most likely lead to their re-election
because their constituency is pleased with their actions (such as stopping the construction
of a highway that community members and environmentalists oppose). The city
government can also be hamstrung by having only limited financial resources to run a
very complex process like the SBI, and/or its obligation to powerful interest groups. At
the same time, Van Jones, appointed by the Obama administration to run the White
House green jobs program, argues that the involvement of government, at all levels, is
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necessary for creation of a socially just, sustainable economy (2008): "Government
policies can and must playa key role in creating an inclusive, green economy - by
setting standards, spurring innovation, realigning existing investments, and making new
investments. Government action can ensure that we make the transition rapidly, while
protecting and benefiting our most vulnerable populations" (Jones 2008:145).
One alternative to a city-sanctioned or city-based sustainability program, and one
that is explored in the last chapter of this study, is having a community-based
sustainability program. A community-based sustainability program is initiated and run
by civil society and/or community organizations. In a process very similar to the SBI,
but run outside the city government, Urban Agenda, a nonprofit in New York City,
conducted a two year process gathering input from businesses, citizens, city officials, and
community groups on how to build an equitable, environmentally sustainable New York
City economy (Urban Agenda 2009). While my study does not examine this case in
detail, it is clear from the Final Recommendations of this Green Jobs Roundtable that
basing such an effort within a social justice and environmentally focused organization
allows these themes much greater presence than the SBI did. On the other hand, because
this process was not established within the city government, it must now engage in
another phase of work that aims to get the recommendations - which contain much more
controversial material related to labor unions and regulation than the SBI
recommendations - adopted by the New York City Council.
Several factors make this project very important to city officials and citizens who
want to address the major social, environmental, and economic issues of urban places.
First, with increasing frequency, sustainability is being put forth as the dominant
framework for dealing with a myriad of social, environmental and economic issues, yet
the ambiguity around the concept, intentionally or unintentionally, leads to political
struggle among various urban actors regarding the use of sustainability. In the case of the
SBI, environmental groups, business owners and business coalitions, such as the
Chamber of Commerce, labor unions, city officials, and other civil society organizations,
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are often involved in the struggle to develop a vision, goals and strategy for action and
implementation around sustainability that fulfills each group's needs.
Second, few studies have closely examined the political-economic forces that
shape this struggle with a specific interest in better understanding how and why social
equity concerns are marginalized in sustainability efforts (Daly 1996; Dobson 1999). In
terms of political-economic forces, the decline of well-paying manufacturing jobs, the
increase in low-paying service sector jobs, an increase in urban inequality, and a shifting
role for local government related to fiscal crisis and increased demands from citizens and
interest groups, such as the environmental movement, all set the stage for the political
struggle over the use of sustainability and, ultimately, what sustainability actions are
taken around social equity.
Third, while the rise of the urban sustainability discourse is fairly recent, in many
ways, the issues surrounding social equity and sustainability are age-old. The struggle
regarding social equity as a component of sustainability efforts, and the relationship
among the three components of sustainability, is at the core of issues inherent in
discussions of economic development versus environmental conservation, environmental
conservation versus job creation, and whether economic growth is linked to job growth
(good jobs). Within the rich, local context of this case study, I seek to find alternatives to
the deeply rooted dichotomies between the environment, economic growth, and the
creation of good jobs and social equity more generally. Does the rhetoric of "alternative
economic development" or "sustainable development" have the political power and
traction to challenge the hegemony of these dualisms? Furthermore, as is discussed
below, the rise of a national discourse on alternative economic development in the form
of the green economy, greenjobs, and sustainable development since Obama's campaign
for the presidency in 2007 makes this study's examination of the tensions between
economic prosperity, environmental health, and social equity even more timely. Put
more broadly, the sustainability discourse provides an opportunity to seriously address
another very important question: how do we improve quality of life for people and, at the
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same time, stop degradation of the natural environment? And if the marginalization of
social equity in sustainability efforts is not closely examined, it is a missed opportunity
for jointly addressing social and environmental concerns.
Research Methodology
This dissertation is based on a case study analysis of the Eugene SBI. It draws on
25 interviews with SBI members and staff, as well as policymakers, politicians, business
leaders, environmental activists, and social justice activists in Eugene, OR, between 2005
and 2009. During this time, an extensive review was conducted of policy documents and
secondary texts related to the Eugene SBI and other cities sustainability work. In
addition, this researcher did participant observation at SBI TF and public meetings. The
case study forms part of a wider study of the relationship between sustainability and
social justice in the United States, particularly justice related to workers and the
workplace.
Chapter Summaries
Chapter 1 Introduction
This Chapter opens the discussion on sustainability, orienting the reader to my
interest in the topic and how Eugene, OR is a microcosm of the national and international
movements to create a sustainable economy. I provide a summary of Eugene's
Sustainable Business Initiative, its members, and the key recommendations that resulted
from the process. Lastly, I layout the research questions that led my study, and explore
some of the theory that informs my responses to these questions.
Chapter II Is There a Socially Just Sustainability? Examining the compatibility ofsocial
equity, environmental health, and economic prosperity
Chapter II sets the stage for sustainability and social equity by reviewing the
theoretical and conceptual background of sustainability. First, I discuss how and when
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sustainability rose to prominence, and then what the conceptual path of sustainability has
meant for defining, measuring and using it today. The theoretical body of works on
sustainability is weak for numerous reasons, and an examination of this body and the
schools of thought sustainability draws on, illuminates the need for theoretical coherence
on the concept. My review of the theory focuses on the relationship between the
economic, environmental and social aspects of sustainability and how this theory relates
to the SBI Task Force (SBI TF) members' understanding of sustainability. There is
variation in how the social aspect is conceptualized, demonstrated by the divergence in
theory, SBI TF member interviews, and materials produced by the TF. Using the
theoretical discourse on sustainability and the experience of the Eugene SBI, I argue that
sustainability is a contested discourse and understanding the various ways it is used
illuminates the political battle for defining, using and implementing sustainability. In
addition, understanding the larger political battle occurring around sustainability helps
explain the vision, goals and strategies of the various interest groups involved with the
Eugene SBI. The chapter concludes with an attempt to push the theoretical bounds of
sustainability by reconceptualizing the relationship between the social, environmental and
economic aspects of sustainability.
Chapter III Sustainability as an "Urban Fix": The politics ofthe Mayor's Sustainable
Business Initiative
In Chapter III, I examine how the political context of the SBI generated a
dynamic, internal political struggle among the SBI participants, particularly related to
social equity. I closely examine the political dynamic produced by the SBI Task Force
members - the specific individuals involved in the SBI, the interest groups they
represented or were reaching out to and, more importantly, what their roles were in
producing the discourse and products of the SBI that ultimately resulted in the neglect of
social equity issues. I argue that the SBI filled a very specific political strategy for the
Mayor, and these political goals, closely linked to electoral politics, historical divides
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between the business and environmental communities, and the City Government's
financial constraints, strongly influenced the composition of the SBI, the process for
developing it, and the outcomes of the SBI TF Recommendations. Next, I critically
examine and discuss the various political reasons for certain individuals and interest
groups being assigned to the SBI groups and how their orientation to social equity
affected how social equity issues were addressed throughout the SBI. Particularly
illuminating in this area is how the labor community came to represent social equity on
the SBI, the specific social equity issues the labor representatives brought to the SBI table
and how these issues were received by the other TF members and the interest groups they
represented.
Chapter IV The Entrepreneurial City: Urban political economy and sustainability
Chapter IV delves into how the changing role of city governments on the national
stage has taken form in Eugene and, in tum, shaped the purpose, goals and outcomes of
the Eugene SBI. More specifically, I examine the motivating and limiting factors for the
City of Eugene governments' role in initiating and implementing a socially equitable SBI
including the city manager form of government, City staff and Council's support (or lack
of support) for the SBI, City Government's (in)ability to implement social and
environmental regulation, and the financial capacities and responsibilities of the City.
Understanding the SBI's outcomes in relation to social equity also requires an exploration
of the political relations between the environmental, business and social justice
communities in Eugene, and also each of these communities' relations with the City
Government. This includes an examination of the increasing demands on the City
Government from the environmental community to implement environmental regulation
and related resistance to regulation from the business community and, consequently, a
long-term polarization between the environmental community and business community
over various local measures. This polarization in many ways boils down to divergent
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views on economic growth and what role the local government should play vis-a.-vis
social and environmental issues.
Chapter V Just Sustainability: Labor-community coalitions working/or regional equity
To enable a better understanding of why the Eugene SBI was not able to address
social equity issues in any substantive way, Chapter V looks at labor-community
coalitions as successful examples of how sustainability/alternative economic
development efforts in the United States have included labor-focused, social equity
components. After identifying the successful actions that brought about the inclusion of
social equity in sustainability efforts in several other places around the U.S., I focus on
why Eugene did not or could not pursue similar actions. For example, how does a city-
led effort for sustainability, such as the SBI, inhibit or enhance opportunities for
addressing social equity? How do the main actors and interest groups involved in the
SBI differ from other places with more successful sustainability actions? The discussion
pays special attention to the historical and contemporary relationship between the
environmental, labor and social justice communities and the specific labor unions and
labor councils involved in the sustainability efforts including their perspective on
addressing broader social justice issues.
Chapter VI Conclusion: Reclaiming sustainability
Chapter VI recaps the Eugene SBI experience in the context of national trends
and recommendations regarding sustainability and social equity, and more specifically,
regarding labor issues. This discussion hones in on the specific elements that playa large
part in determining how sustainability efforts address social equity concerns such as who
initiates the sustainability program in the first place and why; how previous political
battles among the main actors participating in the current efforts affect its discourse and
goals; and finally, what is the historical relationship between the social, environmental
and economic communities in any given place?
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CHAPTER II
IS THERE A SOCIALLY JUST SUSTAINABILITY?
EXAMINING THE COMPATIBILITY OF SOCIAL EQUITY,
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH, AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY
"The 20th century has been 'the' century ofurbanization ... The future ofthe most of
humanity now lies, for the first time in history, fundamentally in urbanizing areas. The
qualities ofurban living in the 2Ft century will define the qualities ofcivilization itself'
(Harvey 1996:403).
Introduction
Over the last two decades a general consensus has been reached around the
desirability of pursuing the concept of "urban sustainability" and, more importantly,
achieving sustainability in cities - which, most generally, means creating cities that can
meet long-term human and environmental needs (Agyeman 2005; Agyeman, Bullard, and
Evans 2003; Fitzgerald 2010; Foley 2004; Mebratu 1998; Wheeler and Beatley 2004).
Both social justice and environmental sustainability are "widely regarded as desirable
goals" and sustainability advocates seek ways to meet social, environmental and
economic goals simultaneously, "rather than play[ing] them off against one another as
more traditional development strategies have often done" (Foley 2004: 1; Wheeler and
Beatley 2004:8). At a most basic level, advocates for social justice and environmental
sustainability realize that social inequality often causes environmental degradation and
that environmental problems disproportionately affect the poor (toxic facilities, pollution,
inadequate transit options, etc. are disproportionately found in poor neighborhoods)
(Foley 2004: 1). The planning and implementation of programs that help achieve urban
sustainability is now a major priority for international institutions, governments at all
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levels, social movements, and citizens (Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans 2003; Agyeman
2005; Fitzgerald 2010; Foley 2004). Major international agencies, such as the United
Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Business
Council, have entire departments devoted to identifying and creating sustainability plans
and programs. There are thousands of sustainability ordinances and initiatives housed in
sustainability offices, which establish indicators and goals for reaching sustainability at
the local, state, and national levels of government around the world (Agyeman 2004;
Wheeler and Beatley 2004). And over the last ten years, sustainability has been declared
its own social movement due to the number of grassroots, state, national and international
organizations working on the various aspects of sustainability (Agyeman 2005; Foley
2004).
A major impetus for the heightened pursuit of urban sustainability stems from
intensifying urbanization processes, deepening urban inequality and environmental
degradation and, more generally, the significance of urban areas in the achievement of
environmental and social sustainability (United Nations Habitat 2007). Most notably,
more than one-half ofthe world's population now lives in urban areas, and five billion
people are expected to live in cities by 2030 (UN Habitat 20l0a). In some cities of the
Global South, over 50% of urban residents live in slums, where there is little or no access
to basic necessities such as water, sanitation, education, health services, or shelter (UN
Habitat 20IOc). Furthermore, cities consume 75% of the world's energy and produce
80% of its greenhouse gases emissions (Fitzgerald 2010: 11). Since the majority of the
world's population lives in cities and cities are massive consumers of resources and have
a significant impact upon the environment (e.g., climate change, destruction of forests,
elimination of coral reefs, loss of genetic and biological diversity, increasing the toxicity
of our environment and our food, overfishing, extinction of species, desertification,
radioactive contamination, shrinking water supplies, etc.), the question of how we will
meet long-term human and environmental needs - generally defined as urban
sustainability - becomes a fundamentally urban issue and, as a result, has risen to the top
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of many urban planners', city officials', citizens', and civil and community organizations'
agendas (Agyeman 2005; Foster 2002).
The simultaneous pursuit of the three components of sustainability - social
equity, economic prosperity, and environmental health - is now a major consideration in
city officials' and citizens' approaches to urban development. However, the
marginalization of social equity within the Mayor's SBI, as well as many other local
government sustainability initiatives, despite its having been proclaimed a main goal by a
mayor with a well-known commitment to environmental and social equity issues,
requires investigation as to the theoretical feasibility of meeting all three components of
sustainability simultaneously (Agyeman 2005; Environmental Law Institute 1999; Foley
2004; Warner 2002). Is there theoretical or practical method to addressing social equity,
environmental health, and economic prosperity in unison? What are the potential
opportunities and tradeoffs in simultaneously addressing the three components? Some
sustainability scholars argue that these three components are compatible in theory, but
not in practice; some argue they are compatible in both theory and practice; and others
argue that the opportunities and tradeoffs of pursuing all three components really depends
on how sustainability is defined and conceptualized (Foley 2004).
In order to better understand the relationship between social equity and
sustainability in the Mayor's SBI, I briefly review the conceptual background of
sustainability including how the concept of sustainability has risen to prominence in
policy-making circles around the world and become highly politicized. Despite the
ideological similarities between the concepts of environmental justice and sustainability,
there is divergence between the environmental justice and sustainability movements;
therefore, I examine the historical relationship between the two movements to better
understand social justice's role in sustainability as a concept and a movement.
Second, I discuss how the major theories of sustainability address the relationship
among the three components of sustainability - social equity, environmental health, and
economic prosperity. I first look at the predominant approach to sustainability-
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ecological modernization and how proponents of ecological modernization define the
three components of sustainability, conceptualize their relationship, and where they
expect the change towards sustainability to come from. This is followed by a discussion
of the views of three prominent sustainability scholars, each of whom addresses the role
of social justice within the concept of sustainability: Paul Hawken, Herman Daly; and
Julian Agyeman.
Third, I review the contributions of eco-feminism and eco-socialism to the
thinking regarding the connection between sustainability and social justice. I believe a
review of these theories and major theorists will help to illuminate the ways in which
various members of the SBI TF conceptualized sustainability, justified their prioritization
of the three components of sustainability, and ultimately, advocated for a particular
approach to sustainability, which resulted in the SBI TF's Final Recommendations to the
Eugene City Council. The reader should bear in mind, this discussion is focused on the
political construction and contestation of sustainability and social justice in the Mayor's
SBI, and how the ways in which sustainability has been conceptualized theoretically are
directly linked to how sustainability is used politically.
Tracing the Conceptual Background of Sustainability
A deep concern for achieving a balance between nature and urban development,
as well as achieving equity in cities, has existed since the 1800s. Thoreau (1854)
discussed the detrimental effects of urban expansion into nature in his writings at Walden
Pond. Engels (1844) was writing about the awful social conditions of the working class
in English industrial cities in the mid-1800s - including the spatial segregation between
urban elites in the suburbs and the unhealthy and unsafe conditions of the working class
in urban tenements. Even poets and great literary figures, such as D.H. Lawrence (1919)
and Charles Dickens (1859), discussed the problems of industrial cities and people's
struggle to survive in these places. In the early 1900s, several major urban scholars
began discussing the environmental impacts of the industrial city and the relationship
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between the development of human society and nature. Ebenezer Howard's (1902)
writing on garden cities emphasized the importance of bringing nature into cities and is
still influences urban planners today. The American scholar Lewis Mumford (1961)
described the social malaise that occurred from overcrowding in early industrial cities,
such as public health concerns related to sanitation, pollution, and a general lack of
serVIces.
In the mid-1900s, such authors as Jane Jacobs, Herman Daly, E.F. Schumacher,
and Andre Gunder Frank severely questioned the path of traditional development, in
cities and globally, and how it affected both people and the environment. In their own
way, each of these authors pointed out that current development patterns were not
improving living conditions for the majority of people, but were actually increasing
inequality (Wheeler and Beatley 2004). These authors' identification of unsustainable
development practices led to a broader awareness among planning and community
development policy makers as to the social and environmental implications of current
development practices. This awareness spurred efforts to establish a different
development paradigm. Building on this momentum, UN Conferences and Commissions
during the 1980s and 1990s also began to explore this idea of creating a new
development paradigm that would give greater weight to social and environmental
concerns, as opposed to economic concerns (Mebratu 1998; Wheeler and Beatley 2004).
The concept of sustainability, or sustainable (urban) development rose to
prominence when the UJ'J-sponsored World Commission on Environment and
Development (WCED) report, Our Common Future (1987) first recognized the concept
of sustainability. This report is also known as the Brundtland Commission Report,
named for its Chairwoman, Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland (Mebratu
1998; Ayres 1998). The report's use of sustainability connected economic,
environmental and social challenges, and raised the importance of seeing these challenges
on a global scale (i.e., the opportunities and challenges of one city or region is connected
to the opportunities and challenges of another city or region) (Mebratu 1998:494). This
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report produced the well-known definition of sustainability: "development that meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
needs" (WCED 1987).
Shortly following the dissemination of the Brundtland Commission Report, the
ideas of "sustainability" and "sustainable development" gained wide acceptance and their
use increased greatly (Agyeman 2005; Mebratu 1998). It has been estimated that by
1994, just several years after the report was published, various organizations and groups
had already created more than 80 different variations (or definitions) of the Brundtland
Commission's definition (Mebratu 1998:502). Also instrumental in the popularization of
the concept was the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), which
was held in 1992. Mebratu (1998) identifies the preparation for this conference as crucial
in connecting sustainability in the international, policy-making arena to specific, local
communities around the world. Apparently, the outreach process was unprecedented in
its scale and ability to engage a sustainability discussion at the local level (502). Of
course, the UNCED also led to the production of several major UN documents, including
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and Agenda 21 - both of which
deal with environmental and social development issues extensively (Mebratu 1998:502).
The Rio Declaration, produced at the 1992 UNCED, was a declaration of27 principles
for sustainable development (United Nations 1992a). The principles ranged from
eradication of poverty to the view that indigenous people, youth, and women have a vital
role to play in achieving sustainable communities, to the idea that states have common
but differentiated responsibilities to protect the ecosystem (United Nations 1992a).
Agenda 21 was a resolution on sustainable development that was passed by 178 countries
at the UJ~CED in 1992 (United Nations 1992b). Agenda 21 is a plan of action, or
blueprint, for international, national and local institutions, governments and organizations
that covers four main topics: social and environmental dimensions; conservation and
management of resources for development; strengthening the role of major groups (this
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includes women, NGOs, local authorities, etc.); and means for implementation (for
example, technology transfer, financing mechanisms, etc.) (United Nations 1992b).
In the 20 years since sustainability's entrance into international environmental and
development discourse, the concept has been used to drive or compel thousands of local,
national and international initiatives (Agyeman 2005; Whitehead 2002). Yet, as Mebratu
(1998) points out, despite the successful adoption of many sustainabi1ity initiatives, there
is still a sense that our ability to address global environmental problems has been minimal
and "this had led to an increasing level of frustration and disenchantment, even among
the different groups promoting the concept of sustainable development" (494). This
frustration helps to explain the attitude of some policy makers and scholars that
sustainability is now a meaningless concept and that sustainability-focused initiatives are
ineffectual in actually improving the social and environmental situation (Prugh, Costanza,
and Daly 2000; Mebratu 1998).
Nevertheless, the idea of "sustainabi1ity" has maintained center stage in policy-
making arenas at all levels of government for over 20 years. It is now at the core of
thousands of local, national and international policies. As a result, there has been space
and time for the discourse around the concept of sustainability to broaden; to take on a
multitude of meanings; and, frankly, become highly politicized (Agyeman 2005; Daly
1996; Mebratu 1998; Prugh, Costanza, and Daly 2000). Therefore, the concept of
sustainabi1ity is increasingly used to address a variety of social, economic and
environmental issues; however, overall, there is little agreement as to what the definition
of sustainability is, what is to be sustained and for whom.
Although the concept of sustainability has gained great prominence and is widely
popular in international, national and regional policy circles, surprisingly, there is little
theoretical coherence regarding sustainabi1ity (Daly 1996; Mebratu 1998; Prugh,
Costanza, and Daly 2000). In fact, there is a surprisingly small body of extant theory
around the concept. Instead, the discourse on sustainabi1ity has focused more on what
sustainability is NOT; what sustainability means at a policy level, rather than on a
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theoretical level; and the issues surrounding implementation of a sustainability policy.
(Whitehead 2002). I think sustainability's lack of theoretical development can be
attributed to two issues: (1) it has occupied policy circles, rather than academic arenas,
from its inception; and (2) as a result of its inherently interdisciplinary nature,
sustainability has not been naturally picked up and developed by anyone academic
discipline (Agyeman 2005).
Daly (1996) argues that the popularity of the idea of sustainability indicates that
"although there is an emerging political consensus on the desirability of something called
sustainable development, this ternl - touted by many and even institutionalized in some
places - is still dangerously vague." In the same vein, others assert that sustainability is
"elusive," "an oxymoron," and "cliche" (Mebratu 1998:503; Goldin and Winters 1995;
Tryzna 1995; Holmberg 1994). While Daly (1989) praises the value of sustainability's
vagueness as a "good political strategy" to gain consensus around the idea, later (in
1995), he said that its vagueness had actually created disagreement over the utility of the
idea and it was no longer a uniting term (Daly 1995). I would argue that while the "loose
use" of the concept of sustainability (applied to everything from corporate green washing
to grassroots, to community sustainability efforts for better transport options, etc.) has
caused contention regarding the term's meaning in academic and more progressive policy
circles, among the general public sustainability is still very much a uniting term,
evidenced by its widespread use. Mebratu (1998) observed that the result of
sustainability's vagueness is: "acceptance of a largely undefined term as a basis sets the
stage for a situation where whoever can pin his or her definition to the term automatically
will win a large political battle for influence over the future" (503). In short, I would
argue that more than anything, sustainability is a politically contested concept.
Redclift (2000) expanded on the obscurity of sustainability by closely teasing
apart the Brundtland Commission's definition of sustainability: "development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs" (60). He pointed out that there is widespread support for societies'
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sustainably developing and little discussion of the complexities and contradictions
underlying this idea (60). For example, Redclift identified the fact that "needs" look very
different depending on the generation or culture one is speaking of. Another complicated
concept in the Brundtland Commission definition is that of "development." Does
"needs" refer to one community's need to help reduce the world's carbon dioxide
emissions to ensure a healthy place for future generations or another community's need
for better public transit to help young people get to school? How does development
reflect changes in need or differences between social contexts? (Redclift 2000:60).
Again, for poorer communities of the Global South, "sustainable development" may be
set in a context of trying to meet basic needs, such as providing water, food and shelter,
without damaging the environment. On the other hand, a Global North community may
be more likely to address methods for curbing consumption, such as replacing residents'
use of personal vehicles with increased use of public transportation. If different cultures
define sustainability differently, Redclift (2000) asks "how do we establish which course
of action is more sustainable?" (60). Furthermore, there are numerous and contradictory
approaches to sustainability, which Redclift explained is because there is "considerable
confusion surrounding what is to be sustained" (60). Should we be sustaining soil
fertility, biodiversity, natural capital, or any number of other natural and social cycles?
Perhaps the most important question is, how does one groups' idea of
sustainability affect another groups' ability to meet its sustainability goals, or even just its
basic needs? In other words, what level of quality of life or consumption are we trying to
sustain and is it possible for all societies to sustain any given level without destroying
natural ecosystems? For example, would strict CAFE standards in the United States
reduce the environmental impact of automobiles enough to allow all other societies to use
cars at the same rates as that of the U.S. population? Examples like this one highlight the
fact that not only can sustainability be defined and implemented in a myriad of ways,
depending on the context and culture defining it but, also, that sustainability is not just
about improving the social, environmental and economic conditions of one geographic
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area. In reality, the social, environmental and economic quality of anyone place is very
much connected to the social, economic, and environmental conditions of other places.
Furthermore, some institutions and organizations define sustainability with a global
awareness of social, environmental and economic health, realizing that one community's
pursuit of a certain quality oflife may limit another community's ability to meet even its
most basic needs. Others focus solely on improving the social, environmental and
economic conditions of their particular community with no interest in how their
sustainability practices affect others.
Another main aspect of the confusion around sustainability relates to the concept
of intergenerational equity. Currently, there are various moral perspectives on
intergenerational equity and they all lack unanimity (Ayres 1998:128; Reddift 2000).
For example, for some, a large part of intergenerational equity has to do with decreasing
population growth because of the consumption issues it engenders but, for others,
limiting population growth is antithetical to their religious belief system (Ayres
1998: 128; Reddift 2000). On a practical level, the concept of intergenerational equity is
problematic because future generations are not able to defend themselves (Ayres
1998: 129). Future generations cannot defend themselves in court or vote in our political
system; "[future generations] are not identifiable individuals with identifiable interests at
stake. What rights they have are only granted voluntarily by us, the present generation.
It is worthwhile to bear in mind that some human cultures give great weight to the
interests of future generations. Others do not" (Ayres 1998:129). While it is obvious that
various parts of the concept of sustainability are nebulous, intergenerational equity is
particularly difficult to define because, as Ayres (1998) points out, it refers to a group
that is not currently present to represent its interests.
Reddift's (2000) analysis of the World Commission on Environment and
Development's definition of sustainability proves that although the definition was broad
enough to gain extensive political support for a vague notion of a new type of
development that emphasizes social and environmental concerns, it left many questions
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unanswered. Whose needs are we sustaining? How is development defined? How do
we determine if certain actions or visions for sustainability are more or less sustainable?
Can all societies sustain the same quality of life? And, finally, how much weight do we
give to the interests of future generations - those not yet here to represent themselves?
In brief, there is little agreement as to the specifics of sustainability, in part because the
concept is undertheorized and, as a result it has become a highly politicized concept. The
political contest centers around who can lay claim, or define, sustainability in a way that
best suits his or her own interests.
Environmental Justice and Sustainability: A Natural Nexus?
Another informative aspect of the development of the concept of sustainability, as
well as the sustainability movement, is its relationship to environmental justice. In fact,
one cannot explore the relationship between social justice and sustainahility without
considering the relationship between sustainability and environmental justice, both as
concepts and social movements, given their overlap on environmental and social justice
issues. The environmental justice movement seeks to end the inequitable distribution of
environmental "bads" and to link social justice and environmental issues (Cole and Foster
2001; Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans 2003; Stein 2004). Environmentaljustice
organizations are typically led by low-income people and/or people of color (Agyeman
2005; Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans 2003). Environmental justice organizations work on
a range of issues including race and the environment, civil rights and human rights,
facility siting, land use planning, brownfields, transportation equity, suburban sprawl and
smart growth, energy and climate justice (Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans 2003). Given
that the concept of sustainability is based on linking social equity, environmental health,
and economic prosperity, and environmental justice is based on linking social justice and
environmental issues, it seems there is natural nexus between the two concepts. But, in
reality, the relationship between environmental justice and sustainability has been rocky
and fraught with ideological and other such problems (Agyeman 2005). While both of
_. _. ---- ---------
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the above concepts have become influential in the public policy and planning realms over
the last two decades, they were conceived from very different backgrounds.
Even though the concept of sustainability is now very much a part oflocal-Ievel
policy and practice, it actually emerged from formal, top-down policy-making arenas,
such as international processes and committees, think tanks, government structures, and
international nongovernmental organization (NGO) networks (Agyeman 2005; Agyeman,
Bullard, and Evans 2003). In contrast, the environmental justice movement was born of a
"local, grassroots, or "bottom-up" community reaction to external threats related to the
health of a community, which had been shown to disproportionately affect people of
color and low-income neighborhoods" (Agyeman 2005:2; Agyeman, Bullard and Evans
2003). A defining characteristic of the environmental justice movement is that it
expanded the concept of the "environment" to include the places where people live, work
and play. In so doing, the environmental justice movement built an equity and social
justice dimension into the idea of environmental stewardship. The environmental justice
movement also challenged the environmental movement to expand its environmental
concerns to include urban disinvestment, jobs, racism, neighborhoods as well as
wilderness and natural resources.
The environmental justice movement is built upon the civil rights movement of
the 1960s in the United States (Agyeman 2005; Bullard 1990; Agyeman, Bullard, and
Evans 2003). In contrast, sustainability advocates mainly come from the traditional
environmental movement and often hold professional occupations (Agyeman 2005).
Sustainability advocates often use what Agyeman (2005) described as "deliberative and
inclusionary processes and procedures" (DIPS) in order to avoid pluralistic decision
making processes that can be dominated by powerful interests like large multinationals
who have "disproportionate influence, economic muscle, and knowledge" (3). He
explained:
The overall aim is to involve a broad cross-section of lay citizens in the
development of shared values, consensus, and a vision of the common
good...DIPS include visioning, study circles, collaboration, consensus building
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and consensus conferencing, negotiation and conflict resolution, and citizen's
jury" (2-3).
Mebratu (1998) critiques the sustainability movement for utilizing DIPS and other
visioning processes too heavily. Mebratu (1998) argues that, in effect, visioning has
become a fallback position for politicians, environmentalists, and others who cannot give
practical advice on an issue, often because agreement was not reached on a specific
definition, purpose or endpoint for their efforts. The visioning process has become a
common path for sustainability efforts (517). Sustainability processes that do not lead to
concrete action contribute to the frustration around sustainability's perceived (or real)
inaction. Without downplaying the importance of a visioning process, Mebratu (1998)
concludes that the emphasis on visioning and ethical processes really comes from a more
fundamental need to have a more clear and concrete body of theory on sustainability and
sustainable development.
As one might assume, based on the sustainability's movement use of DIPS and
visioning, the sustainability movement has a proactive approach to determining the kind
of communities it would like to create. The path that the concept of sustainability has
taken, through formal policy-making arenas, has afforded it legitimacy and access to
mainstream culture, but it has also sheltered it against addressing the concerns and desires
of those who do not regularly participate in those policy circles, typically those who are
less privileged (Agyeman 2005).
At the other end ofthe spectrum, the environmental justice movement tends to
have a reactive approach to action: "Most but not all groups in the environmental justice
movement are trapped in the traditional pluralistic decision-making processes, common
in much environmental law, that make reaction the norm and proaction much more
difficult" (Agyeman 2005:3). The differences in the conceptual history of sustainability
and environmental justice helps to explain their different relationships with equity, the
lack of unity between these two movements and, ultimately, it sheds light on the
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marginalization of social equity within the concept of sustainability, as well as in
sustainability initiatives.
What Are We Sustaining? And for Whom?
Many theoretical schools have contributed to the conceptual development of
sustainability, but there are two basic approaches to the concept and the way in which
each component of sustainability is defined. There is the ecological modernization
approach to sustainability, which stems from modernization theory and is characterized
as weak sustainability, and there is the 'strong' approach to sustainability, which
encompasses a number of theoretical schools' approaches to sustainability including eco-
feminism and eco-socialism (Redclift 2000). Weak and strong sustainability definitions
expose the different relationships that can exist between the social, environmental and
economic components of sustainability. Weak definitions, according to Redclift (2000),
"require shifts in the level of resources allocated to problems, combined with the
establishment of higher environmental 'standards'" (70). Strong definitions attempt to
arrive at fundamental policy choices, and aim for strong environmental protection,
egalitarian social structures, bottom-up participation, a broad look at policy issues, and
develop principles to guide policy. On the other hand, weak definitions focus on weak
environmental protections, non-egalitarian social structures, top-down participation in
decision making, narrow issue scope, and pragmatic delivery of policies (Redclift,
2000:70).
The most critical difference between the weak and strong approaches to
sustainability is the way in which they define economic prosperity and, as a result, what
role the economy will play in relation to social and environmental needs. Based upon the
approach taken, other issues, such as how social justice is addressed, what type of role the
government has in sustainability, and who are the main actors in the sustainability
movement deciding what to sustain, are determined.
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Ecological modernization, a theory that came out of the Free School in Germany
in the 1980s, argues that the current economic system can be adapted to accommodate
environmental concerns (York and Rosa 2003). A core concept of ecological
modernization is achieving greater environmental productivity - the idea that energy and
resource efficiency can be increased, which will lead to future economic growth and
development, just as labor and capital productivity increase economic growth (York and
Rosa 2003). Ecological modernization proponents argue that greater environmental
productivity can be achieved through more efficient use of energy and natural resources,
including improving production processes through sustainable supply chain management,
using "clean" technologies (i.e., carbon capture and sequestration), and substituting the
use of environmentally degrading materials with materials that do not harm the
environment (Redclift and Woodgate 2005). The goal of ecological modernization is that
through entrepreneurialism, new innovations in production processes will increase the
"carrying capacity" of the environment (the number of humans the earth can support
given their production and consumption patterns) so that current consumption and
production patterns can mostly continue as usual. Ecological modernization's approach
to dealing with social issues is similar to its approach to environmental issues: social
issues will also be resolved through greater entrepreneurialism and technological
innovation. Inventions to address poverty, like high-yield seeds, are one such example
(York and Rosa 2003; Redclift and Woodgate 2005).
Under ecological modernization theory, there are a couple of different
interpretations of the role of the state in increasing environmental production. For some
ecological modernization theorists, the state is expected to facilitate competition in the
market and thus drive technological advancements. Under this interpretation, the state
facilitates competition by minimizing its interference in business operations and offering
incentives to businesses for meeting certain goals; regulation is seen as the main form of
interference by the government (LeRoy 2005). Another interpretation is that the state
does playa regulatory role and by so doing ensures that businesses account for their
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environmental impact. In other words, in response to environmental regulation,
businesses internalize their environmental costs (LeRoy 2005). An example of this is a
carbon tax whereby businesses must pay a tax on every ton of CO2 they emit.
Given that entrepreneurialism is expected to generate technological advancements
that create more efficient use of energy and natural resources, businesses and business
associations are identified as the main source of change under ecological modernization
(LeRoy 2005; York and Rosa 2003). The World Business Council on Sustainable
Development (WBCSD) is a good example of an organization that is addressing
sustainable development and ascribes to the ecological modernization perspective. Some
of the main goals of the WBCSD are to:
Participate in policy development to create the right framework conditions for
businesses to make effective contribution to sustainable human progress; develop
and promote the business case for sustainable development; and demonstrate the
business contribution to sustainable development solutions and share leading edge
practices among members (WBCSD 2010).
The underlying assumption of ecological modernization theory is that the growth
paradigm should remain constant, although there is some disagreement about whether the
current economic system requires a slight or significant change to accommodate
environmental concerns. According to this approach, economic growth, currently
measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP), is unquestionable. There are several
explanations for why economic growth and its supposed benefits - a trickle-down
approach to addressing social and environmental concerns - are assumed. For example,
Marx's critique of capitalism was based on the capitalist system's constant need to
expand, consuming natural and human capital in the process (Foster 2002). Similarly,
Ayres (1998) explained that the capitalist system will always grow because an increase in
demand for goods and services creates demand for increased production and, because the
production scale becomes larger, the products can be produced for less and less, further
fueling demand for the new cheaper products (Ayres 1998).
-- ----------------
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On a more practical level, corporations often finance further expansion of their
production by increasing their debt and repaying such debt through future profits. In fact,
"the practice of financing growth by increasing debt is encouraged by government
policies of taxing profits and treating interest payments on debt as untaxable costs"
(Ayres, 1998:102). This practice means that a corporation's survival is dependent upon
future profits being larger than present ones. If borrowing against future profits is not
available to a firm, it can encourage greater consumption through advertisements, by
increasing its market share through mergers and takeovers, raiding pension funds,
reducing employee wages and benefits, reducing or eliminating research and
development, among other strategies (Ayres, 1998:102).
In essence, we have a situation where individuals, corporations and governments
have come to assume and depend upon economic growth. Not only do governments
implement programs to accommodate economic growth, they are just as dependent upon
economic growth as the private sector (Ayres, 1998:102). Most Global North countries
have made financial commitments to their citizens based on the continued growth of the
economy (e.g., paying for social security and pensions). However, even if growth rates
continued at their current levels, there is still a significant gap between expected revenues
and the funds needed to meet entitlements. "In short, most Western governments are
functionally, if not legally bankrupt. Of course, this crisis makes growth even more
necessary as the growth engine slows down" (Ayres, 1998:104). The discourse regarding
creation of a green economy with green jobs taking place at the national level in the
United States is no exception either. The predominant discourse in the United States
around the relationship between the environment and the economy - ecological
modernization ideas put forth by traditional business interests - contends that economic
growth leads to improved social and environmental conditions, particularly through job
growth (LeRoy 2005; York and Rosa 2003). In other words, it is proposed that we can
keep our economy healthy (i.e., growing) and protect our environment through more
sustainable development, which includes creating jobs in sectors that contribute to
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reducing energy consumption (insulating homes, etc.) and expanding our renewable
energy sector (solar panels, wind turbines, etc.) (LeRoy 2005). Yet, in reality, the growth
of "green jobs" or "sustainable businesses" is rarely pegged to specific environmental or
social goals. For example, President Obama has stated his support for the growth of a
green economy and green jobs, yet his proposals for reducing emissions at the last United
.Nations Climate Conference were far below the levels required by science. 13 Similarly,
many U.S. labor unions have expressed their support for growing the U.S. green
economy and creating green jobs but, at the same time, have strongly discouraged the
U.S. House and Senate from passing climate legislation that would set emissions targets
with the levels demanded by science. In short, economic growth - a central feature of
ecological modernization theory, which is the predominant approach in the world to
reducing environmental impact - is, to a great extent, an assumed aspect of our current
economic system, and is often tied to reducing environmental impact and social
inequality by choosing to address thes~ issues through entrepreneurialism, technological
advancements, and job creation.
"Strong" Sustainability
Several major sustainability scholars have sharply criticized ecological
modernization for not protecting the environment or improving social conditions. These
scholars propose an alternative approach to achieving sustainability. Hawken, Daly and .
Agyeman are three of the most prominent thinkers on sustainability, each proposing his
own strategies for achieving both social and environmental sustainability. Several
schools ofthought also contribute to the conceptualization of sustainability including
eco-feminism and eco-socialism. Before reviewing these major perspectives on
sustainability, I outline the major criticisms of ecological modernization - criticisms that
are largely shared by those adhering to the "strong" tradition of sustainability.
13 Obama proposed a 17% reduction on 2005 levels by 2030 (equivalent to a 4% decrease on 1990 levels).
Science demands a 40% reduction (for developed nations) on 1990 levels by 2030 (Obama 2009).
63
Criticisms of Ecological Modernization
The main criticism of the ecological modernization approach is that sustainable
growth is not possible (Foster 2002; Foster 2000). Modernization proponents argue that
growth is inherently unsustainable because it relies on the consumption of human and
natural capital, which comes at great cost to the majority ofpeople and the environment
(Foster 2002; Foster 2000). Moreover, ecological modernization relies on businesses to
self-regulate themselves to achieve less environmental and social degradation (Foster
2000; Foster 2002; York and Rosa 2003). Proponents of ecological modernization often
purport that many advanced technologies to reduce human society's impact on the
environment have already been developed and are available, but the state has not adopted
regulations to compel their use; these technologies lay dormant because businesses do not
choose to use them (Foster 2002; York and Rosa 2003). For example, great gains have
been made within the last few decades on vehicle energy and fuel efficiency, yet these
technologies have not been used in the United States to create more efficient vehicles;
instead, they have been used to produce less efficient but more powerful vehicles. In
other words, the products or manufacturing processes that are most environmentally
sensitive are often not the ones chosen by corporations that are self-regulating.
Speth (2008) in his most recent book, The Bridge at the Edge ofthe World,
tackles the issue ofpricing the environment into the economy head on. On this front, he
has two main conclusions that I greatly simplifY here. In relation to the environment
being priced into the economy, Speth (2008) expects environmental pricing will alter our
current socio-political system by pricing certain activities out of reach and opening up
space for other more environmentally-sensitive processes. He also expects that
appropriate technological advancement will result from including environmental
degradation in the cost of producing certain goods and services. His also contends that
market tools are only one of several ways to protect the environment; other methods
should be used in conjunction with environmental pricing. Speth (2008) made an
excellent case for increased government intervention as a means for pricing the
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environment and, thereby, protecting the environment. In short, Speth (2008) argued that
government intervention, in the form of regulation on activities that harm the
environment and degrade social conditions, is imperative for altering current patterns of
production and consumption in order to become more ecologically sensitive.
In addition, the ecological modernization approach does not address injustices
produced by the capitalist system such as unemployment, lack of health benefits, or
environmental racism (i.e., low-income people bear a disproportionate burden of
environmental damage such as polluted air and water, and lack access to important
environmental benefits such as "complete streets" that give equal access to all modes of
mobility including biking and walking, parks, and open space) (Bullard 1994; Foster
2000; Foster 2002; Harvey 1996). Despite the harsh criticisms of ecological
modernization, it still occupies a prominent place in the sustainability policy discourse.
Redefining Economic Prosperity
Similar to proponents of ecological modernization, Paul Hawken, author of The
Ecology o/Commerce (1993), also argued that businesses can playa lead role in
transforming to a sustainable economy. However, Hawken (2001) called on businesses
to be much more directly responsive to the needs of society and the environment:
"corporations, because they are the dominant institutions on the planet, must squarely
face the social and environmental problems that afflict humankind" (392-393). In his
essay "A Declaration of Sustainability" (2001), Hawken (2001) spotlighted stellar
socially responsible companies, such as Ben and Jerry's ice cream. Ben and Jerry's "puts
ice cream shops in Harlem, pay[s] outstanding benefits, keep[s] a compensation ratio of
seven to one between the top of the organization to the bottom, seek[s] out vendors from
disadvantaged groups, and donate[s] generous scoops of their profits to others" and still
Ben and Jerry's was one of the market leaders in their category (392).
Unlike ecological modernization theorists, however, Hawken's argument began
with an acknowledgement of the fact that capitalism, unfettered, will over-consume
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resources, degrade the environment, and deteriorate social conditions for the majority of
people (2001). Accordingly, Hawken (2001) also placed his theory for change within the
. larger context of social change - "as hard as we may strive to create sustainability on a
company level, we cannot fully succeed until the institutions surrounding commerce are
redesigned" (394). Hawken (2001) went on to say that the notion of a socially and
environmentally responsible company that will also be able to grow economically is
impossible; instead, this notion simply provides a false rationale for "companies to
produce, advertise, expand, grow, capitalize, and use up resources" (394).
Hawken (2001) proposed a system of sustainable commerce that would
significantly restructure the current system. Among numerous important changes
outlined in his "A Declaration for Sustainability" (2001), he pointed out that citizens need
to take back the charters of corporations because corporations are supposed to be under
the control of citizens. Accountability, citizen involvement, and learning are fundamental
components of corporations' operation and if corporations do not meet citizens' needs
and desires, they should be disbanded, sold to other companies, and employees employed
by the new owners. Hawken (2001) also called for prices to be adjusted to reflect cost-
"every purchase must reflect or at least approximate its actual cost, not only the direct
cost ofproduction but also the costs to the air, water, and soil; the cost to future
generations; the cost to worker health; the cost of waste, pollution, and toxicity" (395-
396). Another important aspect ofHawken's (2001) strategy for sustainability involved
drastically reforming the current tax system: the current system incentivizes what we
don't want - waste and overconsumption, disincentivizes what we do want - jobs,
creativity, real income and payrolls, and ignores harmful activities - pollution and
degradation of the environment (396). Other objectives in Hawken's (2001) system
included high-quality employment for all people, a drastic reduction in energy and
natural resource consumption, and a "self-actuating as opposed to regulated, controlled,
mandated, or moralistic" system (394).
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Like Hawken, Daly (1973) has also contributed significantly to the thinking on
how to build a sustainable economy, one that better reflect the needs and desires of
people and the environment. Daly (1973), along with scholars like E.F. Schumacher and
Boulding, built on John Stuart Mill's (1848) discussion of a steady-state economy (Daly,
1973). In the 1970s, Daly argued that an economy based on endless economic growth
was impossible. Instead, he called for a steady-state economy based on qualitative
growth rather than quantitative growth. For most societies, economic prosperity is only
measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and private consumption but, as Daly
(1973) pointed out, there is little evidence that economic growth is positively correlated
to social and environmental well-being. A more critical look at economic growth reveals
that welfare is not inherently connected to economic growth and, in fact, greater
economic growth may actually reduce the well-being of the environment and people. In
Turning Point, Ayres (1998) concisely pointed out the relationship between economic
growth and well-being:
The primary muddle is a confusion of economic growth (i.e., more money and the
things money can buy) with increasing welfare (i.e., greater utility or a better way
of life). What is a better way of life is, of course, mainly a matter of personal
values. But the question is, do we as a society need to have, produce and trade
more goods in order to live better? (104).
Without overcomplicating the situation, suffice it is to say that welfare essentially
equates to happiness - whether a person or society is well depends upon whether they
are happy. Therefore, the next logical question is: does a person's or society's happiness
depends upon economic growth? Overwhelmingly, surveys conducted in many countries
have not shown any correlation between happiness and wealth and income (Ayres 1998:
104; McKibben 2007). For example, low income groups are not significantly less happy
than average income groups and wealthy groups are not significantly happier than
average income groups. Some studies have found:
[A] slight correlation between happiness and wealth when countries are
compared....However, the observed correlation between national wealth and
perceived happiness is probably mostly due to the fact that wealthy countries are
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more likely than poor ones to practice democracy, protect civil rights, secure
public health, and increase literacy. These attributes tend to increase people's
control over their own lives. They also tend to promote optimism. Though I do
not want to stress the point unduly, this chain of linkages implies that
governments have much more to contribute to welfare than merely providing an
arena in which laissez-faire capitalism may thrive (Ayres 1998:105).
In 1989, in response to the inadequacy of using GDP to measure social and
environmental health, Daly collaborated with Cobb to develop an alternative to GDP,
called the Index for Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW). The ISEW reflects a broader
range of social and environmental well-being indicators (Daly and Cobb 1989; Daly
1996; Redclift 2000). The ISEW measures human and environmental well-being through
distributional inequality, costs of pollution, depletion of non-renewable resources, the
value of household services, public expenditures on health and education, and net capital
growth (Daly and Cobb 1989). In other words, economic prosperity or wealth is defined
much more broadly than it is through Gross Domestic Product. Daly's and Cobb's
(1989) argument was that it is only by attaching weight to social and environmental well-
being in our measures of how our economy is serving society that we can begin to truly
focus on meeting social and environmental needs without subjugation to the needs of the
economy.
A Paradigm for Socially Just Sustainability
Agyeman (2005) developed the "Just Sustainability Paradigm" in direct response
to what he saw as the need to solidify social justice's place within what he calls the
"environmental sustainability" discourse. Agyeman (2005) described the Just
Sustainability Paradigm as a bridge between the Environmental Justice Paradigm: "a
framework for integrating class, race, gender, environment, and social justice concerns,"
and the New Environmental Paradigm (Catton and Dunlap (1978)), which focused on
environmental stewardship and a sustainability agenda and guides the majority of
environmental and sustainability-focused organizations in the United States (Agyeman
2005:3). According to Agyeman (2005), the main deficiency of the New Environmental
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Paradigm is its neglect of equity or justice issues. Agyeman (2005) developed the Just
Sustainability Paradigm in an effort to demonstrate that "an area of theoretical,
conceptual, and practical compatibility" exists between environmental justice and
sustainability (3).
Agyeman's (2005) definition of "just sustainability" was built on the more
common WCED definition: "the need to ensure a better quality of life for all, now and in
the future, in a just and equitable manner, whilst living within the limits of supporting
ecosystems" (5). Agyeman's (2005) definition emphasized the central role equity and
justice should play within the sustainability discourse, and highlighted how the
environmental sustainability movement has neglected the interconnectedness ofjustice
and environmental conservation. In The Death ofEnvironmentalism, Shellenberger and
Nordhaus (2004) clearly demonstrated the interconnectedness of environmentalism and
social justice:
Why, for instance, is a human-made phenomenon like global warming -which
may kill hundreds of millions of human beings over the next century-considered
"environmental"? Why are poverty and war not considered environmental
problems while global warming is? What are the implications of framing global
warming as an environmental problem-and handing off the responsibility for
dealing with it to "environmentalists"? (12).
Furthermore, Torras and Boyce's (1998) global research showed that nations with a
strong commitment to social equity and less social inequality also have a greater
commitment to environmental quality. In the United States, Morello-Frosch (1997) did a
study of California counties and found that there were higher levels of hazardous
pollutants in counties with high levels of class, race and income segregation.
Agyeman (2005) argued that the Just Sustainability Paradigm is an emerging
discourse in the field of sustainability, but one that needs to be widely accepted if
sustainability is going to have a more transformative potential:
Our present green or environmental orientation of sustainability is basically about
tweaking our existing policies. Transformative or just sustainability implies a
paradigm shift that requires sustainability to take on a redistributive function. To
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do this justice and equity must move center stage in sustainability discourses, if
we are to have any chance of a more sustainable future (6).
In his own research, Agyeman (2005) found only a handful of environmental
justice organizations in the United States that are intermittently conducting their work in
alignment with the Just Sustainability Paradigm, and he found that local governments -
which were identified under the UNCED, Local Agenda 21 (United Nations 1992) to
carry out urban sustainability efforts - were not making as much progress towards
including equity in sustainability efforts as non-governmental organizations (Agyeman
2005). Agyeman's (2005) claims were backed by other's research on equity and
sustainability: Warner (2002) studied sustainability efforts in the largest U.S. cities and
found environmental justice was rarely mentioned in relation to sustainability. The
Environmental Law Institute's (1999) review of the Environmental Protection Agency's
1996 Sustainable Development Challenge Grant Program found that of 579 applications
submitted, fewer than 5% included equity as a goal.
From a theoretical perspective, as mentioned earlier, Agyeman (2005) viewed the
Just Sustainability Paradigm as a bridge between the Environmental Justice Paradigm and
the New Environmental Paradigm because the two movements differ significantly in
terms of demographics, discourses, and movement-building practices (Agyeman 2005).
There are a few reasons for these distinctions. First, the two movements have very
"different approaches, tactical repertoires, and languages/vocabularies" due to their
different backgrounds (Agyeman 2005:79). As I said before, the Environmental Justice
movement reacts to external threats through grassroots, popular, community or bottom-up
structures. Conversely, the sustainability movement, based in the New Environmental
Paradigm, proactively advances a sustainability agenda through a more exclusive, top-
down approach, utilizing "expert international processes and committees, governmental
structures, think tanks, and international NGG networks" (Agyeman 2005:80).
There is a long history of mistrust between the environmental justice movement
and the mainstream environmental movement (from which the sustainability movement
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in the United States emerged) due to the mainstream environmental movements'
exclusive focus on natural resource preservation, rather than how environmental threats
affect certain social groups more than others. In addition, the mainstream environmental
organizations themselves tend to be far removed from community concerns, focusing
more on national legislative issues.
The composition of the environmental justice and mainstream environmental
organizations are different in terms of their racial, social location, and demographic
composition. The big "beltway" environmental organizations tend to lack representation
by people of color and low-income people on their boards of directors and staff, and have
a high proportion of people with college or postgraduate degrees (Agyeman 2005). In
contrast, the composition of environmental justice organizations' boards, staff and
membership is often diverse in terms of race, gender and educational attainment
(Agyeman 2005; Taylor 2000).
Participants in environmental justice and other social justice movements are often
reluctant to participate in sustainability efforts because they perceive the work of the
sustainability movement as pertaining to exclusively white, middle to upper class issues
(Agyeman 2005). Interestingly, even when environmental justice and sustainability
advocates are working on the same issues, they often use different discourses to describe
and advance their efforts. The environmental justice movement, using lessons from the
civil rights movement, has "(re)framed the discourse oftraditional or reform
environmentalism" with a more inclusive coding; "the framing of environmental justice
has thus created a very accessible communitarian discourse that those in
disproportionately affected groups can identify with, mobilize around, and, more
important, act upon" (Agyeman 2005). On the other hand, the sustainability movement's
use of academic language and framing is less accessible to people with less experience
working in formal policy-making arenas or with less education (Agyeman 2005).
In response to the main differences between the Environmental Justice and New
Environmental paradigms, Agyeman (2005) identified four main elements of Just
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Sustainability. These areas of theoretical compatibility between the paradigms are:
quality of life; present and future generations; justice and equity; and living within
ecosystem limits (79). Like Daly and Cobb (1998), Agyeman (2005) also argued that
wealth and well-being need to be measured by some other standard than Gross Domestic
Product. Agyeman (2005) has supported both the ISEW and the Genuine Progress
Indicator, which uses a multitude of measures to evaluate people's experience of the
economy, including personal consumption data, unpaid work (such as volunteer work),
and negative activities (such as underemployment and environmental degradation)
(Agyeman 2005).
The second element of the Just Sustainability Paradigm is "present and future
generations." On this point, Agyeman (2005) built on Haughton's (1999) identification
of five equity principles that need to be included in the development of sustainable
communities: "intergenerational equity (the future principle), intragenerational equity
(social equity or social justice); geographical equity (or trans-boundary responsibility);
procedural equity (open and fair treatment); and interspecies equity" (Agyeman 2005;
Haughton 1999).
The third principle of the Just Sustainability Paradigm is justice and equity. As
stated earlier, this point simply refers to the need to make equity and justice center stage
in sustainability efforts. This commitment includes procedural justice (around decision
making) as well as distributive and substantive justice regarding people's basic needs and
desires - affordable housing, healthy neighborhoods, good jobs, etc. (Agyeman 2005).
The final component of the Just Sustainability Paradigm requires us to live within
ecosystem limits. This component highlights the importance of our lifestyle choices
being made in the context of environmental limits. And although this point refers to
environmental limits, there is still an important equity dimension to it for Agyeman.
Agyeman (2005) introduced the concept of "sufficiency" to this discussion:
This is the equity-based sustainability message that less can be more. It will be of
increasing importance in the coming years, especially in the [Global] North, as we
begin to develop demand-management policies in order to limit our resource
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consumption by those amounts suggested by McLaren et al.' s (1998)
environmental space calculations, so that [Global] Southern countries can
consume their fair share of environmental space-commensurate with improving
their standard of living-and, thereby, their quality of life. Sufficiency
complements but also contrasts with the environmentalist-based sustainability
concept that runs through the heart of the European environmental modernization
agenda: efficiency, or doing more with less.
Other Theoretical Contributions to Sustainability and Social Justice
In addition to the direct contributions of Hawken, Daly and Aygeman to the
conceptualization of sustainability and social justice, two other main ideologies
contribute to the thinking around sustainability and social justice - radical feminism or
eco-feminism, and Marxism or eco-socialism.
Eco-feminism's contribution to sustainability began in the 1970s when French
feminist writer, Francoise d'Eaubonne (1974), argued that the same social hierarchy,
created by patriarchy and capitalism, that leads to the domination and oppression of
women, leads to the degradation of the environment (Mebratu 1998). Shiva and Mies
have also contributed significantly to the eco-feminist literature by arguing that if an
activity is not considered an export or is not contributing to GDP, then it is not
considered valuable to society. Examples of such activities are work that women often
perform (work within the horne, work within the informal sector, etc.) or activities that
harm or rehabilitate nature (deforestation and forest conservation) (Mies and Shiva 1993;
Shiva 1998). Like Hawken, Daly, and Agyeman, Mies and Shiva called for a redefining
of what economic activities contribute positively and/or negatively to society (1993).
Taking it a step further than did Hawken, Daly, and Agyeman, Mies and Shiva pointed
out that counting only those activities that contribute to GDP disproportionately devalues
the work of women, which more often than not does not involve an exchange of money
(Mies and Shiva 1998).
There are several different schools of thought within eco-feminism, including
feminist environmentalism, ecofeminism and feminist political-ecology (Visvanathan,
Duggan, Nisonoff, and Wiegersrna 1997). However, feminist political-ecology has
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addressed the issues ofjustice and equity within sustainability more than any other group
(Rochelau, Thomas-Slayter, and Wangari 1996). In short, feminist political ecology has
argued that gender, along with class, race, ethnicity, sexuality, and orientation, is a
determinative factor in enabling access and control of natural resources as well as in a
community's decision-making process on sustainable development (Rochelau, Thomas-
Slayter, and Wangari 1996).
According to eco-feminism, creating a system to measure wealth that will
adequately recognizes women's and nature's contribution to society's activities is integral
to sustainable development. Valuing the work traditionally done by women, as well as
other activities that do not rely on a financial exchange, is also important to women being
central actors in the decisions to define and pursue sustainability (Rochelau, Thomas-
Slayter, and Wangari 1996). In terms ofeco-feminism's contribution to sustainability
today, without doubt, it has been instrumental in formulating what is generally known as
a "strong" definition of sustainability; a definition that calls for systemic change of the
current social, political and economic system. From this perspective, a healthy
environment will be achieved only when the social system is restructured to be more
egalitarian and, from this, an economy is created that does not exploit the environment
and/or certain social groups.
Also integral to the conceptualization of sustainability and social justice, and
"strong" definitions of sustainability," is eco-socialism or Marxist ecology. From the
eco-socialist perspective, sustainable development has been defined by the dominant
interests in society as increasing, or at least keeping constant, growth of Gross Domestic
Product or consumption per capita; in other words, an ecological modernization approach
to sustainability (Foster 2000; Foster 2002; O'Connor 2001). Marxist ecologists, such as
Foster, concede that under ecological modernization small tweaks to the capitalist system
may be made, such as internalizing environmental costs, but the underlying emphasis
remains on maintaining current levels of economic growth (Foster 2002). In contrast,
eco-socialists' underscore the conflict between economic growth and social and
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environmental well-being, or sustainable communities (Foster 2002; Beneria 1997;
O'Connor 2001).
Capitalist economies are geared first and foremost to the growth of profits, and
hence to economic growth at virtually any cost-including the exploitation and
misery of the vast majority ofthe world's population. This rush to grow generally
means rapid absorption of energy and materials and the dumping ofmore and
more wastes into the environment-hence widening environmental degradation
(Foster 2002:10).
Because capitalism is based on private ownership and control of the means of production,
social decisions are based on private interests, not social or public interests. This means
that if private and social or public interests conflict, then social/public interests related to
people's and the environment's well-being are neglected, or even harmed (Beneria 1997;
O'Connor 2001).
Rather than completely abandoning the idea of economic development, Foster
(2002) explained that communities around the world must ask themselves, "what kind of
development do we need and want?" and "how do we want to develop?" Foster went on
to describe what he called an "ecological form of social development":
It must have as its first priority people, particularly poor people, rather than
profits or production, and must stress the importance of meeting basic needs and
ensuring long term security. Above all, we must recognize the old truth, long
understood by both romantic and socialist critics of capitalism, that increasing
production does not by itself eliminate poverty (81).
The solution for achieving sustainability, according to eco-socialism, is centered
around a change in our mode of production: a shift from private to public, more
democratic ownership of the means ofproduction so that the needs of producers are
fulfilled; and a reorientation of production so that it meets human and environmental
needs rather than meeting the bottom line (profit) (Clark 2001; Foster 2002; Mebratu
1998; O'Connor 2001).
Production can be said to be nonalienating only if it promotes the welfare of every
.individual as the way of promoting the welfare of all, and only if it fulfills the
human need for a sustainable, and in that sense nonexploitative, relation to nature
(Foster 2002:40).
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Given that the capitalist system not only degrades living conditions for the majority of the
world's people but, also, degrades the environment, eco-socialists advocate for
environmental, urban, labor, peasant and other social movements joining together to
demand environmental justice through democratic ownership of the means of production
(Foster 2002).
Conclusion
At the inception of sustainability, the UN Brundtland Commission purposely
defined sustainability loosely in order to gain wide political support for the concept. The
widespread use of the term confirms that this was a good political strategy; indeed, it has
gained broad political support. Moreover, the concept encapsulates a vision for the future
that broadly addresses the major problems of our era - vast social inequality and
environmental degradation. As a result of its popularity and vague conceptualization, I
would argue that sustainability is one of the most politically contested terms in use in the
United States today. The contestation around sustainability has been further catapulted
into the limelight with the 2008 election of President Obama. His election, along with his
campaign focus on a green economy and greenjobs, in combination with the rising
strength of the environmental movement, has created a convergence around the idea of
addressing social and environmental issues simultaneously - in short, sustainability.
The political clash/contest over sustainability has practical repercussions for how
it is conceived and implemented in policies and programs such as the Eugene SBI. But,
more importantly, this political contest over the meaning of sustainability gets at deeper
tensions between the meaning of economic prosperity and its compatibility with
environmental and social sustainability. Above, I explored the ideas of different
sustainability theorists. The predominant approach to sustainability - ecological
modernization - relies on economic prosperity as economic growth to meet social and
environmental needs. Yet other sustainability theorists, such as Hawken, Daly, and
Agyeman, saw a fundamental contradiction between the current capitalist, political-
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economic system with its focus on economic growth, and social and environmental
imperatives. These theorists explained that economic growth comes at the expense of the
environment and well-being of the majority of the population. Thus, when economic
health, defined as ever-increasing economic growth, is the paramount concern of
sustainability programs, social and environmental sustainability is undermined.
This chapter has attempted to show that sustainability is a highly contested
political term and that the conflation of economic health and economic growth is the
result of a deliberate political strategy by corporate power brokers to maintain political
support for the current political-economic system. And it is within this highly politicized
context that sustainability initiatives and programs, such as the Eugene SBI, are
embedded.
The underlying dimension of these discussions on development and meeting
social and environmental needs is economics. On the economic dimension of
sustainability, the main question to be answered is: "are existing concepts of economic
development compatible with the notion of finite environmental resources and reducing
existing inequality?" It is on this point that the various conceptualizations of
sustainability significantly diverge. As a result, the prescribed actions that flow from
these conceptions also differ, and thus, the pursuit of social equity, environmental health,
and economic prosperity through sustainability initiatives, such as the Mayor's SBI, gets
very murky.
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CHAPTER III
SUSTAINABILITY AS AN "URBAN FIX": THE POLITICS OF THE MAYOR'S
SUSTAINABLE BUSINESS INITIATIVE
"All environmental-ecological arguments ... are arguments about society, and therefore,
complex refractions ofall sorts ofstruggles being waged in other realms" (Harvey
1996:372).
"The 20th century has been 'the' century ofurbanization ... The future ofthe most of
humanity now lies, for the first time in history, fundamentally in urbanizing areas. The
qualities ofurban living in the 2 jSf century will define the qualities ofcivilization itself"
(Harvey 1996:403).
Introduction
The combination of ambiguity regarding the meaning of "sustainability" and the
desire to define this highly popularized term for one's own purposes has created a
political struggle between various interest groups as to how it will be defined and
branded. This chapter examines the subtler, yet more determinative interactions between
the Sustainable Business Initiative Task Force (SBI TF) members around social equity.
The sixteen-member SBI TF, comprised of individuals from the environmental, business,
and social justice communities, with guidance from Mayor Piercy and SBI coordinator
Bob Doppelt, was the main body controlling the direction and development of the SBI. l4
Therefore, this chapter examines the political struggle that occurred within the TF as to
how sustainability should be defined and pursued. Who were the main actors and interest
groups involved in the SBI? What were their visions, goals and strategies for social
14 See Table 1 for list of SBI TF members.
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equity and sustainability? The discussion of these questions provides insight into the
main challenges that city officials and citizens face in attempting to balance the social,
environmental and economic components of sustainability and, ultimately, in
implementing sustainability programs and policies.
Eugene Mayor Kitty Piercy created the SBI TF in April of2005. Piercy launched
the SBI because she wanted to address some of Eugene's most pressing social and
environmental problems and, at the same time, build relations with the business
community in order to shed her image as an anti-business Mayor and develop an
economic development strategy that strived to meet a triple bottom line: people, profits,
and planet, rather than just profit (SBI TF 2006a). This sixteen-member group,
comprised of seven individuals from the business community, two labor leaders, two
environmental leaders, one educational leader, and four individuals representing different
local nonprofit agencies from Eugene, was charged with supporting and proposing
"deliberate and thoughtful steps to strengthen the local economy in a manner that fits the
community and can make Eugene one of the nation's most sustainable mid-size
communities by 2020" (SBI TF 2006a:8). The TF members from the business
community were mostly small and medium-size business owners in the food, landscaping
and forest, advertising, construction, and real estate sectors. The TF members from the
nonprofit sector worked for organizations that addressed educational needs for
immigrants, housing and vocational needs for low-income families, economic
development issues for businesses, and civic and social issues for native youth. At the
first meeting of the SBI TF, the Mayor charged the TF with several objectives. Related
to social equity, these included determining how to "identify ways in which social equity
measures such as good wages, adequate health care, affordable housing, and other actions
can be incorporated into sustainable business retention, expansion, recruitment, and
cluster development" (SBI TF 2005b). At the same meeting, the Mayor expanded on her
intent to address the triple bottom line. She stated that she believed the Eugene
"community could have a strong economy and take care of its workforce" (SBI TF
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2005b). The SBI TF spent one year formulating the initiative. This process involved
assistance from the University of Oregon Resource Innovations program roundtable
discussions with 50 community leaders, and a 50-member Technical Advisory
Committee (SBI TF 2006a). At the end of this period, the SBI TF produced a report that
outlined the recommendations for SBI content and implementation (See Table 2, above).
The SBI recommendations were categorized into three different sections:
recommendations for the Eugene City Government; the private sector and nonprofits; and
other local government and educational institutions. Eleven recommendations were
made for the Eugene City Government, seven for the private and nonprofit sectors, and
four for other local governments and educational institutions (SBI TF 2006a).
Since the SBI was initiated by the Eugene Mayor, as opposed to being citizen- or
private sector- initiated, many of the recommendations are aimed at the Eugene City
Government. The SBI Task Force also mentioned in the 2006 report that it consciously
chose to make "incentive-based" recommendations, rather than "regulatory"
recommendations in order to encourage positive cooperation among the various
participants. This decision will be explored below in detail in conjunction with an
examination of the goals of the SBI, however, it is mentioned here in order to
contextualize the TF recommendations.
One of the main recommendations made to City Government was its
establishment of an Office of Sustainability, as well as a Sustainability Board or
Commission. Both the Commission and the Office of Sustainability were subsequently
established by the Eugene City Council in 2007. Several ofthe other recommendations
to City Government addressed governmental support for sustainable businesses through
the city's purchasing choices, following a "triple bottom line" approach for all policies
and actions, and developing a system for measuring sustainability. The final
recommendation to city government involved educating city staff and partners about
sustainability.
- ~--- ------------
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For the private and nonprofit sectors, the Task Force's recommendations centered
on assisting local businesses and nonprofits to obtain information, tools, and financing for
implementing sustainable practices. It also recommended that business and
organizational networks be created among those pursuing sustainability in an effort to
support each other. Last, it suggested using public campaigns to "grow the local market
for sustainable products and services" (SBI TF 2006a:6). Recommendations for other
local governments and educational institutions involved coordination between local
governments and educational institutions to educate the public on sustainability. The TF
proposed the creation of consortiums charged with overseeing the move toward carbon
neutrality and zero waste to landfills by 2020.
Social equity recommendations, however, presented a more complex challenge
for the SBI TF. The Report (2006a), explained that although social equity is one ofthree
major components of sustainability, it was the most difficult to address:
The Task Force found it much easier to identify mechanisms to promote the
economic and environmental aspects ofthe Triple Bottom Line than the social
equity components .. .In the end the Task Force determined that it had just
scratched the surface on social equity issues ...The SBI Task Force encourages
Eugene City Government and the community at large to pursue additional actions
to address social equity issues (SBI TF 2006a:9).
TF members had identified several potential ways to include social equity in the
SBI. The possibilities primarily revolved around educating community and business
members on the benefits of paying employees at or above living wages, providing health
care and retirement benefits, flexible work schedules, opportunities for career
advancement, and supporting workers' rights. Yet the only social equity-related
recommendation adopted in the Final Report was a vague call to "establish a private-
public task force to continue the dialogue on how to incorporate social equity issues into
sustainable business and job development" (SBI TF 2006a:12).
This final recommendation on social equity - to create a private-public task force
to study it further - was made despite the SBI's social equity sub-committee (within the
TF) issuing very specific recommendations for including social equity within the SBI.
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The sub-committee was comprised of four members of the TF: Lynn Feekin, Labor
Education and Research Center (LERC); Claire Syrett, Eugene Springfield Solidarity
Network; Deborah Noble, West Wind Forest Products; and Lisa Arkin, Oregon Toxics
Alliance. In order to reinforce the importance of addressing the social side of
sustainability within the SBI, two members ofthe social equity sub-committee, Lynn
Feekin and Claire Syrett, together with Bob Bussel from LERC, undertook a separate
study on community members' attitudes and expectations for social equity and
sustainable business development. This report, entitled The Social Equity Factor:
Community attitudes, expectations, andpriorities for Eugene's sustainable business
development (Bussel, Feekin, and Syrett 2006), did not have the intended impact upon the
SBI TF.
The social equity sub-committee presented its final document to the SBI TF. The
report explained the importance of social equity to sustainability and included six
indicators for assessing workplace social sustainability and five indicators for assessing
community social sustainability. The sub-committee defined social sustainability as
follows:
Social equity is important as a component of sustainable practices because it
encompasses the human aspects of the "triple bottom line". This cluster of
indicators focuses on the consideration of worker and community interests that
need to be protected and enhanced, as part of an overall program for sustainable
business practice. Social sustainability is connected to how we choose to treat
other human beings in our communities - the workers and other businesses we
deal with and the community as a whole - in order to maximize individual and
community well-being (Bussel, Feekin, and Syrett 2006).
The workplace indicators revolved around wages, benefits, participation!
communication, fair treatment, safety and health, and opportunities for career
advancement. The indicators for community social sustainability were community
health, education and training, affordable housing, corporate social responsibility, and
transportation. (See Tables 3 and 4 for a more detailed explanation of these indicators.)
The study on social equity and sustainable business development, which included
conducting focus group interviews with union and non-union workers, reinforced the
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importance of the social equity indicators advanced by the SBI TF social equity sub-
committee. Analysis of the interviews revealed that having health benefits, flexible work
schedules, a living wage, and opportunities for career advancement were the most
important social equity indicators in the workplace. Having work that was satisfying and
socially valued, full-time work rather than part-time employment, adequate retirement
benefits, and a guarantee of non-discrimination, equal opportunity, and respect for
diversity were also important social equity issues for those interviewed. However, even
with the specificity of social equity indicators proposed by the TF sub-committee as
reinforced by the study on social equity and sustainable business, the TF merely
recommended that the issue be studied further.
One SBI TF member representing the business community, who agreed with the
poor response given to social equity, stated "My honest opinion is I think that was just
sort of throwing them a bone and to the best of my knowledge that's the last time I ever
heard of [social equity]" (Ransom 2008). This same TF member often reminded other
TF members that decisions needed to be made as to whether to provide a small number of
high-quality jobs (good wages, health benefits, etc.) or to provide a larger number oflow-
quality jobs (low wages, no health benefits, etc.). While this TF member's opinion of
social equity's place in the SBI was not shared by all TF members, it highlights the
tension that existed within the SBI TF and points to the reason for the TF's inability to
offer any meaningful social equity recommendations. Initially, several factors seemed to
indicate that the SBI was on a path to successfully engage social equity: the Mayor was
well known for her commitment to social issues and the SBI was the Mayor's SBI; the
Mayor pushed the use ofthe triple bottom line approach to sustainability, which equitably
highlighted the social, environmental and economic aspects of sustainability; and the
Mayor selected experienced and well-connected individuals from the social justice and
labor communities to serve on the TF. Given this foundation for the SBI, why did the TF
struggle and eventually fail to make any reasonable social equity recommendations?
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Certainly the political-economic context from which the SBI emerged is an
important component for understanding why the TF was unable to address social equity.
The business community's aversion to regulation, and specifically taxation, the city
government's decreasing tax base and loss of federal funding, the city government's
retreat from social spending at the same time that social inequality among residents was
increasing, and a call for the city government to be both more entrepreneurial and
monitor social and environmental concerns, set the stage and created the landscape for
the SBI TF's political struggle over social equity and sustainability. The following
chapter will discuss the role of these political-economic factors in influencing the
direction and actions of the Mayor, the TF, and others. These factors paint only half the
picture of social equity and the SBI. The other half involved how the Mayor, city
officials, the TF, and others chose use the SBI as a means to address local, national and
international political-economic forces. For example, the TF social equity sub-committee
made incentive-based, rather than regulatory-based, recommendations for social equity
because it recognized the traditional business community's deeply entrenched aversion to
regulation. Moreover, each SBI TF member had very specific and nuanced interests in
the SBI. Some examples are that the Mayor wanted to build a working relationship with
the traditional business community; the traditional business community was interested in
monitoring and shaping economic development policy, of which the SBI was a part; and
the social justice advocates were attempting to sculpt economic development policy to
include the concerns of workers and their communities. A closer look at the SBI TF
members, and the interest groups to which they were connected, shows how each
interpreted the purpose and goals of the SBI, how these interpretations affected each
member's ability to influence the final recommendations and, ultimately, how a city,
recognized for its sustainability efforts, led by a social justice-oriented Mayor committed
to a triple bottom line, and including strong social equity representatives, could almost
completely neglect social equity in its final recommendations. Could these diverse
interests have been negotiated in a way that balanced social, environmental and economic
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concerns, or were their visions and goals for social equity and sustainability
incompatible? The answer to this question affords insight into a much larger debate-
how to integrate an economic development agenda with social and environmental goals.
The lessons drawn from the SBI TF can inform sustainability advocates on the
ingredients that Eugene lacked in its process to embrace social, environmental and
economic sustainability. The lessons learned from Eugene's experience can be used to
improve the pursuit of socially just sustainability in other cities; this is especially useful
as other studies have found that many cities struggle to implement sustainable
development agendas that retain social equity dimensions (Agyrnan, Bullard, and Evans
2005; Gibbs 1997). Most cities implement a sustainable development agenda that relies
on a weak definition of sustainability, in which market forces and technological
advancements are expected to improve social and environmental conditions, and no
specific or realistic social and environmental goals are set. Identifying the challenges to
and opportunities for implementation of sustainability programs that contain strong social
equity and environmental dimensions is important because the number of cities and
institutions developing and implementing sustainability programs continues to grow
(Agyman, Bullard and Evans 2005).
I identify four major facets of the SBI TF's struggle over sustainability and social
equity. These facets are based on my in-depth interviews conducted with the Mayor, SBI
TF and Technical Advisory Committee members, and primary data analysis of SBI TF
documents. They broadly include: (1) the Mayor's intentions and goals for the SBI, or
what I call the Mayor's political strategy for the SBI; (2) the impact of the composition of
the SBI TF and other SBI participants upon how social equity was dealt with; (3) the
relationship of each TF member to social equity and; (4) how public involvement in the
SBI affected its outcomes. All four components played a major role in shaping the
political struggle that took place over defining, measuring and implementing the social
equity component of sustainability.
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Sustainable Business Development to the Rescue: The Political Strategy of the
Mayor's SBI
The Mayor first began considering an SBI-like initiative in 2004 during her
mayoral campaign. Her opponent in the mayoral primary, Nancy Nathanson, a library
program manager and long-time Chamber of Commerce member, had the backing of the
majority of the business community (Pittman 2004). The amount Nathanson and Piercy
spent on their election campaigns far outspent any previous Eugene mayoral races.
Piercy spent over $142,000 in the primary, while Nathanson spent over $93,000 (Russo
2004) After Piercy defeated Nathanson in the primary with a majority, Piercy was elected
to Mayor through ratification. Four years later, in the next election cycle, Mayor Piercy
was challenged by former mayor Jim Torrey. Torrey, a Republican and Chamber of
Commerce-backed candidate, had served as mayor of Eugene from 1996 to 2004 (The
Register-Guard 2008). The amount of money spent on this election more than doubled
from the previous election (Pittman 2008). Because neither Piercy or Torrey gained a
majority vote in the primary, they had to have a run-off election in November. As a
result, their election campaigns lasted longer than most and Torrey reported raising
$528,000 and Piercy $395,000. Prior to Torrey's first mayoral election victory in the late
1990s, mayoral races often cost less than $50,000 (Pittman 2008). Such increases in the
cost of elections often require candidates to access large pools of money from businesses,
special interests and wealthy individuals, which often opens channels of influence into
politics for these donors (Logan and Molotch 1987; MacLeod 2002; Portney, et al. 2009).
In her race against Nathanson, Piercy reported 553 donations of $50 or less for a
totalof$22,000. In contrast, the total ofNathanson's small contributions only totaled
$1,400, while the majority of her support came from real estate speculators and
developers, construction companies, local land and timber barons, and the Chamber of
Commerce. IS Also in contrast to Piercy's mainly local financial support, one-fourth of
15 The Chamber of Commerce Political Action Committee (PAC) raised $40,000 for the election campaigns
ofNathanson and other business-friendly people running for City, including the re-election of Scott
Meisner (pittman 2004).
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Nathanson's campaign funding came from companies and individuals outside of Eugene.
(Pittman 2004). The larger and more powerful businesses in Eugene (construction,
building, logging, and sand and gravel extraction) were supporters of Torrey and
Nathanson. Their sizable donations to the Nathanson and Torrey campaigns demonstrate
that businesses and their associations (such as the Chamber of Commerce) are keenly
aware of the importance of gaining political influence at the local level. City government
has the unique ability to significantly affect the business climate in which a business
operates (Bassett 1996; Cox and Mair 1988; Logan and Molotch 1987). In this sense,
campaign contributions and the ballooning of the amount spent on city-level elections
reflects what Logan and Molotch (1987) term the "urban growth machine." Given Kitty
Piercy's lack of financial and, therefore, political support from the mainstream business
community, she hoped that as mayor, she could forge better business relations (The
Register-Guard 2004). In particular, Piercy hoped to develop relations with members of
the business community who were concerned with improving the environment and
benefiting the local community. Gaining greater support from the business community
by demonstrating her concern for creating a healthy economy was a strategic decision
that Mayor Piercy recognized could be integral to moving her main campaign agenda
items through the Council as well as with her re-election to Mayor for the next term.
This strategic decision by Mayor Piercy coincided with the increased city-level
political-organizing capacity of business organizations and associations over the past
couple of decades (Cox and Mair 1988). Business' desire and ability to exert political
influence over city politics is reflected in how much is spent on city political races today,
even in a small city such as Eugene. Candidates and their business association supporters
feel it is very important to gain political influence at the local level because they
recognize that city government has the ability to significantly affect the business climate
in which they operate (Bassett 1996; Cox and Mair 1988; Logan and Molotch 1987; Dean
2009). Reporter Alan Pittman highlighted the stake of local businesses in the 2004
mayoral and City Council elections in Eugene as follows:
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A city council vote can lead to tens of millions of dollars in freeway construction
money to local contractors and sand and gravel companies. A new road,
rezoning, or growth boundary extension can dramatically increase the value of the
land, giving a huge windfall to speculators. Taxes can be lowered for businesses
or millions of dollars of tax breaks and other subsidies given (2004).
Indeed, during his time as Eugene City Councilor in·1996, Jim Torrey was very
supportive ofHynix, a semiconductor manufacturing company, locating in Eugene and
receiving millions in tax breaks through its inclusion in a state enterprise zone. Similarly,
in his second term as mayor, Torrey supported the controversial construction of a
highway to be built through the protected wetlands of West Eugene.
In her 2004 mayoral campaign, Kitty Piercy attempted to differentiate herself
from her opponent, Nancy Nathanson. She did this by highlighting and criticizing the
support Nathanson received from the business community and conservative then Mayor
Torrey. However, in the process of challenging Nathanson's funding from the business
community, and by promoting herself as a mayor who would be not only concerned with
economic issues but also with social and environmental issues, Piercy felt she divorced
herself from the business community, the Chamber of Commerce, and other business
associations (Piercy 2008b). Some of Piercy's main campaign issues that were perceived
as not being business-friendly included enhancing alternative transportation options in
Eugene, repairing existing roads instead of building new ones, limiting big box store
development, increasing funding for the homeless and for the public libraries, progressive
tax reform, and a public financing system for electoral campaigns (Pittman 2008b). As a
result, she was effectively cut her off from a very powerful interest group in Eugene -
the traditional business community. Not only did Piercy fear she would lose the election
without at least some support from the business community, she also knew that if elected,
without any business support, her time as Mayor could be very difficult. Accordingly,
she worried that she would be unable to implement any of her campaign promises (noted
above) without support from at least three "business-backed" city councilors (Piercy
2008b). However, such support was not forthcoming. Almost immediately after Piercy
88
was elected as mayor in 2004, the Chamber of Commerce and other business associations
began strategizing around who they would have run against Piercy in the next election
(Dunlap 2008; Piercy 2008b).
Piercy attempted to differentiate herself from Nathanson and typical business
interest candidates by putting forth an agenda that balanced environmental, social equity,
and economic issues. In a city and state that had perpetually struggled with high
unemployment and other major social issues, such as homelessness, unaffordable
housing, underemployment, a large percentage of uninsured residents, and more, she
knew that she would have to have sound economic principles to bolster her credibility.
Accordingly, she ran on an alternative economic development platform, which she called
a sustainable business/green economy platform. This platform included the social and
environmental issues mentioned above as well as the SBI. The SBI was the centerpiece
of her plan to build a sustainable economy, and it was coupled with a focus on promoting
a clean energy economy, energy efficiency in residential and commercial buildings, green
building standards, and downtown revitalization. In her 2008 campaign, she added to this
list the goal of making Eugene a model for best practices on sustainability, to include a
"Sustainable Eugene" website that would provide local businesses, nonprofits, and the
larger community with information on sustainability (Piercy 2008a).
In contrast, Nathanson and Torrey both expressed their primary interest as
creating a pro-business climate in Eugene. As mentioned before, in Torrey's last four
years as Mayor, he actively pursued a pro-development agenda, which included building
the West Eugene Parkway through the wetlands of West Eugene. Torrey and other
proponents of the West Eugene Parkway argued the new highway would help alleviate
traffic problems in West Eugene. It is no coincidence that many of the same companies
that would benefit from the highway construction - sand and gravel, construction
companies, real estate developers, and more - heavily supported Torrey in his election
campaigns. Torrey created a citizen's Committee on Economic Development that aimed
to "simplify land use rules," assist businesses with navigating the City's bureaucracy for
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pennits and infonnation, and created an enterprise zone in West Eugene "where qualified
companies could get tax breaks in exchange for creating jobs" (Register-Guard 2004:D3).
Nathanson expressed interest in following these business-friendly recommendations
during her election campaign for Mayor (Russo 2004:Cl). In addition to the contention
with respect to expanding economic development opportunities (tax breaks) for
businesses and building the West Eugene Parkway, Torrey and Nathanson, unlike Piercy,
also supported expanding the urban growth boundary, a limit beyond which certain types
of development are prohibited. The urban growth boundary issue exposed deep fractures
that existed within the city between pro-growth and anti-growth groups. Such
development projects stem from what Logan and Molotch (1987) call the "urban growth
machine." The urban growth machine refers to an organized lobby of business interests
found in most U.S. cities that are locally dependent upon increased urban growth and
development (Logan and Molotch 1987; Jonas and Wilson 1999). The urban growth
machine is comprised of businesses and elite individuals who benefit from new urban
growth and development, such as road and building contractors, real estate investors and
agents, resource extraction industries, and various other businesses that benefit from
increased consumption. Such an urban machine was clear in relation to the West Eugene
Parkway lobby, as well as in the proposed expansion of the urban growth boundary.
Piercy, due to her lack of support from the urban growth machine lobby, lacked support
from some of the wealthiest and most well-connected businesses in Eugene. Those
businesses with which she had good relations tended to be small businesses with an
interest in producing organic, natural products, whose owners were more politically
aligned with the left, and also who were not well-aligned with the Eugene Chamber of
Commerce (Piercy 2008b). These businesses, therefore, lent less credibility to Mayor
Piercy than would have an alliance with the business community at large.
Mayor Piercy won the election against Nancy Nathanson in 2004 with just
51.56% of the vote (Nathanson lost with 45.69%). Such a margin ofvictory hardly
evidenced a mandate from the citizens of Eugene (Lane County 2004). It is within this
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political context that Piercy introduced the Mayor's SBI. Mayor Piercy had laid out the
prototype of her SBI proposal in her 2004 election campaign Economic Plan, and her
narrow victory only made it clearer to her that she needed to find some way to work with
the business community (Piercy, McLauchlan and Teninty 2004). In her interview with
me (2008), she said that during her campaign she had worked with several individuals on
her campaign in messaging to the business community. These same individuals
encouraged her to implement something akin to the SBI once she became mayor. Later,
these people became members and leaders of the SBI TF, namely David Funk (co-chair
of the SBI TF) and Bob Doppelt (coordinator of the SBI). Four years later, when Mayor
Piercy ran for reelection against former Mayor Jim Torrey, she won the primary with an
even smaller margin - she had 48.8% of the vote against Torrey's 47.42%; Piercy won
the November 2008 election against Torrey with 51% of the vote, Torrey received 48%
of the vote (Lane County 2008). Again, she did not have the mandate to go it alone and
continued to reach out to the business community through the SBI and other business-
oriented plans for building a sustainable Eugene economy (Piercy 2008a).
Mayor Piercy's decision to pursue the SBI was predicated on five issues, and was
connected to her overall desire to win reelection in 2008 and advance her political agenda
during her first term as Mayor. Briefly, these issues were: (1) establishing links to the
business community; (2) forging a relationship between the business, environmental, and
social justice communities and between the business community and the City
Government; (3) expanding her own political image beyond that of an individual
myopically interested in social service and social justice issues; (4) riding Oregon's tide
of national recognition as an emerging leader in sustainability; and (5) her desire to have
the SBI institutionalize sustainability within the City Government (in the form of a city
department or citizens commission on sustainability) (SBI TF 2006a; Register-Guard
2004; Dunlap 2008; Krall 2008; Piercy 2004, 2008b, 2010). Mayor Piercy commenced
work on these goals after she was elected in 2004, working closely with advisors whom
91
she had selected to help promote and set up the SBI TF and the Technical Advisory
Committee.
Mayor Piercy wanted to develop better connections with the business community
not only to increase her chances of being re-elected, but also to more fully address other
social and environmental issues such as homelessness and climate change. 16 Piercy was
aware that such issues could not be addressed in isolation apart from Eugene's ailing
economy. Yet, while the Mayor alluded to her belief that drastic action was needed to
mitigate Eugene's current environmental and social problems, she was very aware of the
political and economic context in which she was operating and, accordingly, felt that
taking incremental steps was the best route. For these reasons, she sought to work with
the business community to address the environmental and social issues affecting Eugene
and its residents. From this framework, the SBI and an alternative economic
development agenda were born. Her hope was that a business and environmental
initiative could achieve many of her overlapping goals.
In order to forge a relationship with the business community, the Mayor was
personally invested and directly involved in developing the SBI:
In my case I wasn't a member of the TF so I could have just said go do that, but I
felt so much like I needed to show my commitment to what they were doing that I
tried to be there at almost all the meetings beca~se I felt that was sort of a
necessary push for me, and especially since in the beginning when I first brought
it up I was too new as Mayor (Piercy 2008b).
Based on the 2004 election campaign, Mayor Piercy was aware of the divisions
between the business and environmental communities in Eugene. As a political
candidate who was touted as being supported by many environmentalists in Eugene, she
assumed that many members of the business community automatically viewed her with
suspicion. The Register-Guard editorial board, which endorsed Nathanson, quite
accurately described Piercy and Nathanson's campaign positions as follows:
16 In her fIrst few years as mayor, Piercy joined the Mayor's Climate Challenge, signed a resolution,
Mayors/or Peace, in response to the Iraq War, and made the commitment to Eugene's offIcially becoming
a Human Rights City (piercy 2010).
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Both Nathanson, 52, and Piercy, 61, are struggling against the fierce gravitational
pull of strong constituencies that want the campaign to divide neatly along
ideo10gica11ines. Piercy, seen by the city's liberal-progressive voters as their
standard bearer, knows she must reach beyond that base to win a citywide race.
Likewise, Nathanson hopes to convince voters she is an environmentally-
conscious moderate who won't rubber stamp the Chamber of Commerce's agenda
(2004). .
Piercy was endorsed by the Oregon League of Conservation Voters, and the
Oregon Natural Resources Council Political Action PAC (Pittman 2008c). Piercy had
been involved for decades in Oregon politics, including a stint in the Oregon legislature,
making her acutely aware of how Eugene politics have been stymied by this dynamic of
polarization:
And for me, I would say I too would like to have us be the most sustainable
community. I would also like people to be able to see that you don't have to
make enemies of the environment and business and I would like these people to
see that these don't have to be conservative-liberal divisions, that there are places
for us all to move forward together (Piercy 2008b).
Piercy felt strongly that Eugene needed to find a way to move beyond divisive politics
and set an agenda that allowed the business community, the environment, and the people
living in Eugene to thrive - and sustainability was the key.
When I was running for office, even my close associations, very pro-environment
folks would say, whatever you do don't talk about sustainability. That's a killer.
You won't win the election if you do that...And some people still say that. But I
found when I knocked on doors that people were really ready for that discussion.
They really wanted Eugene to live up to its reputation and move in the direction
that we are already moving in. We just needed to bring the full triple bottom line
into the conversation...Then [my advisors] helped to write our economic plan
which incorporated this notion of having a sustainable business initiative. The
reason we chose it, is sustainability is huge, huge, huge so we could have chosen
any number of things but we decided that if we wanted the conversation to be
about how in the triple bottom line it is about people, planet and profits all
together we had to be part of trying to move that discussion (Piercy 2008b).
Sustainability indeed became a tool for rallying multiple sectors of society. In
some ways, it was a politically expedient tool that could be used when most
advantageous. For example, when the Mayor was speaking with the business
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community, sustainability was marketed as a way for businesses to save money on energy
and other resources costs. In this way, the Mayor was able to demonstrate that she cared
for Eugene's businesses and the economic struggles they faced. Furthermore, she was
able to use sustainability in a way that demonstrated she was trying to build
environmental awareness into Eugene's economic system. And, since sustainability was
already being proposed worldwide as a framework to address urban areas' complex
social, environmental and economic problems, Piercy knew she could draw on the
public's growing familiarity and comfort with the concept in order to aid her in obtaining
support for the SBI (Whitehead 2003; Krall 2008; Nichols 2008; Piercy 2008b; City of
Eugene 2005).
The SBI was instrumental in Mayor Piercy achieving her second goal of forging a
relationship between the City and the business community. Because the City is the entity
that ultimately implements or enforces regulations and incentives for business and the
environment, it is often positioned at the center of conflicts between the environmental
and business communities. Moreover, the City Government has what Cox and Mair
(1988) call "twin local dependence" - an electoral dependence whereby the government
must respond to popular democratic and populist movements and an economic
dependence whereby it must respond to local business groups to protect its local tax base
(315). However, most of the business community views City Government and its staff
with suspicion and sees them as playing an unaccommodating or even obstructionist role
vis-a.-vis businesses; for example, one of most common complaints from the business
community during the SBI process was that the City Government created standards for
businesses but did not assist in their meeting the standards (City ofEugene 2005). In this
respect, the Mayor wanted the SBI to demonstrate that the City was assisting rather than
hindering the business community.
The Mayor's third goal, to make inroads into the business community, was
embarked upon by her attempting to shed her image as a Mayor concerned only with
environmental and social issues:
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Well, you know I'd been in the legislature for six years as a State Representative
and I had always taken on more the human rights, human services kind of issues,
children and families, all of those kinds of things so I'm probably more the social
equity piece of the sustainability thing. I, of course, realized that what I needed to
do was convince the community that I understood about a good business bottom
line as well, so that just made sense for me in that respect.. ..But in terms of my
background, I've always been a strong environmentalist and a strong social
service advocate, probably not as strong on the having to make money kind of end
(Piercy 2008b).
This image of the Mayor was coupled with the 2001 economic slump that had led
to a high degree of unemployment, underemployment, contingent work, and low pay,
among other issues, in Eugene and Oregon at large (Oregon Center for Public Policy
2006, 2007). As a result, no matter how much Mayor Piercy wanted to focus on
remedying the City's social and environmental problems, she realized that the economic
woes of the City were of equal import. This need for a balanced approach to
environmental, social and economic issues is echoed nationwide. Such an approach, in
fact, has led to the now widespread, international discussion of "green jobs" and green
jobs policy (Cox and Mair 1988; Logan and Molotch 1987; Dean 2009). The prevalence
of the current neoliberal economic development paradigm, which seeks to spur business
development as the primary means for addressing social and environmental problems,
ensures the domination of neoliberal economic development policy over all other
concerns. Some would argue that it is neoliberal economic development policy, as part
and parcel of the capitalist economic system, that is causing the social and environmental
problems we are currently facing (Foster 2002; Daly 1996; Harvey 2005; Logan and
Molotch 1987; Ayres 1998; Evans 2002; Bullard 2005). To significantly address these
issues requires a different economic system, rather than a balanced approach to an
inherently unsustainable economic system. This issue will be discussed further in the
next section in conjunction with the examination of the implications of the Mayor's goals
for the SBI.
Piercy's fourth goal was to harness the power ofthe "sustainability movement"
(which is more of an idea than a coalesced movement) to make Eugene one of the most
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sustainable cities in the country. 17 Piercy wanted to build on this momentum to address
Eugene's problems. She wanted Eugene to be at the forefront of marketing itself as a
mecca for sustainable businesses. Other Oregon cities, such as Portland, were already
marketing themselves as good places for sustainable businesses and, by 2004, Mayor
Piercy had tapped into a nationwide discussion on green jobs:
And I would say that this has all gotten kind of mixed together between climate
change and sustainability discussions. They're all kind of woven in together right
now. So when I went to the Climate Summit in Seattle and heard Clinton and
Gore, and everybody talk I was kind of excited by the green jobs concept because
to me that meant that these big guys were finally getting the fact that you can
provide, like, solar jobs and do the good environmental work and provide good
jobs for people. That's what we should be trying to do (piercy 2008b).
Such an ideal is quite difficult to implement, as the business community is often highly
opposed to regulations, such as mandatory payment of living or prevailing wages, which
would ensure that any jobs created are good jobs. The business-oriented SBI TF
members expressed their opposition to wage regulations, despite the evidence that
successful programs to stimulate the clean energy economy while providing good, green
jobs, such as Germany's massive home weatherization program, required government
regulation of environmental harm (in Germany's case, carbon emissions) and government
investment in or financing of the program.
Piercy's interest in building a sustainable Eugene economy also stemmed from
statewide momentum to use sustainability as "an important component of Oregon's
economic development efforts" (Oregon Business Association 2010). The idea was that
Oregon could put itself in a "good position to take advantage of shifting national policies
related to renewable energy and to become a leader in innovative initiatives that address
17 In 2000, Governor Kulongoski issued a Sustainability Executive Order that called on the Oregon
Economic and Community Development Department to "develop a range of resources to support
organizations adopting sustainable practices. These resources may include training and educational
opportunities, electronically available information and case studies, and other services of great value to
businesses, communities, and other organizations." There are also numerous sustainability organizations in
Oregon, including the GreenLane Sustainable Business Network, and the Sustainable Advantage (formerly
called the Sustainable Business Symposium) in Eugene (Oregon Department of Administrative Services
2009).
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climate change and other critical issues" (Oregon Business Association 2010). Mayor
Piercy saw this as a window of opportunity for Eugene to take advantage of and develop
an economy that balanced environmental, social and economic interests. The desire for
businesses to locate themselves in a city that has an environmental awareness was
reinforced by a SBI TF member specializing in Eugene's economic development, who
explained that many businesses that looked to locate to Eugene did so in part because of
its perceived environmental awareness and the sheer number of businesses in Eugene that
already practice some form of sustainability (Ransom 2008).
The Mayor's fifth and final goal was to use the SBI to create a structure within the
City Government that would ensure the City's ongoing engagement with sustainability.
In her interview with me, she pointed out that this might be the most important thing the
SBI TF could do because it would ensure that the City kept working on issues of
sustainability beyond her tenure as mayor. It would create an avenue for citizens and the
government to continue working on sustainability issues. This was especially important
to the Mayor because she knew that the SBI's accomplishments would be limited by its
time frame - 18 months - and its funding - $5,000 (Piercy 2008b). In the end, the SBI
TF recommended to the City Council that it establish an Office of Sustainability (as a
City department) and a Sustainability Commission. Both recommendations were
approved by the City Council (City of Eugene City Council 2007; City of Eugene
Sustainable Eugene 2010).18
The fact that the SBI was a central component of the Mayor's political strategy
greatly impacted the ways in which social equity was addressed through the SBI. The
Mayor's need to develop relationships with the business community led to the
development of the SBI in the first place, but subsequently led to a shifting of the process
and methods for organizing the SBI. It influenced the goals she envisioned for the SBI,
which in turn affected the selection of those with whom she worked in proposing and
developing the SBI formulation process. In short, because it was the Mayor's SBI, her
18 The Sustainability Commission is run by citizens and was created March 2007 by Ordinance No. 20379
(City of Eugene Sustainable Eugene 2010).
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varied interests and goals for the SBI shaped its foundation and its results. Yet her
attempt to balance the interests of the various interest groups in Eugene had positive
consequences beyond the SBI. In Mayor Piercy's reelection campaign, her opponent,
Jim Torrey, discussed environmental sustainability issues in his platform as well,
evidencing a clear shift in the acceptability of sustainability (Oregon Secretary of State
2008). Of this, Mayor Piercy said:
At first [Torrey] was kind oflike they were all treating it like, oh, that's the fluffy
stuff she does. Then they realized that it had legs and they wanted to try to own it
(Piercy 2008b).
Implications of the Mayor's Political Goals on the Formation of the SBI Task Force
The Mayor's five main political goals for the SBI drove the formation of the SBI
itself and had significant implications for how the SBI ultimately dealt with social equity
issues, such as wage requirements and greater respect for unionization efforts.
Her first political goal, creating inroads into the business community, had perhaps
the broadest impact on the SBI process. First, if she was going to make inroads into the
business community with the SBI, she needed members of the business community not
only involved but leading the SBI. As a result, the TF was chaired by two members of
the business community, one of whom was well connected to the Eugene Chamber of
Commerce; the majority of the members of the SBI Task Force and Technical Advisory
Committee were from the business community. The co-chairs were instrumental in
setting the agenda for meetings and producing materials for the SBI.
98
Table 3. SBI TF members, staff and professional affiliations.
SBI Task Force Members
Name On!:anization
Lisa Arkin Oregon Toxies Alliance
Josh Bruce Rainbow Valley Design and Construction, Inc.
Julie Daniel BRING Recycling
Roger Ebbage Lane Community College
Lynn Feekin Labor Education and Research center, University of Oregon
Dave Funk FunklLevis & Associates, Inc. (Co-chair of TF)
Kartar Khalsa Golden Temple
Terry McDonald St. Vincent Depaul Society of Lane County
Mark Miksis Arlie and Company
Deborah Noble West Wind Forest Products
Scott Pope Sustainable Wealth Management
Rusty Rexius Rexius Company (Co-chair ofTF)
Jack Roberts Lane Metro Partnership
Randy Ross Honoring Our Native and Ethnic Youth (HONEY); Landscaping
Claire Syrett Eugene-Springfield Solidarity Network/Jobs with Justice
Claudia Villegas Downtown Languages
SBI Task Force Staff
Name
Bob Doppelt
(SBI TF 2006a).
Orl!:anization
Director of Resource Innovations (TF Coordinator)
Due to the apparent control by traditional business interests over the SBI, contrary
issues related to social equity, such as wage requirements, were extremely difficult to
address. The main social equity issue proposed to the SBI TF, implementing a living
wage ordinance, was marginalized by the business community SBI TF representatives
throughout the SBI process (Ransom 2008; Dunlap 2008; Nichols 2008; Bell 2008;
Fenton 2008).
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Mayor Piercy's second goal, to forge a relationship between the business,
environmental and social justice communities, as well as between the business
community and the City, ended up resulting in perhaps the majority of the tension on the
SBI TF. In order to fulfill this second goal, the Mayor needed to make sure that all
communities were represented on the TF and the Technical Advisory Committee. She
ensured that prominent members ofthe business, environmental, social justice and labor
communities were represented. By attempting to bridge these distinct communities, the
TF brought together individuals with very different ideas about the SBI. The
representatives from the social justice community focused on wages and the right to
unionize, key issues for the social justice community, but highly controversial in most
business circles. In short, the social justice representatives' pursuit of their own version
of sustainability was problematic for the representatives of the business community, the
primary community with which the Mayor was attempting to forge relations.
The Mayor's third goal for the SBI, to expand her image from that ofthe "social
justice-environment Mayor," to the "Mayor for all of Eugene," pushed her to pursue
results that were beneficial to the business community. Such results could not be
regulatory, as that would have cemented her political place as anti-business. Instead, the
results had to focus on incentives and encouragement for sustainable business practices.
Yet, the attempt to balance several conflicting interests will often leave all parties feeling
short-changed. Despite her encouragement of a business-friendly SBI, according to two
representatives from the business community, her efforts fell short ofplacating their
concerns (Ransom 2008; Nichols 2008).
Piercy's fourth goal was to build on the existing momentum of sustainability
locally, statewide and nationally. This goal provided a foundation and legitimacy for the
SBI, however its direct impact was minimal. The momentum and energy springing from
sustainability can be somewhat infectious, and it no doubt encouraged the Mayor to press
forward with the process, providing hope throughout the fractious process. There was a
certain degree of danger in the Mayor's investment in the SBI process. Given the wrong
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balance of participants, the SBI could have been commandeered by anyone interest
group, further undermining her already fragile mandate to run the City. Furthermore, a
failed SBI would have provided ample fodder for a victory by an opposing candidate
during her then upcoming mayoral reelection campaign. So, it was in part the hope of
maintaining and enhancing Eugene's position as one of the most sustainable cities in the
nation that motivated the Mayor to pursue and continue her quest to create a successful
SBI.
The Mayor's fifth goal, to create a permanent sustainability department or
citizen's commission within 18 months of convening the SBI process, led to two primary
results. The first stemmed from the fact that all SBI TF members were volunteers, most
held full-time jobs, and most volunteered in the community outside of the SBI. The 18-
month time frame for a group of volunteers was exceedingly ambitious, if not unrealistic.
The decision-making structure for the TF was consensus-based. Given the 18-month
time frame, the TF was forced to preclude discussion of highly contentious issues that
could not be resolved quickly and to focus instead on those issues that would tend to
gamer unanimous support. This process led to a situation in which the TF only dealt with
issues that represented the group's lowest common denominator, which ultimately
benefited the business community. Referring to this, one TF member commented:
But since we were trying to operate on a more or less consensus basis and keep
everybody on board there really wasn't any way to keep the business people there
if you tried to have these very strict rules. So that [social equity] did get
subordinated in fact, if not in our verbiage. We all, I think, at the end of it
recognized we had not really done that piece the justice that some would have
liked us to (Ransom 2008).
Based on this comment, it would appear that the representatives from the business
community felt they held some degree of power over the process that other groups
lacked, and the short lifespan of the SBI only made this power more evident: they had to
move forward with consensus and could not do so without business on board.
The second implication of the Mayor's desire to establish some sort of permanent
sustainability entity within the City by the end of the 18 months was that it provided an
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"out" for the SBI TF with respect to difficult issues. If the TF could not deal with certain
contentious issues, namely social equity, in their l8-month tenure, they could proffer the
excuse that these issues could be dealt with by the Office of Sustainability or the
Sustainability Commission, after the SBI TF's time expired. When I interviewed one of
the co-chairs, who was sincerely upset by the TF's neglect of social equity in the SBI, he
pointed out several times that the TF had an informal agreement to make sure that social
equity "received its day" in the Commission or the Office of Sustainability (Nichols
2008). In short, the combination of a time crunch and the expectation that the City's
sustainability work would continue through another entity provided the TF with a safety
valve concerning their neglect of social equity issues.
Economic development initiatives focused around sustainability can speak to a
multitude of groups and address several issues simultaneously. This is the beauty and the
danger of a sustainable economic development agenda. In other words, sustainability has
enormous political malleability. The use of sustainability to meet multiple goals is not
unique to Mayor Piercy or Eugene's politics, yet examining how it has been used in the
case ofthe Mayor's SBI provides detailed insight into the roots of the conflict over
sustainability. Having addressed the political context from which the SBI emerged and
the Mayor's goals for the SBI, the discussion will now tum to the second main
component of the SBI's micro-political context: how the composition of the SBI TF
isolated and undermined social equity.
The Players: Members of the SBI TF and Other SBI Participants
There were several different groups involved in the early stages of forming the
SBI. A few individuals who later became SBI TF members and the Mayor's advisors
helped to spark the original idea for the SBI and then to define its purpose and goals so
that the Mayor could begin the process of raising awareness and soliciting TF members.
The City Council approved the individual members of the TF and allocated $5,000 to
develop the SBI. It was also the City Council who approved the TF's final
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recommendations and created the Sustainability Commission and the Office of
Sustainability. The Mayor scheduled several roundtable meetings and online forums to
gather input from the general public. The TF organized meetings with environmental and
business groups to ensure that their particular interests were heard. Over the course of 18
months, the SBI TF attended every SBI meeting, and ultimately defined, developed and
led the implementation of the SBI. This sixteen-member volunteer group, led by two co-
chairs from the business community, was composed of three sub-committees that
mirrored the triple bottom line: social, environmental, and economic. The SBI was
staffed by a few people, selected by the Mayor, who exerted a great amount of influence
over the process. The main person staffing the SBI, also known as the Coordinator of the
SBI, was Bob Doppelt, the Director of the University of Oregon Resource Innovations
program. He was assisted by a few University of Oregon graduate students (Resource
Innovations 2010).
The SBI Coordinator's Emphasis on Two Legs of the Sustainability Stool: Economy
and Environment
Bo~ Doppelt, the coordinator of the SBI, played an important part in the SBI's
failure to adequately address social equity. He was selected by the Mayor to coordinate
the initiative for a few reasons. His connection to the University of Oregon gave him
access to resources (material, human, and educational) that were very useful to
developing the SBI. With only $5,000 to develop the initiative, the SBI TF could not pay
an individual or organization to develop materials specific to the SBI; therefore, access to
Doppelt's resources was very valuable to the TF (Piercy 2008b; Krall 2008). In addition,
Doppelt was one of the individuals who first approached Mayor Piercy about
participating in the SBI; he had experience with sustainability that was invaluable to the
process (Piercy 2008b). He had spent many years working with businesses nationwide
on how to make their operations more sustainable, and was well-known in the Eugene
community for similar work. During their interviews, several SBI TF members
103
mentioned that they had had positive previous experiences with him (Ransom 2008;
Fenton 2008; Nichols 2008). One such TF member stated:
I wanted to be involved in it [the SBI TF] because before taking this job I'd had
some conversations with Bob Doppelt who, of course, does a lot of work in that
area and who I've known for many years. And I was really impressed by his
approach to sustainability, not so much as a regulatory matter but really as a way
of showing people how you can do business better from an economic as well as
an environmental and other standpoints (Ransom 2008).
Doppelt and his graduate assistants staffed the SBI (Krall 2008; Piercy 2008b).
They prepared background materials on sustainability, organized presentations for the TF
during almost every meeting, which served to prime TF members for the topic of the
meeting, and summarized each meeting for TF members. At the first TF meeting,
Doppelt gave each TF member a binder with information on sustainability that combined
research conducted by the coordinating team, the Roundtable preparatory interviews, the
Roundtable participant feedback, and public and business surveys. The topics covered by
this information were varied, but followed the topics that were discussed during the
Roundtables, which were convened as an early step in the SBI process to ensure broad
public discussion and participation. These topics included green building, education and
technical assistance for business, reuse and recycling, finance and funding, biofuels,
renewable energy, natural and organic foods, among others. Doppelt and his assistants
conducted literature reviews and gathered case studies of sustainability and then passed
this information on to the TF. Doppelt also invited experts on sustainability to meet with
the TF. Guests and topics included Gary Liss from Loomis, CA, speaking on zero waste;
and Ralph Groschen from the Minnesota Department of Agriculture speaking on biofuels.
Other topics presented by experts involved green mortgages, city efforts to educate the
public on sustainability, alternative energy education campaigns, and green-building
recommendations from the City's technical advisory committee. After each meeting,
Doppelt and his group drafted summaries of what had been discussed at the meetings and
culled useful information for the TF. With input from TF members, Doppelt also planned
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the agenda for future meetings, including the topics to be discussed and the amount of
time allotted for discussion (Krall 2008; Fenton 2008; Ransom 2008).
Doppelt clearly held considerable control over the activities and direction of the
SBI TF. This is important to understanding the way in which the SBI TF addressed
social equity. Doppelt's role in the SBI TF influenced the weight given to social equity
in three main ways. First, he assisted Mayor Piercy in selecting members of the TF. He,
along with others, approached the Mayor with the idea of launching something like the
SBI while Piercy was still on the campaign trail in 2004. After she was elected, they met
again to begin planning the details of the SBI, including discussions of who would be
important to have on the TF (Krall 2008; Piercy 2008). Several of the individuals
discussed during these early meetings did, in fact, become TF members.
Second, Doppelt provided the TF members with much of the information on
sustainability to which they were exposed, as discussed above. After one social equity
representative on the TF complained to him that social equity wasn't being addressed in
the roundtable meetings, Doppelt said that there wasn't a way to have separate roundtable
meetings on social equity because equity wasn't a specific industrial sector (Fenton 2008;
Bell 2008). As a compromise, Doppelt agreed to raise the issue of social equity within
each roundtable meeting. One social equity representative, remarking on the failure to
have a social equity roundtable, explained:
I said this earlier about how we wanted to do a roundtable on social equity and
[Doppelt] said no, it has to cut across all sectors. So Doppelt would say in the
roundtables ...what about social equity? What about the wages and benefits in
this? And people are there and they're so thrown off by this because they're there
to talk about their work and they're there to talk about what would make their
work grow. And now you're talking about wages and benefits and it sort of does
not compute ... so even though social equity was raised in every round table, it
went nowhere (Fenton 2008).
According to several TF members interviewed, including the social equity representatives
and Doppelt himself, raising the social equity piece in the roundtables was always
awkward and caused the discussions to stall. The social equity TF representatives felt
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that the social part of sustainability needed to be built into the discussion at the
roundtables from the very beginning - on equal footing with the economy and the
environment - and that the importance of dealing with social equity issues needed to be
emphasized in the TF's presentations to the roundtables. Instead, social equity was
brought up as "an add-on" in the roundtable discussions, rather than as a central element
of sustainability (Bell 2008; Fenton 2008). As the primary planner and discussion leader
of the roundtable discussions, Doppelt made some critical choices about how or how not
to incorporate social equity into the roundtable discussions. The social equity
representatives, as well as other TF members, commented that Doppelt's expertise was in
the environmental aspect of sustainability, not social equity (Bell 2008; Fenton 2008;
Doyle 2008). Regarding Doppelt's actions around social equity, one social equity
representative commented:
Again, it's this thing of-I witnessed this and I thought hmm, I see this happening
but don't know how to solve this and Doppelt doesn't have [social equity] as a
mandate, geez, I have to solve this. He feels like, I'm doing what [the social
equity representative] asked me to do, I'm raising social equity stuff every single
meeting. It's not that he had some ill motives about it, but just that he didn't care
enough or that it wasn't essential. He didn't see it as, I have to get something
through here on social equity (Fenton 2008).
Doppelt, however, wasn't alone. The social equity representatives on the TF also
struggled with how to talk about the social equity aspect of sustainability. In the end,
while Doppelt did not refuse to include social equity in the discussions, the structure and
process he created did not engage roundtable participants on social equity and may have
done significant damage to its potential inclusion in the final recommendations. Like
Mayor Piercy, Doppelt was invested in producing concrete results by the end ofthe 18-
month period. The lack of financing for the SBI, as well as the constant sense that the
business representatives could walk out of the SBI process, which would have resulted in
great damage to the Mayor's image, may have encouraged Doppelt to avoid bogging the
process down in conflict related to social equity (Krall 2008; Fenton 2008; Bell 2008;
Ransom 2008). Ultimately, the roundtable discussions and the notes taken on them did
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not demonstrate that addressing social equity was deemed an essential aspect of being
sustainable. In a few rare cases, members of the Eugene labor community did attend
roundtable meetings and attempted to make social equity an issue, but given that social
equity was not presented as being on equal footing with the economy and the
environment, their comments were viewed as those of outliers by Doppelt and the rest of
the TF (Fenton 2008; Bell 2008).
The third way in which Doppelt influenced the inclusion of social equity in the
SBI TF was through his role as the person tasked with analyzing the information
collected from all SBI TF meetings. These meetings included the TF's own meetings, the
TF's meetings with organizations in the community (environmental groups, the Chamber
of Commerce, and others), the Roundtables, and other public forums (e.g., an online
survey). One social equity TF member shared the following as an example of Doppelt's
control over the process:
You know, Doppelt had enormous control over what got boiled down at a
Roundtable. There's just too much paper and we all know it and we got drowned
in the amount of stuff. I went to almost every Roundtable, but then there's
minutes and then what are you going to take from it and how do you decide the
import of all the stuff. There's all this process but really, it's Doppelt sifting
(Fenton 2008).
This same TF member pointed out an important structural challenge within the SBI.
Doppelt wasn't only in charge of sifting through information; he took on a great deal
more responsibility simply because the TF members were volunteers, most of whom had
full-time jobs outside of the SBI (Dunlap 2008; Jackson 2008; Doyle 2008; Resource
Innovations 2010). The combination of Doppelt' s position as co'ordinator of the SBI and
other TF members being overwhelmed with the amount of work the SBI process required
of them, led to Doppelt being almost the exclusive link between the information they
gathered and its presentation to the TF.
In addition to the primary ways in which Doppelt influenced the TF - by helping
to choose TF members, preparing select materials for the TF, and culling information
from the public outreach process for the TF - Doppelt was viewed as an expert on topics
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relevant to the SBI. His designation as an "expert" allowed him a higher degree of
freedom in his methods and actions, as well as a greater degree of responsibility and
authority within the TF. At one point during her interview, the Mayor said: "I tried to
keep my hands off because I wanted them to do their [work] - I'm not an expert anyway
- and Bob [Doppelt] did a terrific job" (Piercy 2008).
The failure to appoint a coordinator who brought skills in all three aspects of
sustainability, or alternatively the failure to appoint three different coordinators, each an
expert in one of the three aspects of sustainability, may have doomed social equity from
the outset. However, this may point to a larger problem, that sustainability is a relatively
new field and that few people are adequately skilled and experienced to present with
equal weight the three aspects of sustainability. Finally, higher wages and the right to
unionize, in the short run, cost businesses money. In contrast, environmental
sustainability, such as saving paper and turning off lights, saves businesses money. This
simple discrepancy creates constant tension between businesses and social equity
proponents, such that a coordinator of a sustainability initiative would have to forcefully
place social equity at the forefront of the agenda in order to ensure it survived the
impending conflict.
The SBI TF Co-Chairs
In selecting co-chairs for the SBI TF, the Mayor tried to balance her interest in
reaching out to the business community with keeping progressive politics in play,
especially those related to social and environmental issues. As a result, the Mayor
selected one co-chair, Rusty Rexius, who she believed represented the more traditional
sector of the business community. Rexius owns a forest products business and was
President of the Chamber of Commerce during the initial stages of the SBI (another SBI
TF member succeeded him as Chamber President when Rexius' term ended). The other
co-chair, David Funk, held values similar to the Mayor's. Funk owns an advertising firm
called Funk, Levis and Associates. Although the co-chairs had divergent political views,
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both emerged from the business community. Therefore, from the outset, business
interests were over-represented in the leadership of the SBI TF. With regard to the
selection of Rexius, who represented the traditional business community, the Mayor said:
He contacted me and he was talking to me about this eco-berm that [his forest
products company] had invented in construction to prevent erosion. The
[conventional landscaping industry] just used plastic and silt which isn't a very
environmentally good practice. So they had invented, and were using one at the
[his company] site, a biodegradable eco berm and were frustrated because ODOT
[Oregon Department of Transportation] only would buy conventional berms and
the City wasn't taking advantage of this opportunity, and he was frustrated. I just
said, well, Rusty you're just the poster child of what I'm interested in because it's
a sustainable product, you're a local business, and it's environmentally sound. So
that's the whole concept. So I asked him ifhe would be willing to co-chair this
TF and he said yes. I think he'll tell you he took some heat for doing it (Piercy
2008).
In fact, when I asked one SBI TF member who represented the business community to
comment on how the larger Eugene business community responded to the SBI when it
was first proposed, his answer was short and to the point: "Uh, the initial reaction was
extreme pessimism and speculation and suspicion. I wouldn't get into details here but I
was told several times the folly of my ways for even getting involved with this" (Nichols
2008).
As for the other co-chair she selected, the Mayor said: "Then David Funk agreed
to be [co-chair], which nobody was surprised because David was a big supporter. Rusty,
I'm sure, probably didn't support me when I ran for Mayor and David did. So that was a
really wonderful combination" (Piercy 2008). After interviewing business
representatives with various political leanings, it was obvious to me that their political
orientations colored their relationship and approach to the SBI and particularly to social
equity. During one interview, a TF member named Nichols adamantly pointed out how
difficult it was for him to be a member of the TF. From his perspective, he was part of a
long line of family business owners who did not appreciate the City interfering in
business practices. Furthermore, for him, being sustainable was just good business
practice; if a business owner wasn't being socially, economically or environmentally
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sustainable, then that business would not be last long. For Nichols, it was trying to run
his business in the most efficient and effective manner that led him to sustainability.
Despite his practical approach to sustainability, he adamantly opposed the city
government dictating sustainable business practices - sustainability, according to
Nichols, should occur naturally, the result of a business being run properly. In other
words, he believed that the free market would ensure that sustainable practices prevailed,
because such practices make good business sense. Therefore, his vision of sustainability
did not include city-mandated wage requirements but, rather, focused on incentives to
encourage such business conduct. However, during his interview, Nichols did vacillate
to a degree on this point. He confided during his interview that sometimes it may be
prudent to regulate business, as sometimes businesses need to be forced into doing the
right thing (2008).
Those with a different political leaning, on the other hand, lent a sympathetic ear
to the social equity representatives throughout the SBI process. In an interview with me,
one TF member (who had represented the social equity community) regretted not having
more forcefully asked the co-chairs and others to utilize their power as leaders to raise
social equity issues (Fenton 2008). Yet, those who supported social equity may not have
had a level of support to match the level of opposition to social equity. This imbalance
was aggravated by the dearth of social equity representatives on the TF as a whole. With
the rest of the TF weighted towards the more the traditional "chamber of commerce"
business community, those who supported social equity felt outnumbered (Dunlap 2008;
Bell 2008; Fenton 2008).
It is important to note that the two co-chairs, both business owners, ran very
different types of businesses, which meant they had different individual stakes in the SBI
social equity outcome. Funk ran a small company that employed a small number of
highly skilled employees. Rexius ran a much larger business that relied on hundreds of
workers, a good deal of them low-skill workers. Clearly, the effects of addressing social
equity issues would have been felt more severely by Rexius. This is particularly true in
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relation to the issues pushed by the TF social equity representatives: mandated wages,
benefits and unionization. Most of Funk's employees were white-collar workers who
made above the livable wage and had good benefits. Coupled with this is the fact that a
small business is a less likely prospect for unionization. In contrast, many ofRexius'
workers likely earned below a livable wage and were not unionized (although Ray never
discussed his workers' wages in interviews or in the TF meetings, the wage level for
workers in the forest products industry is, on average, low). Among those on the TF with
larger crews of workers, one stated that he provides health benefits to the majority of his
workers (Nichols 2008). Despite this, that TF member did not feel comfortable allowing
a wage, benefit and unionization discussion to take place in the SBI because of its
potential cost implications for his own business (Fenton 2008; Bell 2008).
The co-chairs were the main public face for the TF and part of the coordinating
team for the TF, along with Mayor Piercy and Bob Doppelt. Therefore, the co-chairs
played an important role in how the TF addressed social equity. As described above,
Rexius had a personal and ideological stake in not drawing the TF toward workplace
equity issues. Furthermore, Rexius had strong connections to the traditional business
community and its associations in Eugene, particularly with the Chamber of Commerce.
These connections may have hampered his ability to advocate for incentives or
regulations related to wages, benefits and unionization. In Funk's case, not only did he
have little to lose as a business owner through implementation of social equity standards,
he also ideologically supported Mayor Piercy and many of her goals around social and
environmental issues. Yet, because Funk was not directly connected to the traditional
business community, he did not have the powerful support behind him that Rexius did.
This support added a great deal ofpower to Rexius' and others on the TF who sought to
avoid any recommendation that required regulations related to social equity.
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TheSBITF
The TF members were strategically chosen by the Mayor and her advisors. The
individuals who agreed to participate were then approved by the Eugene City Council.
The Mayor had a few goals in selecting members of the TF, one of which was that she
was seeking a diverse group of TF members. City governments have been heavily
criticized over the last ten years for not being inclusive enough in their decision-making
processes; this criticism has pushed many city officials to be inclusive in terms of race,
class, experience, gender, etc. when putting together committees that will inform city
decision making (Howard, Lipsky and Marshall 1994; Thomas, 1995). Describing the
process of organizing the TF, the Mayor explained:
[W]e very carefully sat down around this table and tried to figure out how to put
together a broad-based TF.. .to encourage and support businesses that produced
sustainable products, encourage and support every business adopting sustainable
practices, and elevating the discussion of sustainability in general. And the TF
was very good. They worked very hard. Everybody was committed (Piercy
2008b).
Although the Mayor strove for diversity, ultimately, the makeup of the TF was
relatively uniform in terms of race, class and gender. (See list ofTF members and
affiliations above.) Out of sixteen members, nearly all had professional occupations, six
were women, and only a small minority were people of color. Eight members were from
the business community (people who ran their own businesses, represented business
associations, or represented the business for which they worked). Of the other eight
members on the TF, six were from the nonprofit sector, and two were from colleges and
universities. Of the six nonprofit members, four represented social justice nonprofits
(although one was also a business owner) and two represented environmental nonprofits.
While the Mayor expressed a desire for the TF to be broad and diverse, it was still mainly
composed of professional white men. Interestingly, of the six women on the TF, five
represented nonprofits or universities, while all but one of the businesses were
represented by men (Resource Innovation 2010). DeFillippis and North (2004) point out
that there are several barriers to including a diverse cross-section ofpeople in decision
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making, specifically, that individuals from more disadvantaged groups, such as people of
color, working class people, and women, may not have the time to contribute to volunteer
work due to work, family, or other constraints. Mayor Piercy, commenting on the time
commitment required of the TF members said: "Oh my gosh, I think they thought they
were signing up for like, four meetings and ended up having tons of them. They worked
really hard, spoke at so many groups. I think they did a great job and really helped move
our community along a lot" (Piercy 2008b). The TF had anywhere from one to four
meetings per month, and meetings were often in the middle of the day. This made it
nearly impossible for those with inflexible work schedules at full-time day-jobs to attend
meetings.
Interfacing with the city system requires its own set of skills. Bringing in people
as members of the TF who are not familiar with a formal decision-making process would
make it difficult for both the individuals on the TF as well as the city officials and others
trying to make sure the SBI process succeed. Being familiar with the city decision-
making process involves familiarity with following agendas, speaking in turn, voting
processes, such as Robert's Rules of Order, and consensus building. It also involves
having a broader awareness of Eugene politics and how the TF's outcomes could impact
different aspects of the community. Accordingly, most ofthe TF members had
previously served on City committees in some capacity. Having familiarity with the city
process and being an empowered community member was an important factor in the self-
selection of most TF members, as expressed during the interviews. Therefore, those on
the TF tended to be from an empowered class of community members, who
unintentionally blocked access to the TF by disenfranchised community members.
In a similar vein, the business community has a distinct advantage in city
processes, as business representatives are often compensated by their business or business
associations for the time they spend on city task forces and committees (Irvin and
Stansbury 2004). Furthermore, businesses and their associations interact regularly with
the city government regarding incentives, taxes, permits and regulations, among other
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things, gaining skill in navigating the city process. These factors become all the more
important when viewed through the lens of businesses' emphasis on city level
governance as a vehicle for improvement of the economic environment for business
growth (Cox and Mair 1988; Bassett 1996). Therefore, business owners are not only
aware of how city decision making works, but also how to influence such decision
making.
Those representingnonprofits and universities and colleges were also
professionals.. One of the social equity representatives taught university level courses.
Similarly, most of the other representatives from the environmental and social justice
communities were executive directors of their respective nonprofits. Yet, at its core, the
SBI was a business initiative and, consequently, half of the TF consisted of business
people. However, not all TF members from the business community were business
owners. Some were consultants to businesses on sustainability, some managed
businesses, and one was in charge of economic development activities in Lane County;
these individuals were not actual business owners but they all worked very closely with
the Eugene business community and the Chamber of Commerce, and as a result, spoke
with significant authority on the concerns and desires of Eugene business owners.
Mayor Piercy explained that those who were chosen to be on the TF were in part chosen
to influence City Council members to encourage adoption of the TF's recommendations:
So the recommendations came out of each of those round tables [and the Task
Force] then they worked those through a process and eventually came down to
those 22 recommendations that went to Council. The strategy of putting the [Task
Force] together was not only that they had expertise but that there would be
somebody on the Council that each of them would listen to. And the same thing
when they brought the recommendations to Council. They all showed up so that
all those Councilors saw somebody out there that they felt responsible to and
connected to. And [Council members] were very supportive (Piercy 2008b).
The composition of the City Council required the Mayor to seek out several TF members
who would gain the ear of the more conservative Council members. The overarching
goal of the SBI was to develop an alternative economic development agenda, which was
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less likely to be supported by conservative Council members. If the Mayor was unable to
gain the support of these Councilors, the SBI recommendations might not be adopted by
the Council, and the Mayor would be in danger of failing to achieve her goal of forging a
relationship with the business community.
The responsibility to advocate for social equity in the SBI process rested on two
TF members. There were four members chosen from the social justice community,
however, one ofthese, an executive director of an affordable housing nonprofit, rarely
attended meetings and therefore was not a factor in the process (this is a phenomenon that
will be discussed further on). Another TF member represented a social justice nonprofit
as well as a small landscaping business that he owned. Throughout the SBI process, he
aligned with the business representatives over the hardships of being a small business
owner rather than with the social justice representatives around workplace equity. It
seemed that it was hard for individuals who managed employees themselves to see equity
as a structural issue rather than an individual workplace issue where small business
owners struggle to keep their businesses solvent. Admittedly, the two advocates of social
equity were experienced activists and advocates on the issue, but they were simply
outnumbered on the sixteen-member TF.
The fact that TF members were appointed by the Mayor, rather than selected to
participate by their respective constituencies, had a disproportionately negative impact
upon social justice interests vis-a.-vis business or environmental interests. The business
representatives had the support of the Eugene Chamber of Commerce, an organization
that can organize and influence the business community as a whole. This organization
creates a greater sense of cohesiveness, as well as accountability, within the business
community. Also, the majority of business representatives were white males and
therefore were, to a large extent, representative of their business constituency. In
contrast, the social equity representatives, although most were women, were professional
as well as white, and thus did not truly represent their diverse constituencies. The social
justice community also lacked an equivalent overarching organization to ensure
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accountability and unity. With the great diversity of interests within the social justice
community - from labor unions to domestic violence prevention organizations - it was,
and as a general rule is, more difficult to build a sense of cohesiveness and
accountability.
The role of broad-based, labor-community coalitions in city sustainability efforts
(explored in Chapter IV), may have been one of the essential missing ingredients in the
SBI. One of the few effective ways to represent the broad range of social justice interests
in city sustainability efforts is through a broad-based coalition. A labor-community
coalition has the resources and clout to counter the political advocacy ofbusiness
associations such as the Chamber of Commerce. Irvin and Stansbury (2004) point out
that as an alternative to labor-community coalitions, citizen participation in city decision-
making processes can occasionally create the space for divergent interests to be
represented. However, they adamantly stress that effective citizen participation requires
extensive effort, coordination, and financial resources on the part of the city. Citizen
participation became routine following the urban protest movements of the 1960s, and
many people began to believe that city-facilitated public participation was a tactic by city
governments to assuage public anger and to avoid litigation by dissatisfied residents or
interest groups (Irvin and Stansbury 2004). Furthermore, Irvin and Stansbury (2004)
found that citizen participation is often unsuccessful unless several factors are present.
One such factor is that the city must have significant financial resources to invest in
designing and carrying out the citizen participation process:
Although comparative costs have not been subject to close scrutiny, the low end
of the per-decision cost of citizen-participation groups is arguably more expensive
than the decision making of a single-agency administrator, even if the citizen
participants' time costs are ignored (Irvin and Stansbury 2004:58).
Second, unless there is a sense of crisis that drives citizen participation, they are
unlikely to sufficiently invest their time in the process. A lack of commitment by
community stakeholders can lead to harmful conclusions being reached, or may simply
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result in significant expenditure of funds that could have been used for another purpose
(Irvin and Stansbury 2004).
Finally, if the decisions that citizen participants arrive at do not carry authority,
they are unlikely to fully invest themselves in the process either: "If citizen participants
are misled into thinking their decisions will be implemented, and then the decisions are
ignored or merely taken under advisement, resentment will develop over time" (Irvin and
Stansbury 2004:59). Therefore, proper time and resources should be invested in the
design and implementation of citizen participation processes such that their final
conclusions may be implemented with authority.
Unfortunately, the structure of the SBI's decision-making process fails on all
three ofIrvin and Stansbury's (2004) measures for effective citizen participation. The
SBI process had very limited financial resources with which to invest in extensive
outreach, design and implementation of citizen participation. The topic of the SBI did
not engender a sense of crisis to spark broad-based citizen participation. And, finally, the
decisions that the SBI TF reached were only recommendations. The City Council had the
ultimate authority to reject or adopt the TF's recommendations. Thus, based on Irvin and
Stansbury's (2004) standards, the SBI citizen participation process did not meet the
measures necessary to ensure broad-based citizen involvement. Although there were
many opportunities for citizen involvement through the round table process and other
forums, the dedicated effort required to bring diverse citizenry to the SBI was lacking.
Such effort would have required outreach to disenfranchised community members, the
length of time dedicated to developing the SBI would have had to be extended, the
balance of representation on the SBI TF would have needed to be different and the stakes
around the SBI recommendations would have needed to be higher so that citizens felt that
real, lasting change was a possible outcome..
To summarize how the TF composition may have affected SBI outcomes,
particularly with respect to social equity, several points are important. First, because
most TF members affiliated with the business community were either members or
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officers of the Chamber of Commerce, I argue that the business representatives on the TF
were part of a cohesive and accountable business community. On the other hand, the
social justice community in Eugene lacked an equivalent overarching organization and,
accordingly, TF members selected from this community were not accountable to a
unified constituency.
In the end, the domination by the business community over the TF played a
significant role in the TF's recommendations. These recommendations served to
marginalize social equity issues to outside the scope of the SBI discussion. A recent
study by Portney et al. (2009) reveals that the predominance of traditional business
representation around sustainability efforts is not unique to Eugene. Portney et al. (2009)
found that business coalitions were much more likely to participate in city decision-
making processes and interact with city council members regarding sustainability issues
than were other interest groups. Indeed, it is likely that the predominance of business
coalition members on the SBI TF was not a phenomenon unique to Eugene but, rather,
was in keeping with a trend among most U.S. cities in which the strength and resources
of urban business coalitions and their familiarity with city decision-making processes
were employed in order to influence policy outcomes that would affect their business
operations (See Irvin and Stansbury 2004; Logan and Molotch 1987; MacLeod 2002;
Portney et al 2009).
Tracing the Role of Social Equity Advocates on the SBI TF
The central internal struggle between SBI TF members revolved around the
inclusion of social equity in the SBI's final recommendations (Bell 2008; Ransom 2008;
Jackson 2008). Three main issues intertwined to kindle this struggle and to defme the
respective roles of the social equity advocates: (1) the limited presence of social equity
representatives on the TF, the Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), and later, the City
created the Sustainability Commission; (2) the relationship between the social equity
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representatives on the TF and Eugene's labor community; and (3) the influence brought
to bear on the SBI process by Eugene's labor and social justice communities.
Several factors contributed to the lack of social equity representatives on the TF.
These factors ranged from a lack of recruitment within the social justice community by
the Mayor, to the social justice community's resistance to taking part in the initiative.
Examination of each ofthese components provides insight into the social justice
community itself, its connection to the issue of sustainability, and its relationship with
City government and environmental organizations.
Mayor Piercy indicated in her interview with me that she did not do as much
outreach as she could have to the social justice community; however, the social justice
community was not entirely open to participation in the SBI (Piercy 2008b). Although
Piercy has a long history of working in the social justice movement (serving with the
HIV Alliance, the Wayne Morse Center for Law and Politics, Centro Latino Americano,
the Lane County Commission on Children and Families, and Planned Parenthood), the
SBI's orientation was toward encouraging green business practices, not equitable
business practices. The Mayor was preoccupied with getting the business community to
buy into concept ofthe SBI and her position as a "Mayor for All Eugene." At the same
time, representatives from the environmental community strongly advocated for their
involvement in the SBI, creating a situation in which environmental representatives were
overrepresented by virtue of their zeal in seeking to participate. 19 According to the
Mayor, conducting outreach in the social justice community was not easy. She noted that
the social justice community's goals for the SBI were not nearly as cohesive as the
environmental or business community's (Piercy 2008b). Although there are dozens of
environmental organizations in Eugene, they pursued implementation of the SBI with a
unified agenda: that of creating the highest possible environmental standards for
19 Far more than any other interest group, members of Eugene's environmental community expressed
interest in participating in the SBI. They showed up at public meetings of the SBI, and applied to serve on
the Sustainability Commission (based on this researcher's participant observation at SBI meetings and
roundtables; Krall 2008).
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businesses (Smith 2008; Penner 2008). Facilitating this push was the fact that many
environmental standards are cost-effective for a business. Similarly, the business
community was almost unilaterally interested in ensuring that this process increased its
competitive advantage while keeping costs low (Ransom 2008; Dunlap 2008). The
various social justice organizations in Eugene, however, were interested in everything
from affordable housing, to a living wage, to unionization in the workplace, to ensuring
equitable access to sports for low-income children (Bell 2008). Unifying their varied
agendas under the rubric of social equity in sustainability became an extremely difficult
proposition.
In addition to the challenges the Mayor faced in reaching out to the social justice
community, many members of the social justice community opt out of City-led work.
Common conceptions and definitions of sustainability (e.g., the UN's definition,
explained above), exclude or downplay the role of social equity in sustainability.
Therefore, social justice advocates and experts rarely see sustainability programs as a
meaningful avenue for addressing their social equity concerns. This is particularly true
when a sustainability initiative is led by the government, rather than non-governmental
organizations. Accordingly, very few people with experience in social justice issues
applied to serve on Eugene's Sustainability Commission, even after Mayor Piercy and the
TF expressly reached out to that community (Dunlap 2008; Piercy 2008b; Fenton 2008).
Furthermore, nonprofit organizations that represent social justice interests can be wary of
participating in city processes because they fear losing their federal tax-exempt status
(Irvin and Stansbury 2004).
In addition to feeling as if social equity rarely has a place in sustainability
discussions, some environmental organizations have the same problems with workplace
equity and social sustainability as do for-profit businesses. Samantha Jacobs, who runs a
nonprofit organization that mitigates environmental problems and employs many low-
skilled workers, expressed this sentiment. She sided more with business owners on the
SBI TF than she did with social justice representatives regarding the regulation of social
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equity, particularly with respect to paying higher wages and providing benefits. That is
to say that one of her primary concerns was the bottom line, which she felt she could not
meet if she paid her workers a living wage (Jacobs 2008). Interestingly, Mayor Piercy
noted this contradiction among some nonprofits:
To me there's another whole issue with that that's very hard to bridge and that is
that almost by nature nonprofits exist to provide services cheaper and they often
actually depend on an amount of inequity. They're trying to bring more equity to
those that they're providing services to but we are often asking them to do that
without having adequate benefits and wages themselves (Piercy 2008b).
Due to the lack of support for social equity, not only from those outside the movement,
but often within the organizations that lead the movement itself, some social justice
advocates self-select out of processes like the SBI. At the same time, historically,
socially disadvantaged residents have been left out of such processes. For example, the
planning profession comes from a Eurocentric background within which technical
knowledge and expertise are valued, and socially disadvantaged residents are often seen
as impediments to the planning process or are viewed as incapable of comprehending the
technical aspects of City planning and the decision-making processes. (DeFillippis and
North 2004). Furthermore, historical institutional racism within the planning bureaucracy
has led to disproportionately small numbers of people of color, women and working class
people attending graduate programs in urban planning, urban studies, and public policy
(DeFillippis and North 2004). Consequently, although most city governments have
attempted to make decisions in a more socially inclusive way, they still find themselves
with a preponderance of white, male professionals in elected positions, city staffing
positions, and on decision-making bodies like the TF.
DeFillippis and North (2004) point out that even after city governments have been
able to make their decision-making processes more inclusive, socially disadvantaged
residents often remain skeptical of participating in city processes due to lingering mistrust
and disenfranchisement. For example, some labor leaders that I interviewed about the
SBI said they didn't feel it was worth their time to engage in the SBI process because it
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was highly unlikely that they would be able to get the TF to address social inequality
even if they did actively participate in the SBI process (Doyle 2008). In short, many
residents who have been traditionally marginalized by city processes are not interested in
"working within the system"; these residents believe that in order to influence a city
process, they will have more impact if they work from outside of the system. Working
from outside the system primarily includes utilizing social movement organizations to
engage in tactics such as lobbying, running public campaigns around a particular issue,
and using civil disobedience to influence the city decision-making process (DeFillippis
and North 2004).
In contrast, the environmental movement, in Eugene and nationally, has been
successful at accessing and influencing city, state and national political decision making
from both inside and outside the system. There are multiple reasons for the
environmental movement's greater success, but the most obvious is that unlike the
members of many social justice movements, members of the environmental movement
tend to come from more privileged backgrounds (DeFillippis and North 2004).
Particularly in Eugene, the environmental movement is composed of primarily white,
middle to upper class members (US Census Bureau 2000). The social status of the
members of a movement is important because it plays a large role in whether or not they
feel comfortable within, and have the free time to advocate for themselves within,
government-led committees like the SBI TF. Moreover, the vast majority of
environmental organizations in Eugene are focused solely on protecting the natural
environment, rather that environmental justice.2° As the name implies, environmental
justice organizations have an inherent social justice element that is coupled with
environmental preservation.
All of the above-mentioned factors created a situation in which there were only
two advocates for socially just sustainability on the SBI TF, and a lack of interest in the
20 This conclusion was reached based upon extensive internet-based research on the various environmental
organizations in Eugene, including their stated missions and the types of issues they primarily attempt to
have an impact upon.
122
SBI from the social justice community at large. These TF representatives were
outnumbered, and the issues they chose to press were highly controversial within the
business community - the largest interest group on the TF. It is important to note that
despite there being a lack of social equity representatives on the TF, social equity still
remained a hotly debated issue within the TF. During their interviews, most TF members
said that social equity carne up in every meeting of the TF; the problem arose in relation
to actually turning ideas regarding social equity issues into formal recommendations
(Bell 2008; Ransom 2008; Jackson 2008). When the Mayor was interviewed and asked
about this struggle, she said:
I think they agreed [that social equity was just as important] but they found it
challenging. Even when we invited Portland, their Office of Sustainability
people, to come down they found it much easier to do the two [economics and
environment] rather than the third [social equity], but every meeting we had that
discussion. Every meeting we'd recommit to putting it back in there and try to
keep it in focus .. .it was something we unrelentingly worked on (2008b).
Other TF members confirmed that social equity carne up every meeting, but these
TF members were less optimistic about their own commitment to social sustainability.
Business representatives on the TF especially downplayed the importance of social equity
in sustainability. Instead, they focused on how challenging it would be to make any
recommendations around social equity that would not significantly harm the viability of
businesses in Eugene. For example, one of the business representatives responded this
way when asked if and how social equity came up in TF meetings:
I think social equity as an issue carne up at almost every meeting but it was never
the dominant [issue]. I think only towards the end when folks were saying, hey,
we're missing this piece that was made clear by some people who felt-you can't
look at the report and not conclude that-[but] that was not an equal partner with
the first two bottom line issues. But until then it was constantly being raised by
people and some of them had probably had this experience before so I don't think
they went in blind ... they understood that this was going to be the toughest
piece. But it did not get the main focus of our attention until right at the very end
and the question came up, is there something we can do to really make that. The
answer was, we tweaked the words a little but didn't really agree to any kind of
hard standards (Ransom 2008).
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The above statement is telling in several ways. For one, the fact that social equity came
up every meeting shows the persistence of the social equity representatives on the TF. It
also shows that the whole TF was aware that social equity was indeed one of the three
legs of the sustainability stool. In other words, social equity did not slip through the
cracks without anyone noticing; given its prevalence throughout the process, its neglect
in the final recommendations appears to have been deliberate.
The statement quoted above also points out that even though the social equity
representatives raised the issue of social equity constantly, it was never really embraced
by the rest of the TF. In response to these circumstances, and as the end of the SBI
process approached, the social equity representatives made a last ditch effort to include
social equity standards in the recommendations. Through their workplace indicators and
community social sustainability indicators, they highlighted those areas of business
practice that needed regulation to be sustainable (See pages 136-137 for Table of
Community and Workplace Social Equity Indicators). But what prevented the TF from
including these proposals in the final recommendations?
A political struggle ensued with the TF, which itself was a microcosm of the state,
national and intemationallevel struggles around the trajectory of economic development,
protection of the natural environment, and concurrently addressing social equity. In the
case of the SBI, the TF struggled to agree on the method by which to address social
equity. The factors contributing to this problem included: (l) the social equity
representatives on the TF represented the labor community, rather than a more broad
array of social equity organizations; organized labor can be a contentious issue for many
inside the business community because it often infuses the discussion with "class
consciousness" (Cox and Mair 1988); (2) due to their connection with the labor
community, the social equity representatives pushed the TF to focus on workplace equity
issues, such as living wages and unionization, rather than more mainstream issues such
as health care; and (3) in addition to being outnumbered on the TF, the social equity
representatives, despite hailing from the labor community, lacked support from that very
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community. A closer look at these factors will highlight the major tensions that exist
between the business, social justice, labor and environmental communities in general and
enable exploration of possible options for achieving progress in addressing social equity
in sustainability programs. One of the few options available to these social equity
representatives is to engage the larger social justice/labor community in the process, so as
to increase their legitimacy and power on the TF. I will now turn to a more detailed
examination of the social equity representatives on the TF, including an analysis of the
role in the SBI of the larger social justice/labor community in Eugene.
The Pros and Cons of Labor Advocates as Social Equity Representatives
The social equity representatives on the TF used their experience, skills and
connections with workers and their unions to approach the social equity component of the
SBI (Fenton 2008; Bell 2008). Because the SBI largely revolved around making
businesses more sustainable, the social equity representatives advocated for a more
equitable workplace, just as the environmental representatives advocated for reduction of
the workplace's impact on the environment. Similarly, business representatives were
busy trying to balance economic and social sustainability as well as the economic
viability of their businesses. It is this notion of the "economic viability" of a business
that caused the most divisiveness between the business and social justice communities,
because workplace equity was viewed by business as a significant threat to economic
viability. At the same time, the environmental advocates were able to couch their
recommendations within a business-friendly framework - green practices in the
workplace can reduce costs for businesses and therefore were perceived as less of a threat
to businesses. Accordingly, the majority ofTF members were able to find more common
ground with the environmental recommendations than with the social equity
recommendations (SBI TF 2006a).
Had social justice representatives from more diverse backgrounds been appointed
and been active in the TF, the issues advocated with respect to social equity might have
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been quite different. For example, an affordable housing advocate might have pushed for
more city money for affordable housing projects or a larger percentage of affordable
housing in new developments. Such a project would not have directly implicated the
bottom line of business owners on the TF, making the proposal more palatable and also
creating more of a voice and a space for considering social equity more broadly. Also
active in Eugene are various organizations working to bring fresh, local and organic
foods to low-income families; such advocates might have encouraged businesses with
cafeterias or other food needs to purchase these products. Employment advocates
working on issues, such as workforce development, might have pushed to have business
involved in the SBI take on more apprenticeship programs and ensure local hiring. Other
social equity organizations in Eugene include those that work on issues such as domestic
violence, racial inequality, immigrants' rights, international human rights, opportunities
for disadvantaged youth, and more. However, it was workplace equity that took center
stage in the social equity discussion, primarily because labor advocates constituted the
only two active representatives from the social equity community. The TF was never
able to achieve a long-term vision for workplace equity, one in which a business would
remain economically viable despite paying higher wages and increased benefits. Instead,
workplace equity was consistently set up as antithetical to profitability.
Social Equity Representatives and Workplace Equity
After being selected for the TF, and after participating in a few meetings to
discuss sustainability at a more general level, the TF members began learning about each
other's specific "asks" for the SBI. The business community was hoping to escape the
SBI process unscathed and, if all went well, to develop incentive packages for
environmentally friendly practices. The environmental community was exploring a
number of ways businesses in the community could reduce their impact on the
environment, either through altering the types of products they were creating, the
materials they used, or limiting waste in the production process. For the social equity
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representatives from the labor community, guaranteeing higher wages, benefits and the
right to unionize were at the top of their list. From the perspective of the labor
movement, these three issues define the quality of a job. Yet, unfortunately for the social
equity representatives, the issue of higher wages had been contentious on a city level for
some time prior to the SBI:
There had been an issue that had come up in the mayoral race before that had
been before the council, [it] was this issue of should the city mandate living wage
for anybody who is contracted with the city. That was a very contentious issue,
even with some of the business people who were represented at this, who were
general supporters of the sustainable initiative and all that sort of thing, but a lot
of them were small businesses and they were saying, "we can't pay you that
wage. This will make it impossible for us to compete. That was the area that I
think became the most contentious because it really was hitting some people. It
was no longer just a theoretical thing; it was "wait a minute, we do work with the
city and we can't do that if we have to pay these types of wages (Ransom 2008).
One of the most significant attempts to address wages in Eugene was a 2003
ballot initiative, proposed by a coalition of labor, neighborhood and religious
organizations, to create a living wage standard for all City of Eugene municipal
employees and contractors. This initiative failed, yet the issue has not been dropped by
these groups (Mosley 2003:A1). The SBI, with its proclaimed focus on social equity and
social sustainability, seemed like a good place to resume this push. Upon hearing that a
living wage might be a central aspect of the social equity community's focus for the SBI,
the business representatives became nervous about the potential social equity
recommendations (Bell 2008; Dunlap 2008). Although any wage decision that came
from the SBI TF could have been only in the form of a recommendation and would have
had no legal weight, the recommendations could have indeed swayed future discussions
and decisions in the city. Together with the living wage issue, the social justice
representatives focused on the provision of benefits. The TF's discussion of benefits only
explored employer-provided benefits. Thus, this issue was quite threatening to many
employers on the TF who feared the added costs of such a potential mandate (Fenton
2008; Nichols 2008).
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Finally, the social equity representatives pushed for a recommendation that
supported employees' right to unionize, andprovided some degree of preference for
unionized labor. Ultimately, the TF could not even agree to use the word "union" in the
Final Recommendations Report (2006a), and many members felt that by recommending
unionization as a path to achieving workplace equity, it made all non-union workforces
look bad (SBI TF 2006a; Ransom 2008; Nichols 2008). For example, a TF member who
was a prominent member of the economic development and business communities of
Eugene looked at the union question this way:
Part of the fear was, and I was one of those outspoken on this, if you put
something like [a preference for unionized workers] in what is in effect an official
document it advertises to people who are looking at coming here that this is a very
strong union place, and the reality is that Oregon, like most of the rest of the
country, is not a strong union state outside the public sector. There are a lot of
reasons for that and I'm not even convinced that that's a good thing but I do know
that a lot of businesses that come here, that we talked to, we have to first get past
the point that we're not a "right to work" state and we're not going to become a
"right to work" state [and] that this isn't [a state] where you're going to have to
worry about losing a lot of time through strikes or that sort of thing...Also, I think
the last numbers I saw is that the non-governmental workforce is 7% union or
something, and that's why, again, it also didn't make sense to us to say, well let's
brand 93% of our workers as working in a bad workplace because they're not
union. That one really became contentious (Ransom 2008).
Ransom was accurate in his assessment. The labor movement in Oregon is not
very strong outside the public sector and there are many businesses, especially smaller
businesses, that are not unionized?1 Yet, from the perspective of the labor
representatives on the TF, if the City was not even willing to mention unionization in
connection with a business sustainability program, then workers in Oregon are in a truly
21 Unionization rates in Oregon have increased from 15.7% to 16.6% from 2000 to 2008, and the most
rapid expansion of unionization has been in the public sector. Many states, in contrast to the private sector,
"allow public sector workers an intimidation-free union selection process where a union may be certified
once a majority of workers have signed a petition requesting a union. Union membership rates grew from
35.9 to 36.8 percent (275,000 additional workers) in the public sector during the past year, while
membership in the private sector only grew from 7.5 to 7.6 percent (151,000 workers)" (Madland and
Walter 2009).
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troubling position (SBI TF 2006a; Fenton 2008; Bell 2008). In my interview with the
Mayor, she commented:
I think each of those guys [SBI members involved in the Chamber of Commerce]
would say they have a fundamental concern for the well-being of people who
work for them. They want them to have good wages and benefits, and care about
their families, blah, blah, blah. I think if you asked them if they wanted to be
unionized they'd say, not in this lifetime, thank you very much. So from their
perspective, they may be anti-union, pro-worker. The union may see that quite
differently. And I would say, again, the big thing you notice, and I still think is
true of the Chamber, they're very opposed to regulation. They consider that their
duty. So even people who are pretty good on these issues can be very anti-union.
I think that's a problem (Piercy 20008).
The TF members' level of discomfort with unions indicates that unionization is
still viewed by employers as a chief challenge to the power differential between
employers and employees.22 Yet, based on the interviews conducted and meeting notes,
it appeared that only two TF members were adamantly opposed to mentioning or
discussing unionization; however, these two individuals held very powerful positions on
the TF do not only to their positions in society but also because of their forceful
personalities. Apart from a couple of other business people who were not keen on
unions, virtually everyone else on the TF was neutral on the issue and would have gone
along with what everyone else wanted to do. Consequently, the leaders among the
business representatives spoke with significant authority and had great influence on the
TF, as well as the co-chair, were able to convince the rest of the TF to steer clear of the
union issue and, to a certain extent, the wage and benefits issues too.
22 For example, just in 2008 alone, the Chamber of Commerce-led business lobby has spent $80 million
fighting against card check legislation, which would allow employees to form a union if a majority of
employees sign up for the union. This legislation proposed by the labor movement, called the Employee
Free Choice Act (EFCA), is one of the greatest efforts in decades forged by the U.S. labor movement to
rebuild its member-organizing capacity. Conversely, the business lobby has been attempting to erode the
power of the National Labor Relations Act, which, ever since it was passed in the 1960s, gives most
workers in the United States the right to join a union (Fitch 2010).
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In order to properly address all "three legs of the sustainability stool," the SBI TF
decided to set up sub-committees to address each leg. In addition to gathering input from
a website survey and roundtables, each sub-committee was charged with formulating
recommendations as to its "leg of the stool" for the rest of the TF (SBI TF 2006b). The
social equity sub-committee was composed of four people: the two social equity
representatives, a representative from the business community, and an environmental
justice representative. Many SBI TF members, including a few of its leaders, praised the
social equity sub-committee for the thoroughness and thoughtfulness of its work (Krall
2008; Dunlap 2008; Jackson 2008). The social equity sub-committee created a matrix
based on the LEED Green Building Certification program23 for social sustainability (See
tables on next two pages).
23 LEED certification is a standard for measuring building sustainability. "Achieving LEED certification is
the best way to demonstrate that your building project is truly 'green.' The LEED green building rating
system -- developed and administered by the U.S. Green Building Council, a Washington D.C.-based,
nonprofit coalition of building industry leaders -- is designed to promote design and construction practices
that increase profitability while reducing the negative environmental impacts of buildings and improving
occupant health and well-being" (Natural Resource Defense Council 2010).
Table 4. Social equity indicators: Workplace.
BENEFITS
I
I
1
6. SAFETY AND
HEALTH
(SBI TF Social Equity Sub-committee 2006).
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Table 5. Social equity indicators: Community.
INDICATOR LEVEL ONE LEVEL TWO LEVEL THREE
J~~ 3 of6 ill!- H 60f9 "''''
1. COMMUNITY
HEALTH
A. Complie:-o with emissions
sul.... dards
B. Provide.. certified protective gear
C. Equipment in:-.pccted peri-odicaJly
10 assure il's in good working. order
A. Insralls max. emissj(}ns technology
B. On-site waler effluenllre.Hmenl
C. HazardOUS waste trucked away
D. Elimination ()f ru~ili\'e emissions
E. Recycling area..... p;(~\'ided
F. Elimination or herbicides/pesticides
in nr ilIound workplace
A lmtalls max Itlchnology for zero
emissKlns: tests for water/air qualily
B. Hoi", lOxics use reduction plan:
idemifie!'l ";lfe il]lemative~: ha." plan [n
divert \\'ash~ from landfill
C On-site ..hower/change facilltie-s:
prop<Jm to increase ee aWilIcnc<;s
D. "Rcflred equlpmenl" lake-b~ck
E. Ulilizes renewab,le energy sources
A. Company participate... in
wrnmunily education UIld voct\tionaJ
training pr()gram~.
A. Comp~y promotes community
educaljon and facilitates parlicipalion of
employee:-=. with communil)' prngl'ams
A. Cllmp~my dediC!tes slaff lime 10
deve]t1pmt:nL (IF iUld eng~igt:ITICrJl willi
community educalion programs.
2. EDUCATION &
TRAINING
B, Company provides
financiaJ/technical suppnrt 10
\'ocationallrdining prograrn,.
B. Co-sponsors events, perrormances.
& gmups lhut promote civic
eng<!geTTl~nl
'1;'1> I of the f[\UI)Wmg >;¢
A. Pcrcl"n1 of profit<; 10 Hahil.U for
Humanity
B. Cnsigns nn mortgage loan fnr ees
C. Loam: pari or .ill clown pml nf hm.
inlc:rc~1murlgage Inan
D. Actively advocates change in liJ\\'
to promote housing benefits
C. One percent or nd prnfits supporl
Eugene's low j1)come and vulnerableI populatinns
,
-+-7".0'"."=-.,-;,f"'3"'<"".---.-.-----.-
A. EncoUf"dg,es ees' ci\.;c participation
wilh paid lime off fm volunteer
aClivitje~
A. Providl:!'. infnrmation on prog'<lms
for hou<;ing and energy !Wivings
assistance
B. Acti\'e1y seeks lo use malerial~.
products. and \'endon; thai support
sustainability
3. HOUSING
4. CORPORATE
SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY
70" 3 of6 -':,c..
A. Malching funds for e:m:rgy assislancc
B, Matching fund~ for ..;olar panels
C, Subsidie'i for low income housing
D. SubsIdies for mortgages/home
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(SBI TF Social Equity Sub-committee 2006).
The sub-committee created social equity indicators both for the community and
the workplace. The community social equity indicators centered around five issues:
community health; education and training; housing; corporate social responsibility; and
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transportation. Within these five areas, there were more specific indicators such as:
compliance with emissions standards and providing employees with the appropriate
training and resources to meet those standards; company commitment of staff time to
community education; company commitment of matching funds for energy assistance;
company use of materials, products and vendors that support sustainability; and
installation of weather-protected bike racks (SBI TF Social Equity Sub-Committee 2006).
Workplace equity indicators comprised six issue areas: wages; benefits;
participation/communication; fair treatment; opportunities for advancement; and safety
and health. These areas included specific indicators such as a progressive wage schedule;
accessible medical insurance coverage for employees including a probationary period of
not longer than six months; regular feedback from employees to the employer; employer
use of corrective discipline and sensitivity to issues beyond the workplace; each year, at
least 10% of employees are offered opportunities for professional development and 5%
experience actual advancement; and employees are actively involved in improving
worker safety and health, including process redesign (SBI TF Social Equity Sub-
Committee 2006). Like the LEED system, businesses were to receive silver, gold or
platinum ratings based on the level of the social equity standards achieved. The system
was set up to be entirely voluntary and if businesses achieved silver, gold or platinum
certification, they were to receive an incentive of some sort. Based on their experience
throughout the TF process, the social equity representatives knew they would not stand a
chance of success in being able to recommend a regulatory regime for wages or benefits
unless they were prepared to launch a full-fledged campaign within the labor and social
justice communities to advocate on their behalf. This point was confirmed by one of the
business representatives on the TF:
But I was never very optimistic that [the TF social equity sub-committee] was
going to come up with anything that was going to be acceptable to the group as a
whole, just because ofthe nature of what they were trying to do. It's not a
reflection on them; it's just that I don't know how you'd do it. I don't know how
you'd come up with really meaningful measures or criteria that you would get
everybody to buy into... .I remember they came back and they had a number of
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things and we talked around about it. Because I think they were sensitive to
overreaching, they were never going to get anywhere, so they tried to, I don't
want to say water it down, but they tried to come in with fairly moderate steps of
things they would suggest. But my recollection is, it still didn't really go
anywhere and it was clear that if that was pushed too hard that would have
probably broke up the whole deal (Ransom 2008).
But the traditional business representatives' cold response to the social equity
certification program calls into question the whole manner in which social, environmental
and economic sustainability was approached through the Mayor's SBI. If a program to
address social equity issues, which was voluntary and incentivized, was rejected by the
traditional business community, what would be an acceptable way to address these
issues? As mentioned earlier, the traditional business representatives pointed out in their
interviews that they would have preferred to have the program run by an entity from the
traditional business community, such as the Chamber of Commerce. However, if a
traditional business entity was to run the program, there might be more buy-in from the
business community, but there might also be little accountability.
TF Social Equity Representatives Lacked Outside Support
A major stumbling block for the TF's social equity representatives was their lack
of support from the broader labor movement. As explained above, given the social equity
representatives' position on the TF - both outnumbered and trying to push controversial
workplace equity issues - they needed all the outside support they could muster in order
to shift the dialogue toward social equity. Outside support, in the form ofpolitical
pressure on the SBI TF through letters and phone calls to the TF, Mayor and/or
Councilors; statements at public TF meetings; or newspaper editorials on including
equity in the SBI recommendations might have signaled to TF members that social equity
was an important issue for the community,z4 However, the Lane County Labor Council
24 Only one op-ed appeared in the Eugene Register-Guard outlining the importance of including social
equity in the SBI recommendations (Bussel and Syrett 2006).
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(LCLC), the organization most capable of utilizing its power to push a labor agenda on
the TF, was unsupportive of the SBI (Doyle 2008).
Central Labor Councils (CLCs), of which the LCLC is one, provide an umbrella
organization under which a variety of unions from a particular region can join together to
advocate for workers issues. "As local federations organized on a regional basis, central
labor councils are responsible for unifying local unions, long separated by craft and
industrial jurisdictions, around common legislative, political and economic goals" (Ness
and Eimer 2001). CLCs function very differently across the United States. They vary
according to the issues they focus on, their methods of action, leadership structure, etc.
The LCLC represents most of the unions in Lane County, including those in Eugene, but
historically has been unsupportive of addressing workers issues beyond wages and
benefits (Doyle 2008; Fenton 2008; Bell 2008). Consequently, although the two social
justice representatives on the TF were from the labor community, they supported broader
workplace equity issues than did the LCLC leadership. The LCLC was involved in the
SBI - the President of the LCLC was on the SBI Technical Advisory Committee (TAC),
as were a couple of union leaders from the Building Trades - however, this did not serve
to increase the weight of social equity in the SBI (Doyle 2008, Resource Innovations
2010). Instead, it served to illuminate the misaligned interests within the labor
community on the nexus of equity, environmental and labor.
The leaders from the Building Trades conducted a presentation to the SBI TF on a
campaign they were running called Build Oregon Responsib1y25 (Eugene-Springfield
Solidarity Network 2009). They believed their campaign addressed social equity in a
way that could be replicated by the SBI, and recommend that the TF adopt the Build
Oregon Responsible agreement. Essentially, the campaign defined what constituted a
responsible contractor, and encouraged cities and other local and state entities to purchase
25 The Mission Statement states: "Being a responsible contractor, contracting agency, or project owner is
defmed as providing family/livable wage jobs, full family health care, a trained and qualified workforce,
quality/professional workmanship, and a safe work environment" (Eugene-Springfield Solidarity Network
2009).
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goods and services provided by responsible contractors. One Building Trades member
explained that it was a voluntary program, and that hiring responsible contractors would
serve and sustain the community (SBI TF 2006b). However, the Building Trades
members' presentation was not warmly received. TF members were not fervently
opposed to the idea, but no one seemed excited to pick up and run with the idea either
(Bell 2008; Fenton 2008; SBI TF 2006b). In fact, the social equity representatives on the
TF said they felt badly about the reception given to this presentation because the people
who created it had put a lot of work into it and barely received any response from the TF
(Bell 2008; Fenton 2008). The presenters even explained to the TF that the Build Oregon
Responsible agreement did not mandate the use of union contractors, yet the response to
this option was still not favorable (SBI TF 2006b). Aside from this unsuccessful attempt
to advance a labor issue in the SBI, there was hardly any contact between the organized
labor movement and the SBI TF.
The LCLC during that time had a very narrow focus on traditional union issues
such as wages and improved unionization conditions (Doyle 2008). The LCLC's focus
was so narrow that it had not even supported Eugene's Living Wage campaign, despite
the fact that the campaign had been organized by Jobs with Justice, a community-labor
coalition. One of the social equity representatives on the TF said this of the LCLC and
the Living Wage campaign:
We thought we would have won the Living Wage ordinance. We should have
won it...but [with] no help [from] the Labor Council. And the leader[s] of the
LCLC felt about a living wage ordinance, like what does that do for unions? That
isn't a union thing (Fenton 2008).
This statement highlights the LCLC's unwillingness to support any campaign that would
not directly improve its ability to organize workers, even if the campaign had broader
implications for the working class. The statement also reveals that the LCLC had not
changed its stance by the time of the SBI - it maintained its narrow focus on union issues
rather than larger social equity issues. Accordingly, the LCLC failed to be an ally of the
larger social justice community. And an ally was precisely what this larger community
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sorely needed. One labor representative on the TF mentioned in an interview that those
who wanted the Labor Council to address broader social equity issues had been prevented
from attaining leadership positions in the LCLC and, eventually, were shut out ofthe
organization. Seeing no opportunity for leadership within the LCLC, proactive union
leaders often left the regional union in order to assume higher positions in national
unions, creating a vacuum of progressive leadership within the LCLC. With great
disappointment, this SBI labor representative concluded: "So the labor council is a big
problem and a big problem is thinking about how to move forward" (Fenton 2008).
Reflecting on her experience of the SBI, and focusing on the lack of LCLC
support for social equity within the SBI TF, one social equity representative on the TF
said that this factor significantly undermined labor's power in the SBI. And while this
TF member admitted that it may have not changed the outcome regarding the TF's lack
of social equity recommendations, she still felt that the issues proposed by the labor
representatives (a living wage, benefits, and other social equity indicators) would have
been taken more seriously had the LCLC supported them (Fenton 2008).
Without the support ofthe LCLC, the only other method for bringing labor power
to the table in the SBI process would have been for individual unions to rally support.
Such support was not forthcoming. In the case of the Living Wage campaign, individual
unions, through Jobs with Justice, were supportive ofthe campaign. But the SBI, unlike
the Living Wage campaign, was not empowered to produce binding obligations, it could
only make recommendations. Accordingly, the actual impact of the SBI was more
difficult to gauge and, therefore, presented a more complicated organizational task. This
obstacle proved too great, and individual unions did not factor into the SBI power
structure.
The last groups, aside from the LCLC and individual unions, that could have been
rallied to support social equity concerns within the SBI process were the labor-
community coalitions and individual advocates for social equity. Supporters ofthe
previous Living Wage ordinance campaign, which included individuals and labor-
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community coalitions, were in the planning stages for a renewed campaign. Therefore,
these advocates were not interested in expending a great deal of time in the SBI process,
which, at best, could result only in recommendations for a living wage (Bell 2008).
Accordingly, the labor-community organizations did not put their time and energy into
the SBI process; instead, they focused their energy on passing a living wage ordinance
directly through the City Council (Piercy 2008). Accordingly, there was little outside
support brought to bear on inclusion of social equity in the final recommendations of the
SBI.
A Union Centered Vision for Sustainability
The social equity representatives' struggle on the SBI TF to gain outside labor
support for social equity's inclusion in the SBI mirrors a global phenomenon.
Worldwide, the labor movement has failed to develop a vision for worker or union-
centered sustainability, and thus has failed to truly engage in the sustainability dialogue
(Sweeney 2009). Particularly in the United States, where the labor movement has faced
sharp declines in its membership and often must focus on survival rather than new areas
of engagement, asserting a labor vision for sustainability, or working to bridge labor
issues with environmental issues, has been a low priority for most national level labor
leaders (Sweeney 2009). At the local level, there have been some breakthroughs, as will
be highlighted in Chapter V, but these are isolated cases. In Eugene, there has been very
little contact between the labor movement and the environmental movement. Without a
substantial relationship to build upon, the two labor-social equity representatives on the
TF were essentially on their own in terms of developing and advocating for a strong
social equity dimension in the SBI. In short, there were few models in place that these
representatives could use to shape their own version of sustainability. The Mayor
touched on this challenge in connection with the discussion ofthe TF's failure to address
social equity adequately. She stated that even the labor representatives "themselves
haven't figured out how to fit into this [sustainability] discussion in a real way" (Piercy
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2008). This inability to create a vision of social equity on sustainability that others could
buy into follows the trend where the social justice community self-selects out of
sustainability work: it is unlikely that anyone would participate in a process from which
they cannot envision any positive outcome.
Although Eugene's labor community might be disadvantaged in the sustainability
discussion because it has not typically engaged in issues broader than workplace equity, it
is not alone in its lack of vision for sustainability. Across the United States, sustainability
discussions are taking place, most of them without a labor or social justice orientation
(Sweeney 2009). Select think tanks around the country are working with the labor
movement to help it to better understand what stake it holds in sustainability dialogues,
but for the most part, many labor organizations remain focused on more short-term,
parochial issues that reflect individual unions' self-interests (Sweeney 2009). Joe
Uehlein, Director of the Labor Network for Sustainability, summed up the state of unions
and sustainability in a recent talk. He explained that if labor isn't making its voice heard
on sustainability issues, then sustainability will be defined and implemented without the
least regard for the concerns and desires of workers and their unions (Uehlein 2009).
What We Have Here Is a Failure to Communicate: Business and Social Equity
The business representatives on the SBI TF were indeed cognizant of social
equity within the larger realm of sustainability, but what aspects of socially equitable
sustainability were they receptive to, if any? How did they respond to the social
equity/labor representatives' proposals for addressing social equity? Generally, the
business representatives on the TF were not receptive to addressing social equity issues in
the SBI, and especially not in the manner advocated by the social equity representatives.
A few main factors help to explain the business representatives' relationship to social
equity issues on the TF: a general failure to associate sustainability with social equity; an
assumption that the economic leg of sustainability is defined solely as increased
economic growth and profitability; and difficulty defining and measuring social equity.
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At the end of this section, I tum to the ways in which the business representatives on the
TF responded to the only tangible proposal raised by the social equity sub-committee -
the social equity standards certification program. Finally, I explore the TF' s missed
opportunity to successfully address at least one aspect of social equity - health care.
Health care was an issue upon which many overlapping interests existed between the
social equity, environmental and business communities. Addressing health care in the
SBI would have recognized a major social equity concern for workers, and could have
provided assistance to employers in providing a benefit that has become extremely costly.
As I discussed extensively in Chapter II, outside of academic circles social equity
is rarely equated with sustainability, and based on my analyses of the interviews with TF
members and TF documents it appears that this was true for most of the TF members as
well. Sustainability was and continues to be seen solely as an environmental and
economic issue. I argue that this results from the strength of the environmental
movement in the United States and the subsequent success of businesses in coupling
environmental sustainability with businesses innovations and good will. In the case of
the SBI, organizers of the SBI enticed business owners to participate in the process with
the promise that such a program could reduce operating costs. As a result, many of the
business leaders, as well as environmentalists on the TF, did not come into the SBI
process thinking that social equity would be a central component of sustainability, let
alone on par with the environment and the economy.
Mayor Piercy cited as an example a business owner on the SBI TF who produced
natural products, and who did not associate sustainability with social equity:
He told me ... he had thoroughly thought about the bottom line and the green
product. He's natural foods and all of that. But he hadn't really looked at how he
treated his employees as part of the same thing and it really shifted his way of
looking at what he needed to do in his own business with his own employees in
terms of the social equity piece. That's what we [the Mayor and others who
organized the SBI] would hope would happen (Piercy 2008).
Other business owners on the TF also stated during their interviews that the SBI helped
them to see their own business differently, through the lens of a triple bottom line
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(Jackson 2008; Jacobs 2008; Penner 2008; Dunlap 2008). However, no business owner
specifically stated in his or her interview that the SBI process resulted in specific changes
to business behavior that reflected social equity. Thus, some business members of the TF
were receptive to exploring the connections between sustainability and social equity,
even in the context of their own workplaces, but they were not willing to incorporate such
changes into their actual business practices. Other business members said in their
interviews that social equity was a small piece of sustainability, particularly within the
context of the SBI and, accordingly, should not be given weight equal to that of the
economy and the environment (Nichols 2008; Ransom 2008).
The strained relationship between the goal of the Mayor (to strengthen her
relationship with the business community) and the goal of social equity ideals began to
become quite clear. She could only forge relations with the business community by
catering to their interests. As a result, while most business representatives were willing
to pay lip service to the rhetoric regarding the triple bottom line - social, economic and
environmental - in practice, they never expected social equity to be a factor in the SBI
TF's final recommendations. One of the leaders of the SBI TF commented that the hope
was that through the SBI, other sustainability factors would be addressed, but that these
factors were to be addressed under the rubric of economics and business prosperity:
I mean, in the confines of a business initiative ... there was some discussion about
social equity and the environment and all of that was part of the discussion, but it
was part of the discussion under the heading of a business initiative. So that was
important because, I think, in the end what Kitty, what the Mayor had hoped to
accomplish was to really put out there a legitimate effort to identify and then
promote, support, encourage, a particular segment of the business world that was
focused on sustainable products, sustainable services, and in general the notion of
sustainability. And I think that was her goal. I think that's what in the end she
hoped we could look back and say, here are several sections of the business
community that are related specifically to sustainability and here are a set of
things within the business community that is already here, sustainability can be an
everyday part of their business life. That was her goal. I think she accomplished
it (Nichols 2008).
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This SBI TF member, who is also a business owner, chose to understand the SBI
solely as an attempt to expand the number of environmentally sustainable businesses in
Eugene. This was the goal that business owners clung to and used to justify the
preeminence of their own agenda. Ironically, this same SBI TF leader and business
owner later on in his interview spent considerable time explaining the essential role of
social equity in his workplace:
And for me, just personally as a business person in the community, [social equity]
is a significant component always of what we do in order to be profitable and
sustainable and achieve longevity. Ifwe're not extraordinarily aware of our
employee base and the needs that they have and. the right that they have and those
sorts of things, then the rest of that stuff, frankly, doesn't matter a whole lot. So
for me, and I think any business person would say, that's just sort of an inbred,
ingrained part of their thinking. Others would disagree with that. Others would
say, no, you guys never think about that stuff. You care only about profits, which
I mean, that's a different conversation we could have another day (Nichols 2008).
The underlying thread running through this comment seems to be that the
government should have no role in mandating such workplace practices. This
perspective does not take account ofthe fact that often, in the short-run at least, treating
employees poorly may be grounded in employers' financial incentives. Consequently,
the claim that the government need not regulate workplace equity because it is in an
employer's best interest to do so falls flat (Bell 2008; Drier 2002). Furthermore, this type
oflaissez-faire approach to workplace equity does not acknowledge the idea that
employees should have the power to identify for themselves what their primary needs and
desires are, rather than have their employer do it for them. Nonetheless, several business
representatives on the TF concluded that the SBI was not a forum adequate equipped to
deal with workplace equity issues (Ransom 2008; Nichols 2008).
The Triple Bottom Line, or Just the Bottom Line?
The bottom line, simply understood as the dividing line between profit and loss, is
an economic calculation. Sustainability, however, seeks to develop a more sophisticated
bottom line, one that incorporates environmental, social equity, and economic
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considerations. Yet even the economic bottom line of sustainability can be defined in a
variety of ways. On the one hand, it can be defined to mean ever-increasing economic
growth and profitability. On the other hand, it can be defined as general economic health,
referring to a greater number of businesses remaining financially solvent in a community,
and providing jobs, services and goods that are important to the community. In other
words, economic health does not necessarily mean continually expanding the size and
profit margin of the business. Some theorists, such as Daly (1996), argue that a more
holistic version of economic health can be achieved by surrendering economic growth to
social and environmental goals. This is not to say that economic growth is irrelevant;
rather, it holds that the economic component is not the dominant factor defining
sustainability. The foundation for economic growth should be social equity and the
environment. For many ofthe business representatives on the TF, economic growth and
profit were the most important factors in the SBI; this was stated many times in my
interviews with business representatives on the TF. I argue that an interpretation of
economic growth centered around profit contributed significantly to the marginalization
of social equity within the SBI. The dominance of business representatives on the TF
who saw profitability as the central component of sustainability, coupled with the ease of
connecting environmentalism with profit and the difficulty of connecting workplace
equity with profitability, marginalized social equity in the SBI.
The environmental component of sustainability, although to a much lesser extent
than social equity, was also marginalized in the SBI when proposed environmental
measures could potentially undermine profit. The environmental measures that were
warmly received by nearly all SBI TF members and made part of the official
recommendations of the SBI were: helping interested local firms learn about the business
benefits of sustainability and the practices that produce them; committing to expand
sustainable business clusters; recruiting businesses to fill niches and create dynamism
within existing sustainability clusters; and improving access to loans, grants, and other
forms of business financing. The recommendations that required more specific actions to
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reduce environmental impact were made for City of Eugene facilities and operations, not
for private businesses. These specific actions included recommending a plan for
becoming carbon neutral by 2020, developing a Climate Action Plan, purchasing and
using sustainable practices and local products and services, and developing a strategy to
achieve zero waste (SBI TF 2006a).
Similar to social equity issues, the business representatives on the TF were not
interested in discussing environmental measures that required action unless such actions
were incentivized by the City government, voluntary in nature, increased profit, or were
only directed at the City of Eugene itself. There is no question that the City's
commitment to reduce its own environmental impact is important for the larger
community, first because the City sets the example, and second because the City's
demand could spur demand for sustainable products and services, thereby encouraging
the expansion of the market for these goods and services. Yet, the recommendations did
not speak to the social equity component of sustainability, even when it came to the City
(SBI TF 2006a). Had the TF recommended the City commit to reducing social inequity
by contracting with businesses that paid a living wage, provided benefits, and training
opportunities, or had they recommended that the City develop a strategy to achieve 100%
health benefits coverage, the market for these goods and services might have been
spurred, facilitating access to that market for the private sector. In short, in the same way
the TF recommended the City set a standard for reducing emissions or waste, it could
have recommended the City take a leadership role on social equity issues.
Clear-Cut or Mysterious: Defining and Measuring Social Equity
One of the integral factors leading to the marginalization of social equity in the
SBI, as cited by TF members, was that social equity is extremely hard to define and
measure.
The social equity side is particularly tough because you're often trading off
someone else's social justice issues for your profitability and how do you weigh
all that and how do you make that work. So that's what gets really tough when
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you start talking about these things, is getting past the rhetorical recognition to
how do we measure them and how do we figure out how to maximize that bottom
line, and how are each of those weighted. That's the toughest thing, I think, that
businesses have. It's not that they don't want to, it's kind of like how are we
keeping score, so we are playing a game where no one has told you how to keep
score so you don't know how to do it (Ransom 2008).
Definitions are foundational; a problem cannot be tackled until it has been understood.
For example, one ofthe co-chairs explained that, for him, profitability was the easiest
component of sustainability to understand. He explained that for others on the TF, it was
easy to understand the environmental component. "Social equity was, from my
perspective, and I think anybody would agree with this, the most difficult ofthe three
legs to figure out. So first of all, what is it? And then secondly, what do we actually do
to help accomplish it?" (Nichols 2008). Another business owner on the TF made similar
comments:
Since we were such a diverse group, it was difficult to figure out; ok, what is
social equity and how do you get there? And so it's easier to say that we all agree
that good companies are ones that look out for the best interests of their
employees, their customers, the community they live in, and as a general [rule]
that all makes sense. On specific decisions it gets harder. The classic tradeoff is
do we want to have fewer better paid employees or do we want to try to have a
broader base of employees, recognizing if we do that we won't be able to pay as
much or provide as good of benefits (Ransom 2008).
Admittedly, there are few examples of a comprehensive definition and measurement of
social equity, let alone good examples in practice of such. To date, research has revealed
no city that has or is comprehensively addressing social equity in its sustainability work.
As a result, the SBI TF had little in the way of successful examples from which to draw.
Indeed, the TF attempted to find cities taking a more comprehensive approach to
sustainability in other parts of the country, but found none (Krall 2008; Fenton 2008; SBI
TF 2005a). Just as the social equity representatives took a more labor-focused approach
to social equity, many other sustainability projects in other cities have addressed specific
aspects of social equity within sustainability. For example, Burlington, VT addressed
youth involvement in sustainability, and San Francisco addressed environmental justice
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in sustainability (SBI TF 2005a). These examples highlight the fact that social equity can
have a very broad definition, one that encompasses too many issues to be
comprehensively addressed in a sustainability program. When I asked one of the
business TF members ifhe had any ideas for how social sustainability or social equity
could have been better addressed in the SBI, he said:
For me, I think there is a clearer and more well-established nexus between
business activity and environmental impacts and trying to force the companies to
internalize their costs or to recognize the cost component ofthat and trying to
improve the way they do business, that's understandable. The social equity piece,
while businesses have some impact on that, there are a whole lot ofother things
they could do as well, so singling out business activity as the way to try to address
that is a problem for me. So I have a difficult time trying to figure out how to tie
this together and make that work. So I don't have any great ideas (Ransom 2008).
While many of the business representatives on the TF referred to a lack of clarity
around social equity, the social equity sub-committee ofthe TF created a clear and
understandable definition and measurement for social equity. The social equity sub-
committee produced a table of social equity indicators and generated a simple method for
measurement (See Table 5). A comparison ofthe work produced by the social equity,
environmental and economic sub-groups shows that the social equity sub-group provided
as much, or more, clarity on social equity than did the other sub-groups on their
respective issues (SBI TF Social Equity Sub-committee 2006).
Further investigation as to why SBI business representatives found it difficult to
address social equity issues revealed that they felt threatened by the costs related to social
equity measures. The same SBI leader who cited the difficulties of defining and
measuring social equity aspects of sustainability later admitted in a conversation about
health care that his concerns were based more upon cost:
I know from a business person's perspective, it's fine for people to sit around and
say that a business ought to pay for the health care of its employees. In fact, I
can't imagine any business owner who would disagree with that. It's quite
another to actually do it. And not only is it quite another thing to actually do it
but it's an entirely different thing to do it and survive economically. You just
simply can't afford it, in many cases, to do it ... if you require that little
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organization to pay health care benefits, much as they would like to and probably
are aware of the need more than anybody, we're out of business (Nichols 2008).
This SBI leader underscored the fact that, despite business owners' interest in providing
health care to employees, it is simply not always economically feasible to do so.
Although, many business owners in Eugene provide social benefits to their employees,
such as health care, a living wage, or some other form of benefits. However, the issue of
business owners providing employees with health insurance is a huge, nationwide
problem that is demonstrated by the intense debate that occurred over national health care
legislation in the winter months of 2010.
One business representative on the TF framed social equity according to a classic
conundrum of economic development: a community must either choose to have few
good, high-paying jobs (socially equitable sustainability), or many not-so-good, low-
paying jobs (socially inequitable sustainability) (Ransom 2008). In short, the social
equity components of sustainability were framed in the SBI in the same way that
environmental issues are often framed in economic development discussions - jobs
versus the environment. This framing is commonly used to undermine any push to
include environmental, social or community concerns within a given project. In a society
in which employment is essential to individual and community well-being, any threat to
employment, whether legitimate or not, has a dramatic impact upon the direction of the
discussion, just as it did on the SBI.
In the end, while it may be true that social equity is difficult to define and
.measure, I don't think defining social equity was the major challenge for the SBI TF.
The social equity sub-committee provided a definition and method for measuring social
equity that rivaled any proffered by the other sub-committees. The underlying failure
was in not presenting a convincing argument that by creating the triple-bottom line, a
business can still retain a profitable bottom line. Businesses rarely want to appear to the
public as entirely profit-driven, and so, they may rely on the argument that the failure to
include social equity in the SBI was due to its complexity and vagueness, whereas, in
reality, it was simply the business sector's fear oflosing profits.
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The Business Community as Environmentalist?
Since some of the business representatives on the SBI TF played such a major
role in how social equity was addressed in the SBI, it is important to look at these
individuals' previous work on sustainability, and their motivations for serving on the TF.
The majority of the business representatives on the TF had been involved in
incorporating environmentally sustainable practices into their business operations. In this
sense, Mayor Piercy did not solicit business owners for the SBI who were not already
involved in some way with environmental sustainability. When asked during his
interview to comment on the backgrounds of the other business representatives on the TF,
one business representative confirmed that they were environmentally oriented, and that
to have selected individuals who were opposed to environment.alism would have
undermined the purpose of the SBI. "There were no nay-sayers and that wouldn't have
made sense. I mean, there wasn't enough time to try to fight those battles" (Nichols
2008). However, it is essential to keep in mind that these businesses were selected to
participate on the SBI TF based upon their environmental practices, not their social
equity practices.
My interviews with SBI business leaders revealed that many of them had a deep
personal commitment to running their business in ways that benefited the environment.
In addition, as environmental sustainability has become more popular, many business
owners are recognizing that marketing their products as sustainable could have
significant financial benefits. For example, one of the main economic development
leaders in Lane County said:
[M]ost of the businesses that have survived [in Eugene] have recognized that this
is the way of the future, we need to get ahead of it, and increasingly they're trying
to go out and use their own public relations and resources to get the credit for
doing good things, and I think the public is starting to respond to that. For a long
time they didn't (Ransom 2008).
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His comment alludes to the attractiveness of profit-making in the environmental
sustainability movement. However, he quickly followed up this comment by stating that
publicizing environmental sustainability depends on the type of business. Recounting a
conversation he had with another local business owner about the environmental practices
used in that business owner's manufacturing process:
[I said to him] that must be a great selling point with your customers. He said,
you know, what we've learned is that we don't bring [our environmental
practices] up unless they do because as soon as we start telling them how green it
is they assume that it's more expensive and we're not, we're very competitive but
people just assume that (Ransom 2008).
On the one hand, some businesses are using sustainability as a marketing tool to
attract consumers. On the other hand, some businesses are addressing sustainability
because it reduces their operating costs or they believe in it, but do not want to associate
with it publicly because they fear consumers will think their products are more expensive
than traditional products. Similarly, during her mayoral campaign, Mayor Piercy's
advisors recommended she not use the word "sustainability" at all, due to its varied
meanings and potential to alienate certain constituencies. The different ways that
business owners related to sustainability reflect the thin line the Mayor was attempting to
walk throughout the SBI.
Ultimately, it appears the Mayor was hoping that the SB1 process would
encourage better business practices and greater cooperation and support from the
business community for her larger political agenda. However, she does not appear to
have anticipated the strong connection business representatives would make between
environmental sustainability and profitability, as well as the even stronger connection
they would make between equity issues and unprofitability. With more and more
sustainability initiatives like the Mayor's cropping up around the country and the globe,
sustainability will continue to grow more popular with the general public. Consequently,
in the future, more business owners will likely see the benefits of marketing their
businesses as sustainable. However, the much more challenging task is not to broaden
the acceptability of environmental sustainability but, rather, to convince business owners
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that social equity is essential to being truly sustainable, and that social equity is profitable
as well.
The Failure of the Proposed "Social Equity Certification Standards" Program
The Social Equity Standards Certification program, devised by the SBI TF' s
social equity sub-committee, was the only tangible social equity proposal that emerged
from the TF. The proposed certification program elicited a variety of responses from
business representatives, the majority of whom were unsupportive. The strongest
response centered on opposition to an aspect ofthe program that purported to incentivize
certain business operations:
I don't really see any of these as ones that I would say, yeah, this is something we
could do, even such small things as participatory communication.. .1 still think a
lot of businesses would be very nervous about that ... I think it's very intimidating
to a lot of businesses, and sets a tone that makes them feel uneasy about their
relationship with their governing bodies, if that's where it's coming from
(Ransom 2008).
TF members representing the business community said that they would be more
supportive of a social equity program run by an entity other than the City, preferably a
business friendly entity such as the Chamber of Commerce:
I think that [incentivization] works much better, particularly if the awards are not
given, let's say, by the government and have some other group that does that.
Now, Oregon Business Magazine gives these awards for best employers. It's not
as clear cut of criteria as those [proposed by the social equity sub-committee]. In
fact, most of what it is, is it's self-nominated by the employees and then they put
together a package and all this stuff then they go and compete for it and they get
awards .. J think those kinds of things can be really good if they're perceived as
being on an objective basis (Ransom 2008).
Not all aspects ofthe proposed certification program were criticized by the
business representatives on the TF. They were supportive of a proposal to give awards to
any businesses that were able to meet the proposed social equity standards:
The thing I like about the LEED standard is that you're not competing with
anybody else. If you meet it, you meet it and you would be recognized as a
certain type of an employer if you met those standards. I think that would have
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real value. But again, as a nongovernmental way and done in a way that it gets
enough positive publicity that businesses see that as something that they should be
striving for (Ransom 2008).
The aversion to a government-led competitive awarding program was based in part on a
view that the City government would not establish objective criteria for the social equity
program. The advantage of the "LEED-modeled" social equity program was that the
standards were already set and thus were very clear and easy to understand. Businesses
would be aware of exactly what they needed to do to achieve the certification
recognition. However, the business representatives on the TF still would have preferred
the certification, whether LEED or otherwise, to be designed and operated by an entity
more friendly to the needs and issues of businesses.
In a step that could be seen as peremptory, shortly after the SBI process was
completed the business community created its own sustainability program through the
Chamber of Commerce. The business community's relationship to sustainability, viewed
through the lens of its reaction to the SBI, is quite transparent. As long as such a program
was designed to increase profit, it was acceptable to have it administered by the
government. However, if such a program's proposals might have an impact on profit or
regulation of conduct, then should be administered by a business-led organization, and
participation should be voluntary. The business community's relationship to
sustainability was one in which they wanted all of the pleasure and none of the pain.
The influence of the SBI process on business may be considered large, given that
after the co-chair of the SBI TF completed his term as Chamber of Commerce President,
another SBI TF member assumed control as President of the Chamber. In addition, at
least two other TF members became Chamber board members after completion of the
SBI process. This could signify a shift in the orientation of the Chamber toward
sustainable business practices, and that indeed is the hope of Mayor Piercy. However,
the orientation of the business community towards sustainability may be more about co-
optation and control, rather than acquiescence. A social equity representative on the TF
described the post-SBI business community's engagement with sustainability this way: "I
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think that they'll look at these ideas for sustainability and think, what can we take from
this and how can we do whatever ... gives us the label as long as we can control it"
(Fenton 2008).
For many in the business community, the Chamber of Commerce is a good host
for sustainability programs because the Chamber can ensure such programs will not be
implemented in a way that mandates conduct or has an impact upon profitability. In
addition, when operated by the Chamber, the sustainability measures can be more
focused on the interests of business rather than on environment and social equity.
Health Care as the Middle Ground for Socially Just Sustainability
Business representatives on the TF may not have responded poorly to all social
equity issues put forward by the social equity sub-committee. Yet the sub-committee did
not propose a health care recommendation, which may have provided an area for
collaboration. During the interviews with TF members after the SBI final
recommendations had been made, members were asked ifthere were any social equity
issues that were acceptable to all TF members. The majority ofTF members replied that
pursuing health care was a missed opportunity in terms of addressing social equity. For
example, one of the business representatives on the TF immediately gravitated toward
health care:
You can certainly question whether or not employment is the best way to deliver
health insurance coverage ....But that's the system we have today and for most
people if they're going to get health insurance coverage that's where they're
going to get it. So I can understand that there are some small businesses that just
don't have the ability to do that and that's fine, but then I don't think that the
community ought to be putting a lot of time, energy, and resources into trying to
promote those types of businesses (Ransom 2008).
The same individual went on to say:
But it is a huge issue. Most of the other ones [such as wages and benefits] you
can make arguments, like I said, about "well, does somebody who's a part-time
second need to get the same kind of income, but no one can argue that you don't
need health insurance. Everybody needs it and we ought to find a way to get
everybody covered (Ransom 2008).
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The second statement makes clear that this SB1 TF member recognized that health
insurance was an issue that created a nexus between businesses and social equity
advocates. The national crisis around uninsured and underinsured individuals and
families in the United States as well as skyrocketing costs to employers has forced many
business owners to take a second look at potential solutions to health care issues. Given
that health insurance is typically provided to Americans through their employers and, at
the same time, the cost can be virtually prohibitive for many businesses, the business
community is more willing to work with the government to develop a solution.
One possible solution for the health care situation in Eugene is one that only a few
cities have been able to coordinate: City-administered health care consortia. Through
these consortia, business owners with small numbers of employees can pool together with
other small businesses to purchase health insurance. The city simply helps administer the
consortium, which creates a larger pool of employees purchasing health care, bringing the
cost down for each employer who joins. A city-led consortium for health care would
make sense for Eugene, which has a large number of small businesses and therefore a
high number of uninsured workers.26
When 1 asked one of the co-chairs in an interview if the TF dealt with health care
and ifhe had heard of other city governments forming health care consortiums, he
responded:
Urn, no. 1actually-it didn't come up and 1 think it probably could have gained
some traction. Urn, actually, 1happen to deal with all ofthe health care issues
with our company and so I'm painfully aware of that ominous task of securing
health benefits at all under the current climate....1 remember that we talked about
that but that probably would have been something that we all would have agreed
upon and would have probably welcomed the opportunity to discuss that. I've
never heard of the City actually organizing such a consortium....But if it's been
done and successfully, especially in today's climate, 1 think that would be an
awesome thing that the City could do (Nichols 2008).
26 According to the Office for Oregon Health Policy and Research, one in five working age adults lack
health insurance, and one in three 18- to 24-year-olds lacked health insurance in Oregon in 2006. (profile
of Oregon's Uninsured, 2006; Office for Oregon Health Policy and Research.)
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One of the social equity representatives on the TF also responded positively to the
idea of a health care consortium in Eugene. But, for a variety of reasons already
mentioned, little effort was made to find the lowest common denominator for social
equity.
The Business Community's Overall Reaction to the SBI
Based on the interviews conducted during this study, it is clear that by and large
the business representatives on the TF were relieved that the SBI did not result in any
major changes to business operations in Eugene (Nichols 2008; Ransom 2008).
Ultimately, the recommendations that came out of the SBI were uncontroversial and, as a
result, the business community at large was unconcerned with the recommendations and,
in some cases, were completely unaware of the SBI. For example, a business
representative on the SBI TF said:
I'm not sure most of them are even aware of it. I don't know ifit's affecting
them. I think if you went out and talked to the average business person they
would not even know what you're talking about. And that's not all bad because
the way those things become well known is they become controversial, and the
fact that this did not become controversial is good. I don't think that they would
be surprised to learn [of it]. They all recognize that Eugene has a reputation for
being environmental and I think the initial reaction from a lot of business people
is okay, so how much more is this going to cost me or are you going to try to tell
me how to run my business, or whatever. The fact that it hasn't done that and it
hasn't been either a cost or an imposition is really one ofthe more positive things
to say about it (Ransom 2008).
That the SBI process brought together three of the most politically and
ideologically divergent groups in Eugene (environmentalists, social justice advocates,
and the business community) and did not lead to any controversy worthy of the general
public's awareness may be just as much a tribute to its success as to its failure. The
larger business community's lack of awareness regarding the SBI was likely a direct
result of the recommendations involving only voluntary compliance through incentives
and technical support (SBI TF 2006a). Such unenforceable recommendations were the
primary aim of the traditional business community members involved with the SBI and
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they indeed were successful in achieving this goal. This outcome was facilitated by the
Mayor's goal of improving her relationship with the business community, and the
reaction to the SBI by the business community was probably what she had hoped would
result. The SBI process had potential to undermine the Mayor's credibility in all of the
communities it sought to represent, yet, for the most part, it remained out of the limelight.
Had the SBI made recommendations that required regulated or mandatory conduct, the
business community would have surely been angered, solidifying that community's
opposition to her reelection. Instead, the SBI simply helped the business community to
envision new paths for sustainable economic development - a valuable endeavor, but
certainly not a bold one.
One member of the TF who was closely affiliated with the Chamber of
Commerce described the overall effect of the SBI on the business community as follows:
And then as we finished I think people thought, well, that was fairly harmless.
The Chamber of Commerce really got on board. They actually have since then
begun to continue to promote the notion of sustainability and the advantages of
that to the business community. There still is, and I would agree with this, there
still is a sense of, well, that was fine and that's actually somewhat helpful. But in
terms of actually promoting and securing, reaching out to new business to get
folks that are not currently doing business here to come and do business here in
the world of sustainable business products, for example, we haven't really seen
anything that's been very helpful there. We haven't noticed a great wave of
business startups here in town. And so to the extent that was supposed to happen
and the business community saw that as an example of success ...that hasn't
happened yet O'Jicho1s 2008).
The statement commends the City for essentially doing nothing. Because the SBI failed
to produce any mandatory programs, it garnered Chamber support and was considered a
success. But the statement simultaneously blames the City for not directly benefiting the
business community. This puts the City in a position whereby the only way it can placate
business is through direct economic support and the absence of regulation. Neo1iberalism
is indicated as the ideal economic model in this argument.
Ultimately, I would argue that some business owners participated in the SBI to
keep an eye on the process and ensure it would not have a negative impact upon
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businesses. The process was educational for them in terms ofproviding a better
understanding of sustainability. Once the key issues, challenges, opportunities, etc. were
identified, they attempted to co-opt the process by creating their own Chamber-led
sustainability program to strengthen their ownership of the idea. Although this program
does not appear to be functioning as an alternative to the Sustainability Commission, it
points to the goal of the Eugene Chamber, to control any process that impacts business to
ensure a pro-business climate despite the impact on community and environment.
SBI TF Environmental Representatives and the Marginalization of Social Equity
To paint a full picture ofthe marginalization of social equity in the SBI process,
the discussion must now tum to the role ofthe environmental representatives on the TF.
Unlike the social justice community, the environmental community in Eugene was much
more practiced in participating in City governmental processes. In fact, the
environmental community's desire to participate in the SBI was overwhelming. During
almost every public comment period in the initial stages ofthe SBI TF, the vast majority
of comments were related to environmentalism and the SBI, not social equity (SBI TF
2005,2006b). While there were many environmentalists willing to volunteer to
participate on the TF, the Mayor had to actively seek out and solicit social justice
representatives. The distinct responses from these communities toward the SBI reflect
the strength of the environmental movement in Eugene, and the clear connection between
sustainable business practices and environmentalism. Mayor Piercy highlighted the
comprehensive approach towards the environment taken by the City of Eugene:
You saw [the City's environmental commitment] reflected in the Olympic Trials
where we were trying to be a prototype for really green Olympic Trials. We're
just doing that with everything. We're trying to ramp up our bike and pedestrian
plan to keep it moving forward. Just on every level we're trying to bring these
things along. We were working on a carbon emissions baseline and are working
towards our goals for carbon neutrality and all those things. And City purchasing
is, I think it's like 70-some percent local and 80-some percent within the State, so
we are very conscious about the local purchasing. The work we recently did for
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the Council offices was very green. We'll keep doing as much as we can (Piercy
2008).
However, within the environmental community in Eugene (and around the world),
awareness often is limited with regard to how social location affects one's relationship
with and experience of the environment. The Mayor pointed this out when she discussed
some ofthe areas in which community dialogue often breaks down:
And then we have this other quality that I think is a tough one in Eugene too and
that is, for lack of a better way to express it, there are some people who are
involved in the environmental movement who don't have to worry about income
very much. They may be trust babies. They may be people who are happy
leading a kind of modest lifestyle. They're a little elitist about everyday people's
lives and don't have much sympathy sometimes for people who are just struggling
to feed their families and be able to get from one place to another and who either
don't choose or can't lead the same lifestyle as some ofthe environmentally pure.
I think each ofthese need a little bit more understanding of the values ofthe
other....Somehow, being environmentally sound cannot just be the purview of the
privileged and monied (Piercy 2008).
Reflecting Eugene's environmental community's focus on environmental issues relevant
to middle- and upper-class families, the environmental sub-committee generated a list of
indicators of environmental sustainability with no explicit equity dimensions. These
indicators were location (maintaining a sustainable site), green building construction
and/or renovation, water efficiency, energy use, atmosphere/ outdoor air quality, business
inputs/outputs (materials and resources), solid waste, reuse and recycling, indoor air
quality, and employee sustainability education and support.
Conclusion: Eugene's Unique and Significant Experience with Sustainability
Recent literature suggests that city-regions are the main place to promote and
sustain economic competitiveness: "[I]n the new economy city-regions will eclipse
nation-states as the primary scale for promoting and sustaining economic
competitiveness" (Krueger and Savage 2007:215; Scott 2001). But economic
competitiveness is not just about production capacity, it is also about social reproduction,
which includes maintaining or achieving a high quality of life for city residents. A high
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quality of life can be achieved through "strategies for conserving open space, reducing
commute times, delivering public transport, providing affordable housing, improving
access to services (such as healthcare), and creating and preserving good wage-earning
jobs for those not holding one of the city-region's 'signature' jobs" (Krueger and Savage
2007:215).
It may be that Eugene's attempt to provide for a wide variety of needs and
interests created the landscape from which the sustainable development discourse
emerged. City governments are attempting to "manage tensions around competitiveness
and social reproduction," and use sustainability as a way to address these often disparate
needs and interests (Krueger and Savage 2007:215). Yet, the sustainability discourse is
not solely top-down; in fact, the discourse is a dialectic between the government, interest
groups, and individuals. Various interest groups use the sustainable development
discourse to advocate for their own interests. For example, business coalitions tie
sustainability to increasing profit through sustainability marketing; environmentalists
associate it mainly with environmental conservation; and social justice advocates often
seek to tie sustainability measures to alleviating social inequalities. (Krueger and Savage
2007:216) The strength of each interest group, the direction in which the government
leads the process, and the force of individual personalities within the sustainability
discourse often determine the outcomes of the process.
Nevertheless, there may be less wiggle room for social equity advocates within
the sustainability discourse than might appear at first look. "[C]urrent constructions of
sustainable development are inadequate to capture the broad array of social and economic
issues found in the city-region" (Krueger and Savage 2007:216). These same authors
(2007) describe current constructions of sustainability like this:
[S]ustainable development strategy as it actually exists, often amounts to little
more than a spatial development strategy geared towards middle-class
environmentalists or the aesthetic of some emergent "creative class." While
concepts of environmental and social justice do enter into some of these
discussions, they usually do so at the organizational level among subaltern
groups. In terms of policy, however, sustainable development remains ultimately
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about environmental improvements and challenges, not issues of social justice per
se (216).
Despite the relatively simple metaphor used to describe sustainability - the three-legged
stool- and the well-developed scholarly work around "just sustainability," it is clear that
an environmental definition dominates (See Agyeman 2005). Krueger and Savage (2007)
assert that while sustainability has professed a tripartite commitment to social justice,
environment and economy, "as a development discourse and incipient set of policies [,
sustainability] has yet to live up to its progressive potential: to bring together these issues
in a holistic way" (216; Dobson 2003; Gibbs and Krueger 2007; Krueger and Agyeman
2005; Aygeman 2005).
Although citizen participation in city decision making processes has become a
mainstay for many cities since the urban riots of the 1960s, this does not mean that
citizens are effectively represented in city decision making. In fact, many urban scholars
point out that citizen participation processes, such as city advisory committees and task
forces, are often dominated by special interests. Most dominant among these interests is
the urban-level business coalition, which has realized that influencing city policy making
is critical to meeting its constituents' business needs. Many businesses, despite the
impact of a globalized economy, remain locally dependent. As a consequence of their
local dependence, gaining power at the local level is very important to these firms.
Attaining such power is largely intended to create a "business-friendly climate" in which
they can operate. Businesses often claim that without a business-friendly climate,
businesses will pick up and move to a more friendly locale, taking the jobs with them.
(Cox and Mair 1988) Unfortunately, there has not been a corollary to business coalitions
within progressive social movements. Labor unions would be the natural corollary, but
they have often sided with business coalitions when jobs and the environment are pitted
against each other (Cox and Mair 1988).
The city is often stuck between a rock and a hard place when it comes to
balancing the interests of the community and environment with economic growth. This is
due to the city's "dual local dependence" on the electorate and the local economy.
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Elected city officials must provide for community well-being and, at the same time,
ensure that jobs are being created through economic development and that the tax base is
expanded to fund projects related to community well-being. Given their dual allegiance
to the electorate and the economy, city officials are often torn between meeting popular
demands for improved quality oflife (housing, transportation, services, jobs, clean and
healthy environment, etc.) and business demands for a friendly business climate.
Complicating this dual local dependence is the fact that business coalitions have
become more involved in city decision making, particularly around economic
development. This is especially true as city governments make greater use of
partnerships between the public and private sectors. Urban regime theory explains that
city governments are "driven to cooperate with those who hold resources essential to
achieving local goals, regime formation is essentially about building coalitions to
improve the local state's capacity to formulate and carry out strategies to cope with social
and economic change" (Bassett 1995 :548). Public-private partnerships are a form of
coalition that have exploded in number as cities' economic troubles have deepened,
neoliberal policies have become more common, and cities have cut back on local
authority powers. Currently, many U.S. cities are supplementing market forces with "a
new support apparatus of non-elected agencies, such as Urban Development
Corporations, designed (with the aid of public subsidies) to extend market processes into
more marginal areas of the urban economy and land market" (Bassett 1995:540). Bassett
(1995) elaborates on these private-public partnerships by saying that "Although
partnerships may vary in size, number and organization in different cities, they usually
represent a truncated range of local interests with a specific, market-oriented agenda.
Lines of accountability are also often limited and confused" (541). Accordingly, in most
U.S. cities today, a number ofplatforms exist from which business coalitions can
influence and drive local policy, and sustainability is one such platform. Faced with
these pressures, Mayor Piercy pursued the SBI as a strategy to address the economic
competitiveness ofEugene, and to address a number of social reproduction issues that
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were important to Eugene residents - affordable housing, access to open space, good
jobs, etc. Like many other citizen participation processes in the United States though, the
SBI TF opened the door for special interest views, specifically those of traditional
business interests, to dominate the decision making of the SBI TF. The call for city
governments to create a business-friendly climate is a nearly omnipresent demand of the
business community, and this was no different in the case of the Mayor's SBI. Thus,
requests that the SBI TF address social equity invoked claims from traditional business
interests that such proposals were anti-business and would result injob loss.
Krueger and Savage (2007) poignantly explain the common pitfall of the
"sustainability fix," even when city officials like Mayor Piercy have the best intentions in
utilizing this unifying discourse in order to bridge disparate interests and goals:
The literature on sustainable development has long purported to focus on the
tripartite relationship between economy, environment and social justice (internal
citation omitted). Despite this somewhat tiring refrain (and accompanying
political back-slapping), sustainable development as a development discourse and
incipient set ofpolicies has yet to live up to its progressive potential: to bring
together these issues in a holistic way (internal citation omitted). It is an alluring
concept to be sure, yet sustainability remains problematic both analytically and
practically (216).
In the case of the Mayor's SBI, sustainability was used as a framework for Eugene's
economic development strategy, but incorporating such a vision into practice will always
be accompanied by struggle. Analyzing this struggle in Eugene has led to this study's
ability to pinpoint the successes and failures of the program and to call for improvements
in implementation that might be useful for other cities, or Eugene itself, which plan to
engage in a sustainability initiative. I will turn to these recommendations in Chapter V.
Eugene's struggle with social equity in the SBI process is both unique and
common to other communities. When asked if Eugene's experience dealing with social
equity was similar to other communities, a TF representative from the economic
development community said:
I think so. As much as we'd like to think of ourselves as a unique community,
I'm not sure we're that different than a lot of other places in dealing with those
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issues....Maybe the fact that we are a college town and we have groups here that
keep raising those issues to the forefront makes us perhaps more aware of it than
some, not all communities, but I don't know whether it helps us resolve them
(Ransom 2008).
This TF member's comment highlights the fact that Eugene faces very similar economic
development challenges to those of other communities. All communities in the United
States operate within the same national economic sphere, which in general prioritizes
economic growth over other factors, such as social or environmental cpnditions. These
factors are nearly universally present in each community in the United States, thus
although this research is limited to Eugene's SBI, it addresses issues faced by
communities everywhere: how to balance economic, social and environmental issues in a
capitalist economy. Commenting on this, an SBI TF member said:
But I think it would be fair to say that most of what we concentrated on was how
can we improve our environmental record as a community without adversely
jeopardizing the economic or financial one. There was an unspoken sense that the
social part of it was, if not less important, less clear, therefore, it kind of did get
shunted to the side... since we were trying to operate on a more or less consensus
basis and keep everybody on board there really wasn't any way to keep the
business people there if you tried to have these very strict [social equity] rules. So
that did get subordinated in fact if not in our verbiage. We all, I think, at the end
of it recognized we had not really done that piece that some would have liked us
to (Ransom 2008).
This chapter has examined the more subtle and intimate face of the SBI,
especially the SBI TF's relationship to social equity. The social equity representatives on
the TF tried to keep social equity issues in play throughout the SBI process, but because
their focus was primarily on labor issues, progress was difficult. Once the TF got going
and everyone recognized one other's stake in the process, it was probably apparent on all
sides that moving the social equity representatives' issues forward would be contentious.
This was problematic because the social equity representatives did not feel they had
sufficient support from the extemallabor or social justice communities to be able to
really apply pressure to the SBI process. Although addressing social equity was one of
the Mayor's goals at the beginning of the SBI process, pushing it forward became
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problematic when contrasted with her goal of finding common ground among the
different communities in Eugene. She did not want the relationships among these
communities to fracture further. In addition, because she had gone out on a limb herself
to get the SBI going, she did not want it to break down and thereby tarnish her legacy.
While the SBI did not result in the perfect alignment of the triple bottom line, it was
indeed an important step for Eugene's future as it heads down a path toward greater
equality and prosperity.
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CHAPTER IV
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL CITY: URBAN POLITICAL-ECONOMY
AND SUSTAINABILITY
Introduction
Policies to achieve urban sustainability, such as reducing a city's greenhouse gas
emissions, creating good, green jobs, reducing urban residents' waste, or creating local,
organic food sources that are accessible to all urban residents, require government action.
Such action can take many forms and can be broad-based or quite nuanced. However,
there are three overarching methods by which a government can implement sustainability
measures. Government can fund and run a specific program to achieve sustainability
goals; through regulation it can limit unsustainable activities in the private sector; or
through incentives it can encourage sustainable practices in the community. The Mayor's
SBI, as an initiative aimed primarily at changing the practices ofthe businesses
community, could have utilized any three of the above methods, or a combination of all
of them, in order to address the issue of sustainable economic development. Given the
stated goal of the SBI, to create "a healthy economy that conserves the environment
while providing equitable access to jobs with fair wages, benefits and other services
crucial to families," the means to do so were open ended, in theory (SBI Final Report
2006).
Over the last couple of decades, responsibility for urban economic development
strategies has largely shifted from public agencies to partnerships between the public and
private sectors (Bassett 1996; Kearns and Paddison 2000). This shift is attributable to a
broader shift in urban governance. Recently, various local interests and coalitions have
demanded that city governments become more entrepreneurial, exploit competitive
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advantages to attract investment from other cities, and playa role in the global economy
similar to that of a nation-state; this shift in the role ofurban governance is related to "the
rolling back of national state regulation, the cutting loose of localities from centralized
fiscal resources and controls, and the triumph of a neoliberal 'growth first' ideology"
(White, Jonas and Gibbs 2004:549). The proliferation ofpublic-private partnerships
around economic development strategy has provided a vehicle for local business leaders
and coalitions to influence urban politics and decision-making (Bassett 1996; MacLeod
2002). As a result, business coalitions have become much more involved in urban-level
politics and, in many cases, have also become highly influential (Bassett 1996).
While the SBI was a business initiative that fell under the realm of economic
development strategy, the Mayor and others who set the SBI in motion had explicit goals
for the SBI to meet social and environmental needs in the Eugene community: "equitable
access to jobs with fair wages, benefits and other services crucial to families" (SBI Final
Report 2006). As a result, the recommendations born out of the SBI could have followed
the typical economic development strategy- to reduce regulation on businesses, assist
businesses in navigating the city bureaucracy, or provide loan and tax abatements to
businesses (Gibbs and Jonas 1999; Keams and Paddison 2000; Whitehead 2002). On the
other hand, strategies to address social and environmental concerns often require
regulation of action, such as housing codes, occupational safety and health laws, work
hour limitations, minimum wage requirements, clean air and water regulation,
endangered species protection, and other similar regulations (Gibbs and Jonas 1999;
Harvey 1989; ValIer, Wood and North 2000). In this sense, there were major
contradictions between assisting businesses in creating a sustainable economy (economic
development strategy) and addressing serious social and environmental problems in
Eugene, such as high unemployment, underemployment, lack of health benefits,
unaffordable housing, etc. In the end, the SBI TF's policy development process for
building a more socially, environmentally, and economically sustainable Eugene and,
ultimately, its neglect of social equity, raised serious issues about the role of government
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in achieving urban sustainabi1ity; namely, how should sustainable practices be achieved
vis-a.-vis local government- through incentives, regulation or some combination of these
two? And, even more broadly, is it the responsibility of city government to regulate for
social and environmental quality, ensuring a decent quality of life for all urban residents
and a healthy ecosystem?
Some of the members of the SBI TF representing social and labor interests argued
that addressing social justice issues in the context of sustainability would require the
government to regulate certain issues, such as mandating that businesses that contracted
with the City of Eugene pay a living wage- a higher minimum wage that allowed workers
to meet their basic needs for food, shelter and other necessities27 (Bell 2008; Fenton
2008). On the other hand, business owners and other representatives of the traditional
business community adamantly demanded that the SBI not regulate businesses at all, but
instead provide incentives to businesses that meet certain established social and
environmental standards (SBI TF 200Se). However, even incentives were not popular
among the traditional business representatives on the SBI TF because incentives created
aspirations for social and environmental conduct, and businesses that did not meet such
standards could be negatively perceived (Ranson 2008; SBI TF 200Se).
The conflict over whether to incentivize or regulate business' use of sustainability
practices is particularly relevant to addressing social justice and environmental concerns,
and is also quite intriguing given the 2008-2009 deregulation-induced financial collapse
experienced in the United States. There is much evidence to suggest that reducing social
inequality and protecting the environment is very difficult, if not impossible, without
government's targeting certain business behaviors with regulations (Ayres 1998;
Whitehead 2002; Jones 2008). For example, if the government sets a living wage
standard or pollution cap, then businesses have no choice but to adapt. Incentives, like
27 According to ACORN, one of the main U.S. organizations that has worked to pass living wage
ordinances in u.S. cities, "[t]hese laws set higher minimum wages for the employees of companies
benefiting from public contracts, subsidies, or actions, and in some cases also for direct government
employees" (ACORN 2010).
166
tax abatements or public recognition, may alter business behavior over time but,
typically, not as quickly, as directly, or as significantly (Jones 2008). Some city officials
and policy makers have chosen to regulate practices in order to achieve sustainability; for
example, the Eugene City Council passed an ordinance requiring most new City of
Eugene building construction to meet a silver level of certification under the U.S. Green
Building Council's certification system (City of Portland 2010). Similarly, the City of
Seattle passed an ordinance in 2002 that required a 5% fuel use reduction in the city's
vehicle fleet by 2005 (City of Eugene 2010). The aforementioned policies only affect
city government's action, however; actors outside of city government, like private
businesses or nonprofits, are not affected by these standards. Others policy makers and
officials have chosen a combination of regulation and incentives. Most urban
sustainability initiatives, such as the Mayor's SB1, only recommend the use of incentives
to encourage businesses to practice social, environmental, and economic sustainability,
reflecting the influence on policy the traditional business community often wields over
the development of sustainability programs (Gibbs 1997; MacLeod 2002; White, Jonas
and Gibbs 2004). One of the incentive-based programs initiated by Eugene Mayor Piercy
is the "Bold Steps Sustainability Award." Through this program, businesses are honored
for making decisions "based on the triple bottom line: taking extra care in how they treat
people and the planet, while supporting economic prosperity" (City of Eugene 2010).
Businesses that are selected for the award are recognized on local radio and television
networks for their sustainable practices (City of Eugene 2010).
The most contentious and regularly mentioned social sustainability issues the SB1
TF discussed were the level of workplace wages and health and retirement benefits.
Given that wages and benefits are also one of the major expenses for businesses, these are
extremely sensitive issues, which many businesses are unlikely to address unless forced
to do so. As a result, social justice representatives on the TF came to the conclusion that
in order for social sustainability issues to be adequately addressed- including wage and
benefit issues, the city government would need to assume some sort of regulatory role
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such as adopting a living wage ordinance. This position was in stark contrast to that of
the business community. While the purported goal of the SBI was to address
environmental, economic and social sustainability issues simultaneously, ultimately, the
SBI TF chose to only recommend the use of incentives for creating a more sustainable
Eugene, and this was mainly in relation to environmental issues. Social justice issues
were largely excluded from these incentive-based recommendations even though the
Social Equity Sub-Committee produced a lengthy list of workplace and community
indicators for social equity that could be incentivized. This led me to ask the
fundamental question: Why, given that the goal of the SBI was to make recommendations
for creating "a healthy economy that conserves the environment while providing
equitable access to jobs with fair wages, benefits and other services crucial to families,"
did the SBI TF choose to only make recommendations for a more sustainable Eugene that
relied on incentivization? More importantly, is it possible to design an economic
development strategy that addresses equally social, environmental and economic
concerns? If so, what role does city government have in the development and
implementation of urban sustainability strategy? What combination of regulation and
incentives is necessary to truly address a city's social and environmental concerns? And
finally, how do recent national and international political-economic trends impact the
possibility and nature of city-led socially just, sustainability efforts such as the Eugene
SBI? Very few studies of urban sustainability look beyond the local arena to consider
broader social, economic and political processes that shape sustainability efforts, in
particular, how these forces shape urban governance and, as a result, dictate the
relationship city government has with developing and implementing sustainability
initiatives (Bulke1ey and Betsill 2005; Whitehead 2003). In other words, very few
studies of urban political-economy examine the internal features of local governance,
such as organizational structure, policy styles and priorities, government-community
relations, as I did with the SBI in the previous chapter. A ground-level examination of
the internal features of local governance helps reveal the mechanics of business,
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community, and city government in local economic strategy (ValIer, Wood, and North,
2000). These internal features of local governance reflect and are shaped by the broader
political-economic context of cities, including the forces of entrepreneurialism that
impact the potential for and nature of socially just, sustainability measures. These
broader political-economic forces and how they impact the nature and possibility of
socially just, sustainability measures in Eugene are the focus ofthis chapter.
In this chapter, I argue that several major political-economic forces have shifted
the role of urban government in the United States which, in turn, influence local
government's role in sustainability initiatives. First, the triumph ofneoliberal "growth
first" ideology has bolstered the demand from traditional business coalitions for an
entrepreneurial city government. An entrepreneurial city is one which includes the
proliferation of public-private partnerships around economic development, the increased
influence oftraditional business coalitions on city policy, and increasing competition
between locales to attract business investment. As part of the adoption ofneoliberal
policies at the federal level, localities have been cut loose from centralized fiscal
resources and controls. This shift compounds the fiscal crisis facing most U.S. cities and
creates a situation in which city governments attempt to fulfill social and environmental
demands with limited city funding (Cox and Mair 1988; Keams and Paddison 2000;
Oregon Center for Public Policy 2006; ValIer, Wood and North 2000).
In the 1970's, President Nixon implemented revenue-sharing between all levels of
government, but in the 1980's Reagan swiftly dismantled this system and began shifting
responsibility for key services from the federal level to state and local government
(National League of Cities 2003). Since the 1980's, the administration of federal
programs, like housing, job training, Headstart and Medicaid, has been shifted to state
and local government without accompanying funds to administer the programs (National
League of Cities 2003). In general the relationship between federal and state/locallevel
government has been marked by unfunded federal mandates and tax cuts. An increase in
responsibility for program administration along with limited funding from the federal
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government had made U.S. cities particularly vulnerable during economic crises, like the
1991,2000 and now the 2007 crisis, because without federal funding city governments
are largely dependent upon three sources of income- property, sales and income taxes
(National League of Cities 2003). When these taxes decline, city governments face
serious budget crises. The 2007 economic crisis has caused cities across the country to
layoff city employees (usually related to arts and recreation), sell offpark land, cut direct
services (like fire and police protection, trash pickup and library services), and make
other budgetary cuts (Saulny 2008). A 2008 survey of 300 city finance officers by the
National League of Cities found that 80% of city governments "would be less able to
meet their needs in 2009 than this year [2008]" (Saulny 2008).
Second, another aspect of city government's shifting role is the greater demand
from the environmental movement for local government to regulate for environmental
quality. In direct contradiction to business coalitions' call for city government to limit
regulation, the environmental movement, and to some extent the social justice movement,
are asserting that it is the responsibility of local government to affirmatively regulate
social and environmental standards. This contradiction is clear in Eugene where the
environmental movement, particularly the radical environmental movement, has been
very active in influencing local policy making and there has been significant tension
between the environmental and business communities regarding how Eugene should
develop. For example, in June 1997, Earth First!ers and Cascadia Forest Defenders (a
radical environmental organization based in Eugene, OR) protested the cutting of 40 trees
in downtown Eugene to make way for a parking garage and a new commercial and
residential development (Abraham 2006). These environmentalists occupied trees in the
area and had to be physically removed by the Eugene police in order for the trees to be
cut (Abraham 2006). The confrontation between police and protestors ended with one
protestor being violently dragged from a tree just before all 40 trees were cut (Abraham
2006). This case represents just one example of the hardened tensions between
environmentalists, the city government and the business community in Eugene.
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Third, the experience of the Mayor's SBI leads me to argue that most
sustainability initiatives offer a compromise that charts a path somewhere in between the
environmental and social justice communities' demands for greater regulation and the
business community's opposition to regulation. White, Jonas and Gibbs (2002) refer to
this compromise as the "sustainability fix" based on Harvey's (1989) notion of a "spatial
fix"- an attempt to resolve tensions between capital and labor, and economic
development and collective consumption (Harvey 1989; White, Jonas, and Gibbs 2002).
According to White, et al. (2002), sustainable urban development is a way "to safeguard
growth trajectories in the wake of industrial capitalism's long downturn, the global
'ecological crisis' and the rise of popular environmentalism" (551). In this sense, the
notion of the "sustainability fix" attempts to "capture some of the governance dilemmas,
compromises and opportunities created by the current era of state restructuring and
ecological modernization" (Jonas and Gibbs 2002:551). Therefore, in this section, I
examine how sustainability initiatives represent a compromise path for city government
between the demands of traditional business coalitions and the environmental and social
justice communities.
Finally, I conclude the chapter by exploring how social and environmental
concerns may be combined with current economic development strategies, putting
sustainable economic development on a trajectory for success (Krueger and Savage
2007).
The Triumph of Neoliberal "Growth First" Ideology: Local Government as the
Final Frontier
While the effects of neoliberal policies and broader trends of globalization on the
social and political-economic situations of Global South countries have been well
documented, the effects of these trends at the local or city-level have been less studied.
However, neoliberal policy and globalization have significantly altered the political-
economic role oflocal governments, and thus impacted the social condition of many U.S.
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cities, just as they have affected the role of national and international institutions. Peck
and Tickell (2002) describe neoliberalism as an "operating framework or ideological
software for competitive globalization, inspiring and imposing far-reaching programs of
state restructuring and rescaling across a wide range of national and local contexts" (380).
Indeed, neoliberalism is now a strong and hegemonic discourse in most political spheres,
and free trade, flexible labor, active individualism, business involvement and overall, an
extension ofmarkets and the logics of competitiveness, are hardly questioned (381).
Peck and Tickell (2002) identify two main phases ofneoliberal policy that are
closely connected with a changing role for local government in policy-making, service
provision and, more generally, economic develdpment and environmental protection
efforts. The first phase, which began in the 1980s, was termed "roll-back neoliberalism"
because it focused on deregulation and dismantlement of "Keynesian-we1farist and
social-collectivist institutions" (384). Following "roll-back neoliberalism" was "roll-out
neoliberailsm," which focused more on "purposeful construction and consolidation of
neo1iberalized state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations" (384). Prior
to the first wave ofneoliberalism, local government- including elected officials and city
staff- was the main decision-maker, a regulator, and a service provider, and guarantor of
a certain quality oflife (Gibbs 1997).
Following the dismantling oflocal government's Keynesian-welfare model,
which mainly included a significant reduction in housing, job development, Medicaid and
education programs, the second phase of neoliberalism was marked by local
government's role-shifting to one of "urban governance." Valler, Wood and North
(2000) describe urban governance as broad and fragmented, "extending beyond the
formal agencies ofloca1 government to include a 'wide range of other actors, institutional
and individual, private and voluntary and public sector, which are involved in regulating
a local economy and society'" (409, quoted in Imrie and Raco 1999:45). In this sense, the
roles and responsibilities of local governments have expanded without local government
gaining additional power or additional funds to accompany their expanded
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responsibilities (Nicholls and Beaumont 2004). Accordingly, certain changes, such as
more administrative and service provision by local governments, a shift towards
consolidating local governments into metropolitan level governing bodies, and an
increase in interest group involvement in city politics, has led to "an expanded and more
perforated urban political opportunity structure" (123). This transformation in local
governments has spurred urban interest groups and movements to organize and make
demands upon city government (Nicholls and Beaumont 2004). As a result, many cities
today face contradictory forces that greatly influence and shape their policies and actions.
More of a burden has been placed on city governments to maintain the economic health
of their cities with little assistance from federal and state funds (Logan and Molotch
1987). At the same time, various urban stakeholders and social movements recognize the
political opportunity structure in city governments and therefore demand city
governments be more responsive to their demands, including protecting the urban
environment and addressing urban social problems (Agyman and Evans 2003). In short,
city governments are charged with being good "entrepreneurial cities" in a globalized
world, as well as a regulator of environmental and social health.
For example, the private sector, especially business coalitions, such as the
Chamber of Commerce, have taken on various leadership roles related to urban policy,
planning, education, housing, welfare, finance and transport, which were previously filled
by local governmental authorities. This leadership is largely marked by the emergence of
partnerships between local government and the private sector; in the economic
development sphere, urban economic development policy is now almost exclusively
directed by partnerships between business coalitions and local government (e.g., regional,
nonprofit economic development agencies). The Lane Metro Partnership, represented on
the SBI TF, is the organization in Eugene, OR that fulfills this public-private partnership
role for economic development. Lane Metro Partnership describes itself as the "official
source of economic development and business information for Eugene, Springfield and
Lane County Oregon," providing information on site locations and building, the cost of
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doing business, labor force availability, education and training, and business and industry
(Lane Metro Partnership 2010). In the previous chapter, I argued that business interests
had significant influence on the SBI process and this corresponds to the shift to urban
governance that creates space for greater influence by business in local policy making.
Beyond economic development policy, the shift to urban governance means that
local governments have much less power to create policy and, instead, they act in more of
a facilitating or coordinating role for these broader coalitions of local government and
business interests attempts to "boost" capital development in the region, what Harvey and
Logan (1989) and Molotch (1976) call the "urban growth machine." It is important to
note that labor unions have also often been a part of this so-called "growth machine" that
encourages increased economic growth and development in the region, particularly the
building and construction trades, which benefit directly from new development (Harvey
1989; Molotch 1976). Essentially, local government is leveraged by broader business,
and sometimes labor interests, to gain outside sources of funding, new investment and
new employment sources (Harvey 1989). Harvey identifies four main strategies for
urban entrepreneurialism: 1) exploiting some labor or natural resource advantage for the
production of goods and services, such as offering a package of assistance as an
inducement to corporations; 2) a consumerist style of urbanization that markets the city
as an "innovative, exciting, creative, and safe place to live or visit, to play and consume
in" (1989:9). This may include improving and drawing attention to the environment of a
region or highlighting its unique arts and culture to attract consumers and/or business
investment (Keams and Paddison 2000); 3) gaining headquarters or key command and
control centers related to finance, government or other information gathering operations;
and 4) obtaining key contracts from the federal government, usually pertaining to military
and defense (Harvey 1989). Most cities pursue at least a couple of these strategies, ifnot
all of them, in some shape or fonn.
The push for deregulation is part of what Harvey (1989) identifies as strategy
number one - exploiting some labor or natural resource advantage - and is one of the
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most common strategies pursued by cities under "roll-back neoliberalism." It encourages
localities to compete with each other by reducing social and environmental regulatory
standards and, at the same time, be more entrepreneurial; in other words, "to facilitate,
encourage and even publicly subsidize the accelerated mobility of circulating capital and
resources" (Harvey 1989). Prior to the pressure for cities to be more entrepreneurial,
local governments focused on providing their residents with necessary services, facilities
and other benefits; under the 'entrepreneurial city' model, local governments instead
focus their attention on fostering and encouraging economic and employment growth
through local development (Harvey 1989). Under the entrepreneurial or economic
development model of governance, entitlements are less available and services and
benefits are less comprehensive and less adequate (Kearns and Paddison 2000). The push
for local government to be more innovative and entrepreneurial is also exacerbated by the
reduction in federal redistributions and local tax revenues under the neoliberal model. In
fact, many cities do not feel the federal government can assist them with their fiscal
austerity, thus cities actually try to "delink or decouple themselves from their national
economies, sometimes outperforming the national state (Kearns and Paddison 2000).
Deindustrialization, widespread and seemingly "structural" unemployment, fiscal
austerity at both the national and local levels, all coupled with a rising tide of
neoconservatism and much stronger appeal (though often more in theory than
practice) to market rationality and privatization, provide a backdrop to
understanding why so many urban governments, often of quite different political
persuasions and armed with very different legal and political powers, have all
taken a broadly similar direction (Harvey 1989:5).
Local government's reduction of its social and environmental regulations is a
main neoliberal strategy for attracting capital and spurring local development. This
model increases competition between locales, not just regionally but internationally as
well, and is directly connected to a concurrent decline in the urban manufacturing base
and a rise in the service sector. Overall, this "race to the bottom" has created a highly
unequal economy in many cities (Brecher and Costello 1998; Sassen, 1990 and 2001). A
growing service sector creates new wealth, but not for all people. Women, immigrants,
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and people of color are often excluded from the benefits of a growing service sector and,
instead, are marginalized to low-wage, part-time and contingent work within the service
industry (Sassen 1990; 2001). The shift to a service sector economy has led to a vision
for U.S. cities that focuses on the needs and desires of privileged residents, rather than the
needs and desires of the majority of urban residents, many of whom are poor (Bayat
2000; Ruben 2001). An emphasis on real estate development also often accompanies a
growing service sector economy, which increases the cost of living and, as a
consequence, exacerbates low-income residents' economic insecurity (Sassen 2001).
It is within this broader political-economic context of the shift from local
government to urban governance that the role of local government vis-a-vis the SBI must
be viewed. This shift sheds light on the potential for and nature of local government's
involvement in sustainability efforts, such as the SBI, and more broadly on the
responsibility oflocal government to provide social and environmental quality.
Neoliberal policy aims to reduce the social welfare provision role of government,
including local government but, in the process of dismantling state and national level
programs, has shifted more responsibility to local government to deal with the demands
of residents and urban interest groups. Yet, local government has not been given the
power or the financial resources to address these concerns. As a result, there is much
greater interaction between local government, the private sector and a third sector
regarding decision-making and policy creation. The business community has taken this
opening to advocate successfully for its version of economic development, while the
environmental community has advocated successfully for environmental regulation. In
these public-private partnerships to address a myriad of urban issues, from downtown
revitalization to climate action plans, local government now plays a more coordinating or
facilitating role rather than a leadership role.
In terms of local government's need to be more entrepreneurial in order to fulfill
its social and economic responsibilities to its residents and other stakeholders, local
government tends to use a few different economic growth strategies, which were
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identified by Harvey (1989). Eugene has by no means been immune to the pressure to
become entrepreneurial but it also has, at times, asserted its power in this discourse; for
example, Eugene bucked the hegemonic discourse around economic development when it
passed a Toxic Right to Know law with the help of the environmental movement.28 But
in other aspects of economic development, Eugene has used deregulation as a strategy to
attract capital and has engaged in competition with Springfield, OR to attract businesses.
In short, elements of both "roll-back" and "roll-out" neoliberal policy exist in
most cities, including Eugene. Below, I explore some of the characteristics ofneoliberal
policy and the shift to urban governance, which emerged as prominent themes in the SBI
process - the business community's powerful call for local government to create a
"business-friendly climate" through deregulation and lowering taxes, the effect of inter-
urban competition between Eugene and Springfield on local government, and the Eugene
city government's financial austerity. Ultimately, my examination of these broader
political-economic forces illuminates the diverse pressures that city government's face,
and specifically how the SBI process was impacted by these forces. In an increasingly
competitive economy in which business interests lobby for government to be more
entrepreneurial and social and environmental advocates demand local government meet
local welfare needs, officials of local government feel the pressure of trying to fulfill two
quite contradictory roles (Keams and Paddison 2000). Essentially, the pursuit of
sustainability measures both assuage and exacerbate local government's ability to fulfill
these dual roles, explaining the challenge local government faces in implementing
sustainability programs.
The Political-Economic Context of Eugene's City Government
Business opposition to government regulation
Reflective of the broader neoliberal shift from local government to urban
governance, two very prominent themes emerged in the SBI process. One, the traditional
28 The Toxic Right to Know law requires companies to report to the public what chemicals they bring into
or emit in Eugene, OR.
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Eugene business community, including the Chamber of Commerce, effectively lobbied
the SBI TF to ensure that the SBI process did not result in any regulatory measures. Even
measures to incentivize certain actions by the business community would not have been
accepted by the business community carte blanche; instead, the business community
would have wanted to be closely involved or actually implement the incentivization
programs. The influence of traditional business coalitions on local policy making is not
just an abstract aspect of the triumph of neoliberal "growth first" ideology; the Eugene
SBI was a case in point.
Despite evidence that implementing social and environmental standards, or
increasing taxation, may not sabotage a city's economic development strategy, there is
intense opposition to regulation, particularly environmental and social justice regulation,
from certain segments of the business community. At the SBI TF's meeting with the
Eugene Chamber of Commerce, without any mention of the SBI introducing regulation,
Chamber members emphatically expressed their concern that the SBI might result in the
implementation of regulations.
The SBI coordinator began the meeting by discussing the SBl's triple bottom line
approach (environment health, economic prosperity, and social equity). The City's
record of the comments immediately following this introduction are as follows:
A member of the Chamber commented that people fear that the process will go to
extremes. He hoped that the TF would produce something that was non-
regulatory in nature, and that encouraged change rather than mandated it. He said
that education was needed, and encouraged the TF not to move too far, too fast, or
it would create a roadblock rather than a pathway (City of Eugene 2005).
Chamber members pointed out numerous times that the TF and the City government
should reward businesses for implementing sustainable practices; the City should not be a
rule setter or regulator. "When companies meet or exceed regulations, the community
should find some ways to recognize them and publicize those efforts" (City of Eugene
2005). Continuing in this same vein, a Chamber member stated,
My family owns a golf course and has cooperated with the National Audubon
Society in managing the property for wildlife as well as recreation, including
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native tree plantings. There should be some recognition from the City for such
efforts in the form of "attaboys" for businesses that try to do the right thing. In
my experience, the City ofEugene does not support or recognize such efforts
(City ofEugene 2005).
One TF member followed up by asking this speaker what form of recognition he thought
businesses should receive. Without directly responding to the question, the speaker
responded: "The City could be a problem solver as opposed to being a permitter or rule
setter. The City needs to shed its bad reputation. It's critical to partnering with the
business community" (City of Eugene 2005). Indeed, the vast majority of comments
from Chamber members reinforced the idea that to date, the City government had been
unfair to businesses and ifthe City wanted to spur change, it should seek to do so with
incentives, not regulations or rules.
Echoing this idea that the City government had given itself a bad reputation by
being unfair and making it difficult for businesses to operate in the City, another
Chamber member commented on the onerous nature of government permits as well as
encroachment on the decision-making power of businesses:
Businesses are not asking for a gold star but rather government appreciation of
businesses it works with. For example, I submit construction plans with an
engineer's seal and then am informed that my plans are not complete. Another
example is tree cutting - I should be able to remove a tree without having to apply
for a permit. That's the kind of recognition a business wants to see because it
demonstrates value for a business owner's time and a willingness to partner (City
ofEugene 2005).
Chamber members' complaint that the City government was encroaching on a business'
ability to make its own decisions and have control oftheir business was expressed more
explicitly later in the meeting:
The question [of what will make the SBI successful] goes back to the issue of
business owners wanting to be in charge of their business decisions. Businesses
fear that government will attempt to dictate their business practices. Your biggest
challenge will be getting businesses to believe you will encourage them in shifting
to sustainable business practices, not dictate to them (City of Eugene 2005).
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Speaker after speaker at this meeting of the SBl TF and the Eugene Chamber of
Commerce cited specific examples of how government bureaucracy was a major problem
for Eugene businesses and how the City of Eugene government did not support Eugene
businesses. One Chamber member specifically explained how he found it difficult to
work with the City of Eugene staff, officials and related bureaucracy:
Another example is a recent application for a car wash, which is sustainable
business because of water recycling and stormwater reduction but after going
through the application process I was told that the property lacked a stormwater
permit. I was told I would have to spend several thousand dollars to study and
mitigate the runoff and install stormwater facilities. Subsequently, my company
hired a formed City employee who found the missing stormwater permit on file.
No City employee took the time. The City consistently demonstrates a lack of
willingness to work with businesses (City of Eugene 2005).
One Chamber member went so far as to say that the city government's regulatory
processes were destroying Eugene businesses: "The City should consider how its actions
potentially affect and destroy businesses due to the length of time City processes take"
(City of Eugene 2005).
Clearly, Chamber of Commerce members were generally opposed to regulation,
but regulation around environmental issues was a particularly sensitive issue. For
example, one Chamber member brought up the issue of land use, and disagreements in
Eugene over whether the City of Eugene's urban growth boundary should be expanded:
lfthe City does not grow, businesses could be in trouble. The homebuilding
industry was in danger of collapse because of the lack of buildable land in the
urban growth boundary, which has an effect on suppliers and related businesses
who wish to be sustainable but without a market have a difficult time doing so.
The City needed to be honest about the available land and its actual development
potential. How can sustainability work with so much angst about expanding the
UGB when all the data showed the community was lagging behind the goal of
having a 20-year buildable land supply? (City of Eugene 2005).
Responding specifically to the idea of creating a more sustainable Eugene economy, one
Chamber member implied that sustainability or environmental measures could cause
businesses to lose profit or even close down:
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If business does not have a market, a key factor to sustainability goes away. If
businesses want to expand, what do they do? It seems like a good idea to look at
that and have a reasonable planned strategy to make sure that businesses that wish
to expand can do so. The community needs to get over its resistance to actually
planning for growth (City of Eugene 2005).
During the two-hour-Iong meeting between the Chamber of Commerce and the
SBI TF, the Chamber members argued that when the City does not cooperate with the
business community, it impacts everyone in the community, through job loss, decreased
tax revenue, and a lower quality of life. If the City wants to support the business
community, it should lead by example. It should provide a great many more incentives to
engender desired behavior, it should use little or no regulation to achieve the desired
behavior, and it should be much more understanding of and sympathetic to the precarious
situation of small businesses. In the end, the SBI TF largely followed the request of the
Chamber members.
In reality, the platform for local government action that the Eugene Chamber
members were proposing in response to the SBI was a very typical agenda for traditional
economic development, which closely aligned with the main prescriptions of neoliberal
policy. The main issues that Chamber members raised in their meeting with the SBI TF
also closely mirrored a broader critique of the local government by the traditional Eugene
business community. A survey of Eugene businesses in 2003 found that "the
overwhelming majority of companies in Eugene believe that the city government is
'unsupportive' of business, and they wish the city would encourage economic growth or
at least accommodate it" (WihtoI2003). Not only did the results of the survey find that
Eugene businesses felt they must struggle with cumbersome regulations, but also that
Eugene's toxic reporting law and the City'S withdrawal of enterprise zone property tax
breaks represented the city's lack of support for businesses. Issues of land use and
growth have been among the most controversial in the Eugene business community:
"91 % of respondents say local regulations and anti-growth attitudes among elected
officials and residents are a barrier to growth" (WihtoI2003). Interestingly, when
surveyed about the City government's sustainability policy, just over half of respondents
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expressed support for the City having a sustainable development policy, and just under
half of respondents said that a sustainable development policy contributed to "negative
perceptions about Eugene as a place to do business" (Wihtol 2003). The Eugene
companies surveyed did say that Eugene possessed several positive characteristics that
enhance its business climate; these assets included quality oflife, recreation, safety,
educational system and an abundant, skilled workforce. Ironically, almost all of such
assets are directly related to services that are highly dependent upon the financial
condition of the city government, including whether its tax base is sufficient to fund these
services.
Neoliberalism: Declining tax revenue
A major part of the Eugene business coalition's call for local government to
regulate less and generally create a "good business climate" was demanding lower taxes.
Interestingly, several members of Eugene's business coalition said that the local
government needed to create a better business climate in order to attract businesses,
which would ultimately increase tax revenues. From a different perspective, several SBI
TF members and the Mayor pointed out that the City's ability to address social and
environmental concerns was severely limited by the City's financial struggles, partially
the result of insufficient tax revenues. Indeed, the Mayor was only given $5,000 to run
the one and a half year SBI process. The reality is that there's been a long-term corporate
assault on taxes, which is largely responsible for cities' reduction in tax revenues.
LeRoy (2005) described the tax situation of cities this way: since the 1950s,
"states have been trying to cooperate and set up a simple, uniform system so that all
profits of multistate corporations are taxed somewhere, somehow. And since the 1950s,
corporations have been relentlessly attacking the states' effort to cooperate - with
litigation, lobbying, and creative accounting" (105). The Executive Director ofthe
Multistate Tax Commission in 2005, Dan Bucks, said: "Why do we have less uniformity
in state tax laws than we did in the early 1980s? Because businesses don't support it.
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They undermine uniformity whenever they see it because they have learned [that] the
lack of uniformity creates opportunity for tax shelters ...The multistate tax system is
becoming a Swiss cheese income tax system" (114).
Consistent with neoliberal "growth first" ideology, local government's focus has
shifted from providing a certain level of welfare to facilitating and coordinating an
economic development strategy that is supposed to create a healthy economy, with jobs
for residents and a good quality of life overall. However, neoliberal policies draw funds
away from social and environmental programs in order to offer business incentives and
subsidies such as tax abatements. The end result is that local governments provide fewer
social services and welfare benefits and, at the same time, collect a smaller amount of tax
revenues because they are taxing fewer businesses. Furthermore, the deregulation of
other social and environmental standards means that city residents require social services
and welfare benefits from local government more than ever.
According to a 2006 study conducted by the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU), the corporate taxation rate in industrialized countries has fallen
from 45% to 30% over the last 20 years. Similarly, the "average corporate tax rate for
the world as a whole has decreased from 38% in 1993 to less than 26.8% in 2007," and
the corporate tax rate declined in 78 out of 97 countries studied by the International
Labor Organization (ILO 2008). In the U.S., despite record profits from 2000 to 2004,
corporations only contributed 7.5% of all tax revenue (ICFTU 2006).29 The ILO and
ICFTU estimate the loss of corporate tax revenues globally is hundreds ofbillions of
dollars annually (ICFTU 2006; ILO 2008). In 2006, the ICFTU concluded that "no
country, no matter its size, can expect to keep the downward pressure on taxes at bay by
itself' (ICFTU 2006); the multinationals, "due to their total size can force many
governments and authorities to grant them special tax breaks, and by reason of their
international scope they can shift around their revenue, profits, losses, and debts as they
please" (ILO 2008:132-133).
29 This includes all federal and state taxes: income, sales, and property.
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While taxation rates, especially corporate taxes, have fallen in many u.s. states
and in countries around the world over the last two decades, taxation rates in Oregon
have decreased even further than other U.s. states. According to the Oregon Center for
Public Policy, corporations operating in Oregon paid 71 % less in state corporate taxes as
a share of the economy as they did in the late 1970s (Leachman 2005). In terms of the
percentage of income taxes that corporations pay, "in the 1973-1975 budget cycle,
corporations paid 18.5% of all income taxes"; and in the 2003-2005 budget cycle,
corporations paid only 4.6% of the all income taxes. If Oregon corporations were paying
the same percentage of income taxes they were paying in 1973-1975, the 2005 state
budget would have increased by $1.8 billion. Accordingly, over the 20-year period
between 1975 and 2005 that Oregon's corporate income taxes have been decreasing, the
state has lost $10.9 billion (Leachman 2005).
Ironically, as corporate income taxes have decreased in Oregon, personal income
taxes have been increasing, resulting in a greater tax burden on Oregon's families and
small businesses (Leachman 2005). Most striking, in the 2003-2005 budget cycle, while
corporations paid 4.5% of Oregon's income taxes; personal income taxpayers paid 95.5%
(Leachman 2006). Leachman explained that the reason the income tax burden has been
shifted from corporations to individuals is "primarily because Oregon gives corporations
numerous tax breaks and because corporations are employing abusive tax shelters that
lawmakers never enacted or intended to allow. Multi-state corporations have
increasingly dominated Oregon's corporate income tax base and are the primary
beneficiaries of the income tax decline" (Leachman 2006). This evidence demonstrates
that the business representatives on the SBI TF who argued regulation could not be
enacted or taxes increased because such measures would detrimentally affect small
businesses, were wrong. In fact, it is mostly large and multi-state corporations that are
benefiting from the lack of social and environmental regulations, declining tax rates and
tax abatements in Oregon.
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Also important to note is that while the drastic reduction in Oregon's corporate
income tax rates may benefit corporations in the short term, in the long term it will
undermine the economic strength of Oregon (Leachman 2006). A disinvestment in
Oregonians's public infrastructure will degrade the quality of Oregon's workforce,
making it hard for businesses to find employees with appropriate skills. Public
investments in schools and universities, roads, health care coverage, worker training,
parks and the court system all depend on Oregon's tax revenues. Aside from the fact that
such investments create a better quality of life for the majority of Oregonians, they are
also business investments: businesses rely on well-trained workers and a solid
infrastructure (McDonald 2008). Unfortunately, the corporate lobby in Oregon, and
beyond, has focused more on short-term gain (decreasing the taxes businesses pay) than
long-term social, economic and environmental health (Brecher and Costello 1990; Klein
2007; Oregon Center for Public Policy 2006). Furthermore, the above statistics
demonstrate that not only do corporations pay less in taxes, they shift the tax burden onto
individuals, many of whom have a difficult time paying their share of taxes in the first
place.
In addition to decreasing corporate income taxation rates, Oregon already suffers
from a small tax base due to its capped property tax and the absence of a sales tax. In
1996, Oregon voters passed Measure 47 (State of Oregon 2010). It reduced property
taxes in Oregon by approximately $450 million per year and "limited future increases to
not more than 3% per year, unless voters approved higher taxes" (McDonald 2008). Bill
Sizemore, a well-known anti-tax proponent, head of Oregon Taxpayers United and owner
ofa petitioner company, authored and was chiefpetitioner for Measure 47 (Sizemore
2010). Sizemore also authored Oregon's Double Majority Law "which prohibits the
approval of property tax increases in special elections, unless there is at least a 50% voter
tum-out for the election" (Sizemore 2010). According to Sizemore (2010), "Double
Majority, similar to quorum laws which almost universally prevent elected bodies from
passing laws without a quorum ofthose officials eligible to vote on the issue, save
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Oregon taxpayers hundreds ofmillions of dollars per year." Like many of Sizemore's tax
measures, these also surreptitiously benefit wealthy individuals and corporations (Oregon
Center for Public Policy 2006). According to the Oregon Center for Public Policy,
Measure 47 "disconnected property taxes from real property values at a time when
business property values were lagging behind residential property value" (Leachman
2006). Effectively, Oregon's business property taxes are now significantly lower than
those that burden individual homeowners. "In 1978-79, households paid 50% of all
property taxes in Oregon. Business paid the other half. In 2003-2004, households paid
60% of property taxes, compared to 40% for businesses ... .Ifhouseholds still paid 50% of
total property taxes, instead of 60%, they would have saved nearly $500 million in 2004
alone" (Leachman 2006). Like the corporate income tax rate, decreases in the property
tax rate have not been designed to lower tax rates for all Oregonians; they have only
lowered the tax burden on corporations and actually increased it for individual
households and small businesses. And, like the reductions in Oregon's corporate tax rate,
decreases in Oregon's property tax significantly reduce Oregon's overall tax revenues,
limiting Oregon's ability to pay for critical services and infrastructure.
Finally, Oregon has no sales tax (State of Oregon 2010). And, although Oregon's
personal income taxes are often cited as high, it often ranks near the bottom nationally for
state taxation rates (State of Oregon 2010). This means that Oregon's tax base is even
more compromised, making it extremely difficult to fund critical public investments.
As I mentioned above, despite Oregon's having lower taxes than many other
states in the United States, lower and middle class families in Oregon are especially hard
hit because Oregon's tax system is flat compared to the federal tax system. Leachman
(2006) described the unfair burden Oregon's tax system places on working families:
"Oregon's tax system is upside down. A tax system promotes opportunity when it is
based on ability to pay. But in Oregon, those who can afford to pay more wind up paying
the smallest share of their income." Leachman's (2006) study found that "Oregon's low-
income families had an effective tax rate of9.2%, compared to an effective rate of7.8%
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paid by Oregon's wealthiest 1% offamilies. The effective tax rate paid by Oregon's
wealthiest families falls further, to 6.7%, when federal deductions for state income and
property taxes are taken into account" (Sheketoff, Leachman and Ordonez 2008). Just a
handful of U.S. states require families living in poverty to pay significant income taxes,
and Oregon is one of them: "A two parent family of four in Oregon with income at the
poverty line owes the state $325 in Oregon" (Leachman 2006). While such an amount
doesn't seem like much, to a family attempting to escape poverty it is a significant
amount ofmoney. And, when placed within Oregon's larger taxation picture, it becomes
obvious that over the last two decades, the tax burden has shifted from corporations and
wealthy individuals to lower and middle-class Oregonians.
The contention around increasing tax revenue in Oregon was apparent during
2009 when two tax bills were passed in the Oregon legislature that will increase tax
revenue by $733 million over the next two years by increasing taxes on the top 3% of
income earners and corporations. According to one bill, the "corporate income tax rate
would increase from 6.6% to 7.9% for companies with net income above $250,000. The
rate drops in 2011 to 7.6%. In 2013, it returns to 6.6% for companies with net income
below $10 million" (Register-Guard 2009). It also "updates the corporate minimum tax
from $10 - where it's stood since 1931 - to a sliding scale increase that ranges from $150
to $100,000, depending on a company's Oregon sales" (Register-Guard 2009). In
response to these bills, fiscal conservatives and the business lobby in Oregon quickly
joined forces to have a referendum vote on the two bills. In the past, opposition to such
measures has been led by the main anti-tax group in Oregon, FreedomWorks, while
business associations contributed little to such efforts. However, for these 2009 tax bills,
"FreedomWorks organized a coalition that includes Associated Oregon Industries,
homebuilders, the lumber industry, general contractors, grocery stores and other retailers,
gasoline dealers, agribusiness, restauranteurs and car dealers" (Register-Guard 2009).
Defend Oregon, a union-backed organization supporting the tax measures, ran a major
campaign to keep the measures from going to a referendum vote. However, Defend
---I
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Oregon's efforts were unsuccessful and the referendum qualified for the ballot. Both
Associated Oregon Industries and the Oregon Business Association said they would have
supported temporary tax increases that helped Oregon get through its current recession,
but not permanent increases as these measures put in place (Register-Guard 2009).
Accordingly, Senate President Peter Courtney questioned:
Whether any amount of compromising with the business lobby could have
satisfied its more conservative factions' fundamental opposition to paying taxes.
"1 have a feeling that if we had made it [the tax measure] temporary, they would
have said the biggest mistake you made was the kind of tax increase you had,"
said the Salem Democrat. "They were definitely going to come after these
revenue measures" (Register-Guard 2009).
This experience shows the steady buildup of opposition to government involvement in
the market, even in an era where the government budgets are depleted and government is
faltering in its provision of social services to the ever-increasing jobless and indigent
population. However, Oregon voters did approve an income tax increase on top earners
(over $250,000) in 2010, the first income tax increase in Oregon in 80 years (Yardley
2010). The campaign was mainly led by a progressive coalition of public sector and
teachers' unions and focused on the need to raise taxes on those people with the ability to
pay (Yardley 2010). The main group opposing this tax increase was called, "Oregonians
Against Job-Killing Taxes" (Yardley 2010). This campaign strategy was recognized
nationally as a model for raising taxes on corporations and top earners in other states
where the 2007 recession, tight household budgets and high unemployment are the major
public issues (Yardley 2010).
The growing strength of neoliberal ideology in Oregon and nationally over the
last two to three decades has had two main consequences. First, since the 1980s,
opposition to regulation has increased, causing a decline in taxation rates as well as a
relaxation of certain social and environmental standards. This includes a reduced social
safety net in the form of fewer benefits for the unemployed, injured workers, affordable
housing, health insurance, among others (Oregon Center for Public Policy 2006). And
when local government has proposed implementing social and environmental regulations,
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the result has been highly contentious discourse, usually led by business coalitions that
have become much more involved at the local level with local government's reduced
leadership role. Second, the effect of decreased corporate, personal and property taxes
has resulted in less money for city budgets, money that is needed to address social and
environmental issues (Oregon Center for Public Policy 2006).
Interurban competition
The Eugene business coalition's push for less regulation is part of a much larger
neoliberal strategy by which locales are "whipsawed" against each other, while
companies search for the best business climate. The best business climate is
conveniently, and generally, defined by corporations as tax abatements and low social
and environmental standards. As local government's involvement in economic
development has decreased and businesses have played a greater role in economic
development strategy, including through public-private partnerships, much of the
information related to enticing businesses to locate in a city is proprietary. In other
words, the public and city officials are not even able to see what other cities are offering
companies to know what they are competing against.
Competition between states and cities for business capital is not new; however,
the role cities and states play in this competition has become much more sophisticated, if
not more convoluted in the last 10 to 20 years. Greg LeRoy chronicles the rise of the
economic war among states in his book, The Great American Jobs Scam: Corporate Tax
Dodging and the Myth ofJob Creation (2005). On "business climate," LeRoy writes:
It remains an ambiguous, malleable term readily available for corporate use. Are
we talking about the corporate income tax rate here, or is it how 'business-
friendly' people are, or how loose environmental enforcement is, or how generous
the property tax abatements are? Companies and their lobbyists can always
decide which part of the 'climate' matters most today and whale away on it,
insisting that if companies don't get their way, the area has a 'bad business
climate.' Since the real-decision-making process remains a black box, public
officials have no way to judge such claims (80).
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Rankings of cities' and states' business climates were issued annually from the
late 1970s to the late 1980s by one accounting firm, Grant Thornton. Grant Thornton's
business climate surveys attributed negative weight to cities with good jobs. In other
words, if a city had high-paying manufacturing jobs and unionized jobs (often with low
turnover and higher skills), it counted against them in the survey. Similarly, local and
state taxes and social safety nets, such as welfare, workers' compensation and
unemployment compensation, were counted against a locale. And how a locale used its
tax revenues did not matter; thus, "the quality of infrastructure, education, training,
recreation, public safety, or cultural amenities" was not factored into a locale's score
(Leroy 2005).
The Grant Thornton survey has since been discontinued, but other firms have
continued it with equally subjective and unaccountable methodologies (LeRoy 2005).
More importantly, the underlying themes of the Grant Thornton index are still powerful
in shaping the discussion on what states and cities do about jobs, wages and taxes. In
essence, states and cities are still pitted against each other, and a good business climate is
still defined by low taxes, low wages, and few environmental and social standards,
including anti-union laws.
One location management service that exists today, Mintax, offered this advice in
an economic development magazine:
Government agencies are more likely to treat you properly when they feel like
they are competing for your business and are cognizant that you are flirting with
others....Play hard to get, flirt, create a bidding war, and the sky is the limit. With
billions of incentive dollars available, and global competition at an all-time high,
the future belongs to the corporations that best compete for these monies (LeRoy
2005:87, quoting Neville 1999:8).
U.S. cities have been particularly affected by the competition that has been fueled
between states and cities by site locators and corporate lobbies. Citing security reasons,
lower wages, more open space, lower taxes and friendlier government, many companies
relocated in suburban areas shortly after World War II (LeRoy 2005). Together with
other post-war trends that hurt U.S. cities, the exodus of factory jobs was a major reason
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for the rising concentration of urban poverty and the racial and social tensions that arose
in the 1960s and 1970s (77). The threat of businesses relocating to a city with a more
friendly business climate has been exacerbated as the federal government has placed
more burdens on city governments to raise their own funds to balance their budgets. In
addition, in the last 30 to 40 years, firms have become much more mobile as technology
has improved and laws on international trade, particularly U.S. protectionism, have
relaxed, allowing companies to relocate to cheaper communities and maximize profits
through reduced labor and resource costs (Brecher and Costello 1990). As a result, some
U.S. firms have greater leverage as they ply city governments for tax breaks and
deregulation because they can threaten with the loss of their business, jobs and tax
revenues from the community (Brecher and Costello 1990; Klein 2007). In short, the
pressure on local government officials to maintain or increase tax revenues, attract
businesses, and provide citizens with jobs and a good quality of life has increased greatly
over the last few decades.
Between 2004 and 2007, Eugene's local paper, the Register-Guard, was peppered
with stories highlighting competition between Eugene and its sister city, Springfield, over
attracting new and existing businesses. However, the reality of attracting businesses by
creating a "good business climate" is much more complicated. First, companies'
definitions of a good business climate do not positively weight aspects of local
government that are important to a businesses' health, such as residents educational
attainment, the quality of a city's infrastructure, the skill level of workers, or that union
shops tend to have less turnover and higher skilled workers. Second, the majority of
businesses do not relocate to an area because of the tax abatement package they receive;
tax abatements are often just an added bonus for companies. Most companies have very
specific needs that dictate where they locate, such as workers with certain skills and
access to infrastructure, such as transportation corridors, cheap electricity, consumer
markets, etc. Still, the threat of inter-urban competition is a powerful discourse for local
government officials and policy makers who are concerned with their city's economic
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health and residents having job opportunities. Therefore, with several business
representatives consistently juxtaposing a healthy economic with a healthy environment
and a few high-road jobs with many low-road jobs, the threat of inter-urban competition
weighed heavily on the SBI's discussion of how to pursue a sustainable development
strategy.
In a Register-Guard article comparing Eugene Mayor Kitty Piercy and
Springfield Mayor Sid Leiken on economic development issues, summaries of the two
leaders' perspectives highlight the tension around cities setting environmental and social
standards for businesses:
[Kitty Piercy] Eugene's new Mayor, has declared economic development a top
priority. She wants to end the city's reputation as a place where it is difficult to
do business because of environmental regulations. Instead, Piercy hopes to make
Eugene known for fostering environmentally friendly businesses that treat
workers well. By contrast, Springfield Mayor Sid Leiken makes it clear that
Springfield is open for business period. 'When there is a business interested in
locating in Springfield and they are denied because of an outdated rule, it is our
job to do appropriate review and updates,' he said in his own State of the City
address two days later. 'When it is appropriate, we improvise'" (Russo and
Keefer 2005:F3).
Aware of falling prey to the traditional economic development discourse that warns of
losing business to cities with a better business climate (i.e., lower social and
environmental standards, tax abatements, etc.), the Mayor expanded on her perspective of
economic competition between Eugene and Springfield when she relayed a story to me
about Springfield Mayor Sid Leikin trying to attract the Federal Court House to locate in
Springfield:
Sid Leikin told me once while they were talking about building the Federal Court
House, and his grandfather was an old politician, he called him and said, do you
think we could stand a chance of getting the Federal Court House in Springfield?
His grandfather said, well, where's the judge from? He said, oh, he's from
Eugene. Well, no you won't get it, but you can pretend you can (Piercy 2008).
Mayor Piercy explained that much of the discussion around competition between the two
cities is only talk - it rarely plays out in reality. Her feeling, shared by many others,
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including one key economic development leader in Lane County, is that if a business
wants to locate in Eugene because it contains the right market, labor supply, resource
pool, etc., it will, regardless of the level of regulation and taxes. In fact, a recent Jobs
with Justice study demonstrated that only a small percentage of businesses' relocations
are attributed to cities offering tax abatements, instead the businesses are looking for a
good location with a high-quality workforce and a high standard ofliving (Jobs with
Justice 201 0).
Despite Mayor Piercy and many other elected and city officials knowing that the
threat of inter-urban competition is largely unfounded, Mayor Piercy still acknowledged
that the threat of losing businesses and jobs creates a "climate of fear" in and among
cities. For example, the Register-Guard newspaper, in an apparent pro-business bent,
covered many stories on the competition between Eugene and Springfield over attracting
the Carnival Cruise Lines National Call Center and Peace Health and McKenzie-
Willamette Hospitals (Register Guard 2008). The Call Center, as well as Peace Health
Hospitals, eventually located in Springfield. Clearly, for business-backed politicians,
such as Sid Leikin and former Eugene Mayor Jim Torrey, a "climate of fear" makes it
easier to implement pro-business policies (lower taxes and fewer social and
environmental regulations), as they appeal to citizens' concerns about losing or attracting
businesses, creating jobs, and increasing tax revenues.
Unfortunately, creating a more business-friendly environment is only business-
friendly in the short term; in the long term, it will reduce businesses' ability to provide
high-quality products and services because the city in which they are located will lack
quality infrastructure, skilled workers, and basic services such as fire and police
protection. Reducing the burden on business, at least in the case of Eugene specifically
and Oregon as a whole, usually means reducing taxes through temporary tax exemptions.
Yet, increased tax revenue is one of the main reasons local governments try to attract
businesses. If the business' presence in a city, due to tax exemptions, does not actually
increase the revenue stream for a city, then the purpose of attracting the business is
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largely negated. A review of the tax exemption programs offered by the State of Oregon
Economic and Community Development Department shows that many of the tax-
exemption programs, which last 10 to 20 or more years, result in a significant loss of tax
revenues for the state and city. And, by the time a business is due to pay the state taxes,
sometimes up to 20 years later, the value of its property assets has decreased so much that
the taxes it pays hardly compares to what it would have paid when it first opened shop
(LeRoy 2005).
Importantly, there is some evidence to suggest that it is through more stringent
social and environmental regulations that a community attracts business. In my interview
with Mayor Piercy, she pointed out that while the business community is generally
opposed to any type of regulation, at the same time, businesses are aware that the high
quality of life in Eugene, accomplished through environmental regulations, such as the
urban growth boundary, is a main attractant of high-quality businesses and workers.
Mayor Piercy stated:
... People love to live here [Eugene]. That's the other trade off. Every time I
meet with people - the Chamber used to have these little luncheons where I could
meet with business people and every time I sit down and talk with them they'd
talk about how they wish the permitting process was easier, blah, blah, blah, but
in the end they always to say to me, whatever you do don't change our
environment here because that's why people choose to live here. They choose to
live here for less because it's such a good place to be. So that's where the policy
decisions that rest on our shoulders, and they're not easy, I mean most of the time
even within the pro-sustainability part of policy makers they argue over
themselves between where the lines should be. These are not easy decisions.
There are not perfect rights anywhere so you're always sort of trying to give your
best judgment between all of the things that pull and tug on each other (Piercy
2008).
Interestingly, it wasn't just Mayor Piercy who mentioned that a high quality of
life attracts businesses. One TF member who was also a leader of economic development
efforts in Lane County, mentioned that if there are no environmental or social standards
for the businesses operating in your community, then the community is going to attract
businesses that don't care about social and environmental issues in the community,
194
leading to a downward spiral in both quality oflife and quality ofjobs (Ransom 2008).
Ironically, even the Eugene Chamber of Commerce's own website cites numerous studies
that say Eugene has a good business climate. According to its site, Eugene was ranked
#21 in Forbes' 11th Annual Ranking of the 200 "Best Places for Businesses and Careers"
(Eugene Chamber of Commerce 2008). This ranking was based onjob growth, income
growth, the cost of doing business, cost of living, crime rate, educational attainment,
presence of four-year colleges, cultural and recreational opportunities, and net migration.
In the 2008 Kosmont-Rose Institute "Cost of Doing Business Survey," Eugene was
ranked among the least expensive cities to do business based on taxes and fees imposed
on businesses by the city government. The Chamber website also mentioned that Eugene
made Fortune's Small Business 2008 list of "100 Best Places to Live and Launch a
Small Business in the United States (Eugene Chamber of Commerce 2008).
Viewed through the lens of the SBI - an economic development strategy to
simultaneously address social equity, environmental health and economic prosperity - it
becomes clear that the neoliberal economic development discourse is antithetical to
addressing social and environmental concerns, and more generally to improving quality
oflife in Eugene. While proponents of ecological modernization and neoliberal policy
argue that economic development strategy will attract businesses that will provide jobs
and boost local tax revenues, attracting businesses has become an end in itself for many
city officials and economic development officers. In other words, the ultimate goal of
providing residents with good jobs and a high quality oflife, including a healthy
environment, has been lost to making concessions to businesses that undermine local
government's ability to serve the needs of its residents or the environment. Instead,
under a model of urban governance, business coalitions partner with local government on
economic development, calling for less government regulation of businesses, which
includes fewer social and environmental standards and lower taxes. And when city
governments do not comply, business coalitions use the threat of inter-urban competition
to scare local government into acquiescing to their demands. Sadly, less regulation and
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lower taxes result in a lower quality of life for residents and, in the long term, a bad
business climate, because the components essential to a healthy economy - high-quality
infrastructure, a skilled workforce, a safe and healthy community, etc. - are undermined
by the city's financial austerity.
Local Government as Environmental Protector
Demands from the environmental movement
Like business coalitions, the environmental movement has also responded to a
more perforated, urban governance structure by becoming more involved in local
government policy making (Agyeman and Evans 2003; Lee 2006; Krueger and Savage
2007; Whitehead 2002). However, while business coalitions call for less government
regulation on their activities, the environmental movement, and to a lesser degree of
success the social justice movement, are demanding that local government take
responsibility for setting standards that provide a good quality of life for residents and
protect the environment (Hawken 2007; Krueger and Savage 2007; Beaumont and
Nicholls 2004; Ruben 2001). The environmental movement became especially engaged
with local government from 2000-2008, while President George W. Bush rolled back
national level environmental regulation (Natural Resources Defense Council 2008). It
was during this time that numerous cities began creating international networks of cities
working on environmental issues such as climate protection. This contradiction is
particularly clear in Eugene where the environmental movement has been very active in
local policy making and there has been significant tension between the environmental and
business communities with respect to how Eugene should develop.
Prior to the SBI, there were three major battles that occurred in Eugene around
development that contributed to tensions between the traditional business community, the
environmental community and city government. One, there was major conflict around
Hyundai/Hynix locating a semiconductor manufacturing plant in Eugene in 1997. The
traditional business community wanted to offer Hynix millions of dollars in tax breaks
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and not demand that Hynix meet any social or environmental standards in the
community, even though the semiconductor manufacturing process relies on large
amounts oftoxic chemicals and large amounts of water. Per usual economic
development discourse, the traditional business community argued that imposing any
social and environmental demands on Hynix may drive the company to another city, thus
denying Eugene residents thousands of new jobs and a large source of tax revenue. On
the other side, Citizens for Public Accountability (CPA), a political and environmental
watchdog organization, mounted broad opposition to Hyundai receiving large tax breaks
and locating in protected wetlands in West Eugene. A major victory of CPA around the
Hyundai battle was implementing the Toxic Right to Know law, the first in the country.
However, Hyundai never hired the number of workers at the wages they promised, kept
seeking tax abatements after they located in Eugene, and in the end, closed down the
factory and laid off all its workers just more than a decade after it opened in Eugene.
Two, since the mid-1990's there has been a major struggle around what role local
government should have in the management of Eugene's growth and land use. In 1998,
the Eugene city government undertook a Growth Management Study which included
many segments of the Eugene community in a process to identify what actions, if any,
should be taken to manage Eugene's future growth. On the traditional business side,
there was broad support for local government to expand the existing urban growth
boundary for new business and housing development, to increase densities for new
development, and regulate the development process less. In essence, the business
community argued that by not expanding the urban growth boundary, the city
government was driving businesses away who wanted to locate or expand in Eugene, as
well as driving up living costs for residents by limiting the supply of new housing. Many
residents and environmentalists in Eugene, however, argued for greater regulation of the
development process through updated and more sophisticated land use and building
codes that evaluated projects by its siting, design, job creation, and environmental impact
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(City of Eugene 2000). This process was extremely contentious and many of the tensions
remain unresolved through 2010.
Three, a proposed West Eugene Parkway deeply divided environmentalists and
the business community for most ofthe early 2000's. From the environmental
perspective, not only would the West Eugene Parkway fill and pave protected wetlands
and parklands in West Eugene, it would also exacerbate traffic congestion and sprawl,
not alleviate it (Eugene Weekly 2002). From the traditional business perspective, the
parkway would alleviate traffic problems in west Eugene as well as create new jobs for
residents and provide for more efficient transport of goods and services in and out of
Eugene (Eugene Weekly 2002). The West Eugene Parkway was the center of numerous
political campaigns, the subject of dozens ofpublic hearings, and one of many conflicts
around how to deal with development in West Eugene. Finally in 2006, due to wetlands
impacts, high costs, and local opposition, federal and state highway planners decided not
to build the West Eugene Parkway and later in 2008, Eugene City Council voted to
remove the West Eugene Parkway from the official transportation metropolitan plan
(TransPlan) (Pitman 2008).
As in many regions ofthe United States, tensions in Eugene between the business
and environmental communities over urban growth and development create a difficult
situation for city officials and policy makers to navigate. This tension also spills over
into the labor community (particularly the building trades) which at various times finds
itself aligned with environmentalists and business leaders. Broadly defined as pro-
growth versus anti-growth, tensions frequently arise over job creation and economic
growth versus environmental protection. Disagreement over how to address development
and growth issues become particularly pronounced as the environmental movement
makes demands for strict regulation of business practices and takes a "no compromise"
position on environmental degradation.
These tensions were less present in the SBI process because the Mayor
consciously chose more environmentally friendly business people for the TF;
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nevertheless, business interests still shaped the SBI process and recommendations. One
ofthe Mayor's main goals for the SBI was to bridge relationships between the city
government and the business community, and between the business community and the
environmental community. As a result, the baggage of past conflicts between these
communities, mainly regarding regulation, informed how they approached new initiatives
such as the SBI. More importantly, this context greatly influenced how the Mayor
approached her goal of creating a sustainable economic strategy that addressed social and
environmental needs, and ultimately it shaped the role that local government would play
in pursuing this goal.
I identify three main factors as having contributed to an unfriendly relationship
between the environmental and business communities in Eugene and Oregon, as a whole.
This, in turn, has contributed to more polarizing positions on both sides - the business
community is extremely wary of environmental regulation and the environmental
community puts greater pressure on local government to regulate environmental quality.
These factors include: 1) historically, a significant source of economic growth and job
creation in the City of Eugene and the State of Oregon, has been based on natural
resource exploitation; 2) the Pacific Northwest, and particularly Eugene, have been a
hotbed for environmental protection activities and organizations; and 3) the referendum
system in Oregon creates more contention around the implementation and elimination of
regulation.
From the start of the SBI process, Mayor Piercy was well aware of the tensions
that existed between the environmental and business communities; it was a large part of
the reason for her initiation of the SBI in the first instance - she hoped to resolve some of
these tensions. In fact, she explained to me that many of her environmentally sensitive
business friends warned her not to mention the word "sustainability" during her campaign
or once elected: "Whatever you do, don't talk about sustainability [in your election
campaign]. That's a killer. You won't win the election if you do that" (Piercy 2008).
Some of the longest-standing tensions in Eugene with respect to environmental regulation
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revolve around logging. Lumber mills and forest products were a thriving industry in
Eugene and the surrounding region until a couple of decades ago when environmentalists,
using the well-known Spotted Owl issue, succeeded in regulating the amount and type of
logging by timber companies.
Defense of some of the last remaining old-growth forests in the United States
drew many environmentalists to the area. Eugene is host to numerous environmental
nonprofits, particularly no-compromise environmental organizations, as well as more
radical collections of environmentalists, such as eco-anarchists. While there are several
specific issues that have divided the environmental and business communities over the
years, logging of national forests has been a particularly divisive issue in Eugene and the
surrounding Willamette Valley. Logging companies, owned by some of the wealthiest
and most politically powerful families in the Eugene-Springfield area, and
environmentalists have been involved in bitter struggles over logging that have dragged
on for years. Environmentalists have conducted tree-sits, spiked trees, blocked roads and
bridges that lead to logging sites, used litigation and boycotts, and numerous other tactics
to prevent areas from being logged.
Reflecting the tension over environmental issues in the region, a 2006 Eugene
Weekly article on salvage logging began:
Stemming from decades long fights over logging old-growth forests in Oregon,
business and environmental tensions have also arose in the Eugene area over what
to do with old-growth forests after they've burned from forest fires. The most
recent fight, concerning the Biscuit Forest in Southwest Oregon, was so heated it
even attracted national attention from former President Bush, timber companies
and environmental organizations from across the U.S. and others (Eugene Weekly
2006).
In the case of salvage logging, timber companies, which hold great political sway in the
area, want to log legally protected forests that have burned, in order to salvage lumber.
Many environmental organizations, however, argue that intact post-fire forest ecosystems
are among the rarest in the world and want them left unmolested to regenerate.
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Indicating the level of tension over logging in the region, this Eugene Weekly excerpt
describes the response to the issue:
A flood of public opposition followed the proposal [to log Biscuit]. The agency
received 23,000 public comments, 95% of them opposed to post-fire logging, and
environmental groups filed a half-dozen lawsuits challenging the plan. The Forest
Service pushed ahead with logging operations anyway, despite staffing shortages
and auction prices 70% lower than expected. By January 2005, with only 53
million board feet cut, the oper~tion had cost taxpayers more than $14 million,
according to a World Wildlife Fund report (Abraham 2006).
Tension over logging has been particularly high in Eugene and surrounding
communities because two to three decades ago the regional economy was largely
dependent upon natural resource extraction such as logging, sand and gravel extraction,
and fishing (Oregon Blue Book 2010). For example, Hull-Oakes Lumber Company,
based in Monroe, Oregon, was awarded the contracts to log four federal timber lots in
Oregon in 1991, but years went by before Hull-Oakes was able to log any of the lots
because local environmental organizations contested logging of these areas. In a
Register-Guard article, owner Ralph Hull said: "We've had to cut timber [on our 11,000
acre tree farm] that was too young to be harvested - at a great sacrifice to the future"
(Burri 1995). As most of Oregon and Eugene's economic base depends on natural
resource extraction, limiting natural resource extraction sparks intense debate.
In other words, Eugene's and the State of Oregon's economies have traditionally
lacked diversity. Only in the late 1990s did Oregon obtain a small high-tech industry,
such as the Hynix plant in Eugene, which produced computer chips. Unfortunately, the
high-tech industry tends not to be labor intensive, and thus, for its economic profit, it
provides a proportionately small number ofjobs. As I mentioned before, this plant closed
down in 2008 after receiving a multi-year property tax abatement worth over 50 million.
Other than the small high-tech sector and resource extraction activities, the University of
Oregon has provided a degree of stability to Eugene's economy. The University, in
2009, was the second largest employer in Lane County, and attracts thousands of students
to Eugene each year who bring a significant amount of outside money to the area (City-
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Data 2009). A lack of economic diversity and a historical economic reliance on natural
resource extraction has created a foundation for conflict between the business and
environmental communities over environmental regulation, but specific issues, such as
old-growth logging, land use regulation, social and environmental regulations on
corporations etc., punctuate this long, harsh and hardened relationship.
Also contributing to the polarization of political perspectives in Eugene regarding
how to address environmental issues is that the Pacific Northwest, and Eugene in
particular, became a hotbed for radical environmental action in the late 1990s. Most
notably, several members of the Earth Liberation Front (ELF) were charged and tried in
federal court in Eugene for over a dozen environmental actions, including "the 1996
destruction of the [United States Forest Service] Oakridge Ranger Station, the 2000 arson
attempt at the Eugene Police Department's West University Public Safety Station, the
fiery destruction of 35 SUVs at a Eugene truck lot in 2001" (Bishop and Steves
2006:Al). One of their most significant activities was burning parts ofVail ski resort in
Vail, Colorado in 1998, causing $24.5 million in damage. This action not only brought
radical environmentalism into the limelight in Eugene, but also nationally. Ultimately,
the ELF was infiltrated by the FBI, leading to charges against six individuals in 2005
(Bishop and Steves 2006:Al). The decision of the federal court in Eugene to charge the
ELF members as "terrorists" under the federal terrorism enhancement sentencing law,
which allows the court to add up to 20 years to each defendant's sentence, was
unprecedented. This in no way improved the relationship between environmentalists and
the business community, and the struggle to gain political influence over government
decision making raged on.
Yet it is not solely the radical environmentalist movement in Eugene that has
caused tension. The targeted success of the environmental movement at large in Eugene
has also contributed to the tension between the traditional business community,
environmentalists, and local government. The environmental community has succeeded
in advocating for and passing a Toxics Right to Know law (the first in the nation),
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preventing a major highway from bisecting the West Eugene wetlands, and maintaining
an urban growth boundary around Eugene to protect open space and farmland (Oregon
Toxics Alliance 2010; Oregon.Gov 2010; Blue Green Eugene 2005).
Land use, urban growth and economic growth
More recently, tensions between the environmental and business communities
have been exacerbated over regulation of land use and urban growth. Related to conflict
in the 1990's over growth management and the urban growth boundary, Measure 37 was
introduced in 2004 to the Oregon state legislature; it has been an especially polarizing
issue in the Eugene-Springfield area. A perfect example of "roll-out neoliberalism," the
Measure requires the state to compensate landowners for any decreases in their property
values due to state-imposed regulation, such as environmental, land use or zoning rules.
According to the Eugene Weekly, "Eugene's share of that bill is proportionate to its
population, local taxpayers here could end up with an annual bill of $185 million a year
in claims and administrative costs. That's the equivalent of about two years worth of city
property tax revenues" (Eugene Weekly 2004). One Eugene City Councilor described
the measure as "institutionalized anarchy," stating "if it passes it will destroy the
desirability of the state of Oregon as a place to live, do business and recreate" (Eugene
Weekly 2004). Proponents ofland use regulation and zoning argued the bill would cost
the taxpayers millions, while developers, land speculators and timber barons could make
millions because they could now claim that any of their lands situated outside the urban
growth boundary would be worth much more if they were allowed to subdivide or
develop it, with projects like strip malls, subdivisions, and big box stores (Eugene
Weekly 2004).
With so much money up for grabs, the timber barons and land speculators have
pumped big bucks into the pro Measure 37 campaign. The pro-37 PAC reported a
half million dollars in contributions by Sept 23 - mostly in big checks from
timber and development interests ....Measure 37 would make Oregon perhaps the
first place anywhere where governments must compensate property owners for
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such a wide range of regulation. Even many staunch critics ofproperty regulation
say that's too radical (Eugene Weekly 2004).
Since 2004, many parts of Measure 37 have been refolmed through subsequent actions by
the state legislature and the Oregon Supreme Court (State of Oregon 2010; Chaimov
2008). What's most interesting about this battle around regulations related to land use is
that the cities in Oregon with stricter land use regulations and zoning laws have been less
affected by the Great Recession of 2007-2009 and the failing housing market. This
resilience is mainly attributed to these cities' tighter regulations on land use, which
limited overbuilding of housing stock (New Geography 2010). Consequently, Oregon
cities like Bend, which do not have strict land use regulation, have been much more
affected by the economic downturn, mainly because oftheir surplus of housing stock.
Related to land use regulation, the regulation of big box stores like Wal-Mart,
Horne Depot, and other such big box stores has been highly contentious as well. In April
2004, before Mayor Piercy assumed office, but as she was first organizing the SBI, the
Eugene City Council held a vote to put a moratorium on the building of big box stores.
New big box store proposals would be denied until the City Council decided how to
regulate the size, location, traffic impact and other development issues related to these
stores. While many other cities around the United States, and even some smaller towns
in Oregon, had put a moratorium on big box stores until they were better able to regulate
them, the Eugene City Council voted 5 to 4 to not impose a moratorium on big box
retailers. The Eugene Weekly captured the following quotes from Councilors both
opposing and supporting the moratorium:
'The intent is to protect local businesses and local workers,' said [Betty] Taylor of
her moratorium proposal. 'It's way overdue. People are saying now, 'Why
haven't you done something?" But [Jennifer] Solomon said she opposes
restrictions on the 'valuable services' stores like Wal-Mart provide. 'This just
feels very anti-business to me.' [Nancy] Nathanson, now running for mayor, said
city staff work on the moratorium would distract from higher priorities. She said
a moratorium could affect a wide variety of retailers. 'Are we saying no more
Jerry's [an Oregon horne construction store that competes with Horne Depot and
Lowe's], no more 5th St. Public Market [a local shopping district mainly occupied
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by small, local stores]?' [Bonnie] Bettman said preserving local jobs against
poor-paying big boxes should be a city priority. The city spends a lot of money
on economic development, she points out. 'I think we can also spend money to
protect local jobs' (Eugene Weekly. 2004a).
The tensions between the environmental and business communities over
regulation are also exacerbated by Oregon's unique referendum process whereby
citizens' can write and pass laws through the initiative process. It is through such
initiatives that Oregon's property tax was cut and capped (see Measure 47), that Measure
37 was passed (although mainly repealed through subsequent legislation), and that many
other anti-tax measures have been proposed. The initiative process tends to succeed
when it is backed by well-funded groups, because paid petitioners and campaigning
companies can be hired. It started out as a populist tool created in 1902 to give citizens
direct access to creating and overturning laws, but some claim it is now a "new and
expensive weapon for well-financed interest groups" (Broder 1998:A01). The spike in
use of ballot initiatives really took off after California approved Proposition 13 in 1978,
which cut and capped property taxes. Nationally, "collecting signatures to qualify ballot
initiatives has become a multimillion-dollar industry, and the ad battles over these issues
are as intensive and expensive as any candidate campaign" (Broder 1998:AO1).
Other states' initiatives, like Oregon's, tend to focus on cutting taxes, but Oregon
has consistently placed more initiatives on its ballot than any other state (Broder 1998;
USA Today 2000). Speaking in 1998 after Oregonians had placed more than 30
constitutional amendments and laws on the ballot, and had passed 12 ofthem, University
of Oregon President Dave Frohnmayer said: "Initiatives that limit taxes without cutting
spending or that mandate spending without providing revenue usurp the role of the
legislature and governor in managing the ledger of state government. It especially
diminishes the role of the legislature as the central instrument of the government. And
that is bad for democracy" (Broder 1998). Bill Sizemore, the Director of Oregon
Taxpayers United and owner of a petition company, has been exceedingly prominent in
Oregon for instigating and successfully running initiative campaigns. He led a successful
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campaign to cut and cap property taxes in 1996, he led the effort to pass Measure 37, he
unsuccessfully posted initiatives to end payroll deductions for union political dues
(twice), and he failed in an initiative to ban same sex marriage (Sizemore 2010). In the
case of ending union political dues, the state employees' union, AFSCME, has had to
fight Sizemore's initiatives twice, and put their own counter-measures on the ballot at a
huge expense to the union.
The referendum process has fueled an ongoing debate between the environmental
and business communities over how Oregon and its cities should develop. More
specifically, this debate centers on the role that government regulation should play in
Oregon's development. In the eyes of the business community and many workers in
extractive industries, "economic development" is stunted in Eugene due to environmental
land use regulations like the urban growth boundary, and other environmental and social
regulations like the Toxic Right to Know law. A stunted economy means fewer jobs,
which is a direct and tangible harm to workers and their families. In the eyes of many in
the environmental community, the preservation of the environment benefits workers and
their families in the long run, and should never be compromised by short-term business
interests. It is within this context that Mayor Piercy attempted to broker cooperation
between the environmental, business and social justice communities around sustainability
and develop an alternative economic development agenda through the SBI.
Conclusion
The negative response of the Eugene business community to the potential
regulation of social equity through the SBI reflects a typical agenda for traditional
economic development. This agenda is one that closely aligns with the main
prescriptions of neoliberal policy: reduce government spending on social services, reduce
regulations and taxation rates, and ensure the government facilitates and coordinates the
attraction of new businesses and business capital (Harvey 1989; Keams and Paddison
2000). There was not unanimity among the business community to push a neoliberal
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agenda. However, the few business owners involved in the SBI who supported
government regulation for environmental and social well-being were outsiders to the
Chamber of Commerce and were already addressing social and environmental issues in
their business operations regardless of incentives or regulation.
The prominent role that the traditional business community played in the SBI
reflects broader political-economic trends. Firstly, as local governments shift from a
leadership role to more of a coordinating and facilitating role, they tum power over to
private interests and nonprofits in determining city priorities, policies and action. This
shift in power affects many issues relevant to a community's well being, like housing,
infrastructure, welfare, environmental health and economic development. However, for
the purposes of the SBI, I am most interested in how the role of local government has
changed in the sphere of economic development. The Mayor's SBI, as an initiative
aimed at changing business practices for greater sustainability, had at its root a vision for
an alternative economic development policy. Yet this vision conflicted with the Chamber
of Commerce's vision for economic development. According to the urban governance
model, the more perforated structure oflocal government has provided an opportunity for
traditional business coalitions to have much greater involvement and influence in policy
making. Therefore, the significant involvement of the business community, their
relatively cohesive agenda, and their ability to speak with authority in the SBI, led to a
result that mirrored the Chamber's interests. This reflects a much broader trend across
the U.S. oflocal government turning to the private sector for assistance with their
entrepreneurial strategy, and at the same time, the private sector message being
dominated by traditional business coalitions. Agencies like the Lane Metro Partnership,
the main entity dealing with economic development in Lane County, is one factor lending
to the cohesive and dominant traditional business community, and it also highlights the
emerging role ofpublic-private partnerships in performing the role of what used to be
local government's sole responsibility.
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The more perforated structure of local government has also created more space
for other interest groups, namely the environmental movement, to make demands of local
government. For the most part, the environmental movement has called on local
government to take responsibility for environmental protection by implementing and
upholding environmental regulation. Efforts by the environmental movement to have
local government regulate environmental quality were particularly strong during
President George W. Bush's administration because of the lack of federal-level
environmental leadership. The city-level results of the environmental movement's
demands on government are evident in the Toxic Right to Know law, strict land use
codes, the protection of wetlands in West Eugene, the protection of forests in the
Willamette Valley, and more.
However, the environmental movement's effort to regulate at the local level
clashes with the traditional business community's efforts to reduce social and
environmental regulation. As a result, Mayor Piercy's efforts to bridge economic
development and social and environmental sustainability through the SBI rested on
highly contested political ground. While this political ground was somewhat of a mine-
field, Mayor Piercy hoped to use this contested space to forge a more collaborative
relationship between local government and the business community, and also to boost her
political capital with the business community. Indeed, maintaining the economic health
of one's city through entrepreneurialism is now a major responsibility of city officials.
Thus, she wanted to find a middle ground. In this sense, the SBI was a compromise path
that attempted to address both the business community's discourse around economic
development and job creation and the environmental community's concerns around
protecting forests, open space, farmland, and air and water quality.
In an effort to walk this compromise path, the structure of the SBI lent itself to
strong business influence. As a result, the outcomes of the SBI were weak, despite the
fact that strong regulation is necessary to ensure that the benefits of economic
development are more evenly distributed across society. The perforated structure of local
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government lends itself to those civil society groups with the greatest resources and time
to dedicate, as well as to those groups with the most to lose. Accordingly, issues of
particular importance to the social equity representatives on the SBI, such as wages,
health and retirement benefits, etc. were ignored. The pressure exerted from the
traditional business community for the SBI not to regulate, along with the Mayor's own
interest in bridging the divide between the business community and the city, trumped all
other interests. Based on the uncompromising stance of the business community, it is
apparent that regulation may be one of the few means to bringing businesses into
compliance with social and environmental norms. In fact, the larger political-economic
context around businesses and regulation demonstrates that states and cities should
attempt to implement uniform social and environmental standards across regions,
reducing competition between cities by evening the playing field between them.
To provide a case in point, the few times where all three components of
sustainability - social, environmental and economic - have been addressed, the
government has taken a leadership role through regulation and incentives. Germany, for
example, is internationally recognized for its housing energy retrofit program. The
program was initiated by a coalition of labor, environment and government officials to
address unemployment, high energy bills for low-income families, and the need to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. Between 2001 and 2005, the German government invested
$1.8 billion in retrofitting low-income residents' homes for energy efficiency and
renewable energy sources. Then, in response to the global recession of200? and the
need to provide greater employment opportunities for German residents, the government
invested $8.1 billion more to expand this horne retrofit program. By 2009, around
300,000 good, union jobs had been created by this program and more than 600,000
apartments had been retrofitted, reducing low-income residents' energy bills by 80%
(Schneider 2010). Germany has also significantly reduced its energy consumption and
greenhouse gas emissions. In terms of regulation, the German government has required
that businesses obtain a certain percentage of their energy from renewable sources. This
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mandate has driven investment in renewable energy sources and also provided job
opportunities for residents (Schneider 2010). In the United States, the city of Los
Angeles has created a building retrofit program modeled after the German program. The
Los Angeles program includes energy efficiency retrofits of all city-owned buildings.
Similar to Germany, this program was initiated by a coalition of labor, environment and
government officials.
While Germany is operating under unique social, political and economic forces, it
serves to highlight the strong leadership role that the government must play in
sustainability efforts. Yet in Eugene and across the United States, the capacity of local
governments to regulate for sustainability is limited by neoliberal ideology and the
strength of traditional business coalitions. The historical tensions in Eugene between the
environmental movement and the business community have led to a heightened
sensitivity towards a regulatory framework. The regulation oflogging, land use and
urban growth has served as a lightning rod for tensions around the role of local
government in social and environmental regulation. In short, these tensions run deep in
Eugene and play an important role in policy making. These tensions were in part what
led Mayor Piercy to introduce the SBI, yet they also contributed to the failure of the SBI
TF to recommend any form of regulation to address sustainability. The sustainability
movement sits at the nexus of neoliberal economic development and a community's
social and environmental well-being. Sustainability demands government regulation,
while neoliberalism demands government entrepreneurialism. The strength of business
coalitions, coupled with perforated urban governance, serves to limit the opportunities for
successful sustainability initiatives. This points to the limits of sustainability within the
current urban political-economic context, and also partially illuminates the path towards a
sustainable future.
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CHAPTER V
JUST SUSTAINABILITY: LABOR-COMMUNITY COALITIONS
WORKING FOR REGIONAL EQUITY
Introduction
In this chapter, I turn to one of the few ways that social equity is addressed within
urban sustainability efforts in the U.S. - among labor-community coalitions with a
vision for regional equity. Labor-community coalitions are made up oflabor unions and
other non-labor institutions in civil society - housing, religious, immigration,
transportation, and social service organizations - all working together towards shared or
common goals (Frege, Heery, and Turner 2003). After extensive primary and secondary
data analysis, interviews, and participant observation, I turned to these coalitions because
I had yet to find a city government that comprehensively addressed social equity in its
sustainability efforts. While Mayor Piercy attempted to build an alternative economic
development agenda through the SBI, it lacked certain necessary ingredients for making
social equity a central component of the outcome. Labor-community coalitions with an
eye towards regional equity, however, may contain the necessary mix of ingredients.
These coalitions may successfully provide an alternative to the traditional business
organizations' economic development agenda, with the goal of fully integrating their
social equity and environmental sustainability agenda within a city region.
The main driving force for social equity goals within the Mayor's SBI came from
labor representatives on the Task Force (TF). However, these labor representatives
lacked broad support, either from the labor movement or from other community
organizations and social justice movements which might have helped advance social
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equity concerns within the SBI. Prior to the SBI, there was no existing network formed
between the labor movement, the environmental movement and the broader social justice
movement that could be activated during the SBI process in order to collectively develop
and advance an equity agenda. In fact, the Lane County Labor Council had shown little
interest in working on issues outside traditional workplace negotiations between the
employer and a union. Furthermore, the SBI process did not represent an urgent or
threatening issue that required immediate attention; with limited time and resources, most
unions and social justice organizations only respond to issues that threaten their existing
interests. The labor representatives' lack of success led me to look at labor-community
coalitions in the U.S. that are addressing social justice and environmental concerns
through participation in regional equity movements. An exploration of labor-community
coalitions' work in sustainability and regional equity provides great insight into the ways
in which concerns of workers and their communities can be addressed alongside
environmental and economic issues. While a traditional strategy for labor unions is to
intervene and reshape the economic development process in the workplace, in industry,
or at the national level, it is only recently that labor unions have intervened in economic
development efforts to ensure equity and broader community benefit at the city/local
level (Applegate 2007:53). Unions' and other community organizations' recent interest
in influencing economic development at the local level should not come as a surprise
given the shifting roles of local governments and business coalitions in the last few
decades. In a neoliberal fashion, local governments have retreated from coordinating
economic development programs, handing over this responsibility to business coalitions
that drive development based on the pursuit of profit rather than the public interest. "In
addition to sacrificing the governance role of unions and communities to that of
businesses, the government's retreat from 'mixed' governance since the 1980s has also
entailed abandoning economic equality as a public policy priority" (Applegate 2007:54).
In the last decade, amidst waning political power, cuts in social spending, growth
in low-wage jobs, and a worsening urban ecological environment, unions and other
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community organizations have begun to see the potential of working together to
challenge the growing power and influence of business coalitions at the local level. As
an alternative to the business coalitions' vision for development, labor-community
coalitions are forming and advocating for a development agenda focused on creating
regional equity. Intentionally broad in scope, they create an organizational structure that
allows for larger and more powerful coalitions. Their agenda for regional equity can
include everything from good jobs, health benefits, affordable housing, affordable and
accessible transportation, a healthy work and living environment, access to green space,
and much more.
Regional Equity Movements and Their Ideological Principles
"Every word in the term regional equity movement is important: The region is the
level for action, equity is the goal, and a movement is the way to make change"
(Blackwell and Pastor 2009: 16). In the Mayor's SBI, social equity was constantly
juxtaposed with strict economic concerns, a strategy used to discredit social equity by
traditional business representatives on the TF. Consequently, the idea that cities operate
within an environment of scarcity was the dominant framework guiding the SBI IF.
There were two main tradeoffs that consistently arose during SBI TF discussions: (l)
community members must choose between many low-road jobs and fewer high-road
jobs; and (2) community members must choose between a healthy economy and a healthy
environment. Operating within this framework, it was virtually impossible for SBI TF
members to identify recommendations that created a win-win-win situation for
environmental, social equity, and economic goals.
In contrast, labor-community coalitions and the regional equity movement
transcend a scarcity perspective to devise ways to meet social equity, environmental, and
economic goals simultaneously. In other words, the development of a city is not viewed
as a zero sum game. Instead, development is viewed within a framework of abundance
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and with the perspective that there's enough economic, environmental, and social wealth
to meet a whole community's needs (Blackwell and Pastor 2009).
The regional equity movement and labor-community coalitions, in particular, are
"proposing a new politics of sustainable metropolitan development" based on fairness,
participation, democracy, and access to opportunity (Pavel 2009). This paradigm of
sustainable development for regional equity is generally based on four ideological
principles that together provide a very different orientation for development than that of
the Mayor's SBI. The broad principles of regional equity are to: (1) build a broad based
movement for regional equity; (2) build an equitable, inclusive city; (3) allow the
environment, society and the economy to flourish; and (4) ensure meaningful community
voice, participation, and leadership.
Building broad-based movements
A guiding principle of the regional equity movement is that in order to challenge
the neoliberal urban economic development paradigm, a broad array of organizations
must work in uilison. However, it's not easy for diverse organizations to overcome their
differences and pursue a common agenda. A notable obstacle for labor-community
coalitions is overcoming differences between social and environmental organizations,
historically pitted against each other by business in a job-versus-the-environment
dichotomy. It is often difficult for social justice advocates to see the value of addressing
environmental problems unless those problems lead to serious community health issues.
Likewise, the environmental movement's traditional focus on preserving natural
resources can come at the expense of poor and working families (Duncan 2009:13). The
movement for regional equity recognizes the importance of aligning the interests of
environmental and social justice advocates. Duncan explains that "this vital symbiosis is
as yet embryonic" (Duncan 2009: 13). The labor-community coalitions for regional
equity, numbering around 15 throughout the U.S., are doing the difficult work oflinking
social justice with environmental concerns, because when their objectives are integrated,
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it creates a powerful framework for organizing (Duncan 2009:14; Partnership for
Working Families 2010).30
The labor movement is an essential member of the regional equity movement, and
the struggle is to expand labor's focus beyond the workplace to broader social and
environmental issues. The regional equity movement strives to encourage the U.S. labor
movement to adopt "social movement unionism" as a means for labor to revitalize its
membership, its organizing tactics, and, ultimately, its power (Moody 1988; Nissen
2004).
Social movement unionism is defined as the labor movement making alliances
with other social and community movements that are attempting to be a counterweight to
corporate power (Nissen 2004:67). A more specific definition is provided of social
movement unionism: "a shift in orientation and strategy from insider or business union
approaches to the innovations of a mobilization-based social unionism" (Turner 2007:3).
Many labor scholars agree that if the labor movement builds alliances with other social
movements and community organizations, the cultural climate in the U.S. may shift
towards viewing unions in a more positive light, and believing that the right to join a
union is a human right (Turner 2007). Furthermore, social movement unionism pushes
for substantial social change that goes beyond the workplace and touches on broader
social issues of regional equity. Social movement unionism is different than a social
movement; it refers to union mobilization strategies that combine with social movement
approaches for resource development, coalition building, grassroots mobilization,
aggressive organizing, demonstrations, and civil disobedience (Turner 2007:15).
In large part, calling on unions to adopt social movement unionism and build
broad-based coalitions for regional equity has become an ideological principle of the
30 According to the Partnership for Working Families, a national organization that assists labor-community
coalitions, there are 15 labor-community coalitions working on regional equity issues in various U.S. cities,
as of 20 10 (Partnership for Working Families 2010). These coalitions exist mainly in major U.S. cities like
Los Angeles, CA, Seattle, WA, Boston, MA, Denver, CO, Atlanta, GA, but also exist in smaller U.S. cities
like Syracuse, NY, Pittsburgh, PA, and Hartford, CT (Partnership for Working Families 2010).
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regional equity movement because central labor councils can playa decisive role in
transforming the economic development agenda of a region:
Organized labor is one of the few remaining entities in a position to contest for
power with these increasingly influential bastions of corporate influence. Labor
has long been organized on a regional basis through Central Labor Councils that
are essentially coalitions of the labor unions operating in an area. As such, they
can playa valuable role as a counterpoint to the regional influence that has been
smartly cultivated by the business community. By acting regionally on behalf of
an entire community, Labor has the opportunity to become a spokesperson for the
aspirations of its community, which is something that is not possible when Labor
focuses only on more narrow concerns, such as negotiating contracts one at a time
(Dean 2009:96).
In fact, without the labor movement and central labor councils stepping up to this
challenge, working families have no effective lobby on issues of economic development
at the city/region level (Dean, 2009). Labor's role in labor-community coalitions adds
significant weight to their agenda because the labor movement is the largest membership-
based movement in the U.S. that represents working families - "only the church and
senior citizen groups rival Labor in terms of their capacity to organize and influence the
larger society" (Dean 2009: 105).
The first labor-community coalitions for regional equity emerged in the late
1990's in California, in Los Angeles and the San Francisco Bay area, but most labor-
community coalitions have only formed and become active since 2005 (Partnership for
Working Families 2010). Prior to the recent emergence of labor-community coalitions in
some U.S. cities, local government officials and their agencies had often succumbed to a
region's well-organized business community and its local economic policy, which
included lower taxes, more development, and less regulation, as we saw with the Mayor's
SBI. Although labor-community coalitions are proposing and implementing a counter
agenda to the traditional business-led economic development agenda, many coalitions
consist of (progressive) business leaders, government officials, policymakers, and
academics, not just social movement organizations. Having a truly broad movement for
regional equity, including social equity, a healthy economy, and environmental
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sustainability, is a key principle of the movement. Many progressive movements are too
"compartmentalized, too narrowly oriented around single issues, and lacking a broad
moral vision" (Blackwell and Pastor 2009: 19). The sustainability movement in general
also draws its strength from its broad agenda, as it brings together many different issues
under one roof. Unfortunately, the Mayor's SBI suffered from compartmentalization.
While social, environmental, and economic concerns were brought together in a single
initiative, these concerns were addressed separately and social issues were prioritized
below the others. Conversely, the agendas oflabor-community coalitions often
supersede narrow organizational or movement interests, and the coalition has the clout to
ensure that the larger issue of equity takes precedence. The "right to good jobs, decent
wages, local services, and environmental quality remain a common cause between unions
and an array of social justice movements within communities" (Sellers 2007:36).
Building an equitable, inclusive city and reducing regional disparities
After the need for a broad coalition, the second ideological principle of the
regional equity movement is building an equitable, inclusive city and reducing disparities
that exist between the region and its parts. While achieving social equity is essential for
regional equity, reducing a region's social inequalities is important for other reasons, too.
Having a more inclusive city (including access to good housing, jobs, education, health
care, etc.) is not just a moral imperative but is also good for business - "in the new
economy, the most important factors fueling competitiveness are the skills and innovative
capacities of a nation's and region's workforce" (Blackwell and Pastor 2009: 16).
Studies show that paying attention to the needs oflow-income people benefits all
residents of a metropolitan region (Pastor et. al. 2000; Barnes and Ledebur 1998; Voith
1998; Blackwell and Pastor 2009:18).
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A difJerentframeworkfor sustainability: Operating in an abundant society
The third main principle of regional equity movements is prioritizing a region's
sustainability, in terms of both social and environmental equity - with economic policy
developed around meeting those concerns. For regional equity movements, their efforts
are focused on shifting "policy in a direction that is more favorable for disadvantaged
communities" (Blackwell and Pastor 2009: 18). This approach to economic development
is in marked contrast to the SBI's approach, which was shaped by the mainstream
business community's emphasis on scarcity. The SBI operated according to a zero sum
game, in which meeting one component of sustainability meant another component
wasn't addressed (i.e. an increase in wages meant less jobs overall). This perspective
ensures that business, the driver ofjob creation, always comes out on top. This
perspective needs to be changed, and one of the few successful means of doing so is by
developing the power of labor-community coalitions within regional equity movements,
which can shift the terms of a debate to that of abundance rather than scarcity. One of the
main ways that the economic development debate is being shifted from one of scarcity to
one of abundance is through labor-community coalitions holding individual development
projects accountable to broader community benefit. Because a developer receives public
monies for a project, labor-community coalitions can make public support for the project
dependent upon the project meeting a community's need for good jobs with a living
wage, health care, and workforce training, affordable housing, environmental health, and
more. In short, proposed projects and programs are evaluated by their ability to meet
residents' basic needs so that inequality between privileged and disadvantaged residents
in a region is decreased, not increased.
Ensure meaningful community voice, participation, and leadership
The last major principle of the regional equity movement is ensuring meaningful
community voice, participation, and leadership in creating regional equity. There are two
main aspects to this principle. First, direct involvement of a large number ofpeople is
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important to the decision-making process. Second, the involvement of socially
disadvantaged residents is key to finding solutions to a region's problems because these
residents are most impacted by a region's policies. While the Mayor's SBI did bring a
large number of residents into the process through community meetings and web surveys
(around 700 people were engaged in the public participation aspect of the SBI), the
central decision-making power for the SBI was controlled by a small group of people
who were appointed and not accountable to the larger community. Furthermore, the SBI
TF and Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) membership hardly included any socially
disadvantaged residents. Instead, the TF and TAC were mainly made up of white,
middle- to upper-middle-class professionals with expertise in sustainability.
The regional equity movement is one of the few comprehensive responses to the
rising power of business and trade associations in cities. Corporate leaders have become
acutely aware that regional-level policies related to land use, taxation, development, and
permitting are set by local jurisdictions. Consequently, corporate leaders and their
business associations have become very organized and effective at shifting regional
policy. Dean describes their involvement:
"Unfortunately, most of the business-dominated groups formed to address these
bureaucratic obstacles to their success often pursue competitiveness for its own
sake. Frequently, and despite growing evidence to the contrary, they operate
under the mistaken notion that economic competitiveness will translate into a
healthy economy. The focus on competitiveness to the exclusion of all other
concerns often has very negative consequences on the overall social welfare in a
community" (Dean 2009:97).
Labor-community coalitions for regional equity help create a new vision for economic
development that goes beyond economic growth to include social and environmental
goals, using a process led by the very members of society who have been excluded from
traditional economic growth.
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Labor Community Coalitions Leading the Movement for Regional Equity
Across the U.S., regional equity efforts are carried out primarily by labor-
community coalitions. I will use Frege, Heery, and Turner's widely accepted definition
and taxonomy of labor-community coalitions: "discrete, intermittent or continuous joint
activity in pursuit of shared or common goals between trade unions and other non-labor
institutions in civil society, including community, faith, identity, advocacy, welfare and
campaigning organizations" (2003 :2).
Labor-community coalitions have existed in different forms since the 1930s in the
United States. However, their existence has been inconsistent, as relations between the
various movements have been in constant flux since that period. Today's labor-
community coalitions are closely linked to community-based development organizations
(CBDOs) and their model of community empowerment. CBDOs also emerged in the
1930s in the U.S. and drew on the union model of organizing to empower community
members - "community organizing to empower residents to gain the benefits of
economic development initially imitated, even as it elaborated on, labor organizing:
mobilizing residents to bargain with and compel concessions from those controlling the
development system" (Applegate 2007:57).
In fact, in the early 1960s the President of the United Auto Workers (UAW),
Walter Reuther, became involved in uniting labor unions with community-based
organizations to form city-based labor-community coalitions. Reuther worked with
President Lyndon B. Johnson to mesh Johnson's War on Poverty agenda with the
concerns of labor-community coalition members, eventually building Citizens Crusade
Against Poverty. The coalition called for democratic economic planning, full production,
and equitable income distribution. Reuther and the coalition were specifically concerned
with connecting the anti-poverty agenda with other important urban social issues, like
decent jobs, affordable housing, etc. The UAW eventually set up the Demonstration
Cities (DC) program that aimed to "rehabilitate the central cores ofAmerican cities,"
connecting neighborhoods to downtowns and connecting low- and middle-income blacks
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and whites to housing and public services (Applegate 2007:63). Central to Reuther and
DC's efforts was gaining social-democratic control over a city's economic development
plan and process (Applegate 2007).
Reuthers' efforts eventually led to the formation of the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and a proposal for HUD's first program, called
"Model Cities." Unfortunately, Reuthers' plan to be the first head ofHUD and run
"Model Cities" was not realized. Instead the "Model Cities" program offered "no
challenge to existing governance relations, while replicating the residential, race, and
class divisions that Demonstration Cities was framed to overcome" (Applegate 2007:63).
Relations between labor unions and community organizations deteriorated quickly after
the creation of HUD. Reuther was criticized by community organization leaders for
pursuing a government-sponsored, top-down model that undermined his social-
democratic aims. "Community organizers were left to contend with the restructuring that
had occurred: a government role in directing community organizations that was
unprecedented, and community organizations that manifested an unprecedented
dependence on government for their existence and agenda" (Applegate 2007:64). By the
late I 960s, great mistrust had developed between labor unions and community-based
organizations. The civil rights and women's movements took legal action against labor
unions; many labor unions opposed the anti-war movement; and some New Left
movements accused unions of being a part of the racist, imperialist Establishment
(Applegate 2007:64). Today, however, there are new features of labor-community
coalitions that did not exist in the past. Many labor scholars contend that the organization
Jobs with Justice emerged in many cities around the country in the late 1990s because
community and union activists were discontented with the narrow issue focus and weak
mobilization of CLCs (Nissen 2004). Jobs with Justice formed in 1987 and is now
present in more than 40 U.S. cities (Jobs with Justice 2010). Jobs with Justice "engages
workers and allies in campaigns to win justice in workplaces and in communities where
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working families live" and uses existing organizations like unions, congregation, and
community organizations to build broad coalitions (Jobs with Justice 2010).
Today's labor-community coalitions are city based, yet they often belong to a
national network that helps strengthen individual coalitions through information-sharing,
power-sharing, and on the ground support. One of the most well-known and active
networks of this type is the Partnership for Working Families that has an explicit goal of
developing networks of similarly structured organizations in 50 major U.S. cities. They
currently have about 17 network partners throughout the U.S.
Second, labor unions are not only building alliances with other social justice or
civil society organizations, but also with environmental organizations. As a result,
community health and broader environmental issues are now part oflabor-community
coalition platforms. Only recently have labor-community coalitions included a
significant environmental element and opened their membership to various other social
justice and community organizations such as strict environmental organizations, as well
as segments of the business community. Furthermore, the labor-community coalitions
that are acting as part of the larger regional equity movement inherently focus on the
social and environmental needs of a whole region, not just specific issues or short-term
gam.
One of the most well-known labor-community coalition campaigns in the U.S. is
called Clean and Safe Ports. This campaign was run by the Teamsters union, alongside a
Partnership for Working Families network organization - Los Angeles Alliance for a
New Economy (LAANE) - and included dozens of environmental, community, health
and labor organizations. The campaign forced the publicly owned, Long Beach and Los
Angeles port authorities to employ port truck drivers, so that the drivers had better
working conditions and could afford emissions control equipment for their trucks or new,
more efficient trucks (Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports 2010). This was also a huge
victory for the environment and the communities living near the ports who suffered from
the trucks' diesel emissions (Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports 2010). The coalition
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around the Clean and Healthy Ports campaign hopes to replicate its model for change in
other U.S. port cities (Coalition for Clean and Safe Ports 2010).
Taxonomy of Coalitions
Frege, Heery and Turner (2003) identify four types of coalitions: vanguard,
common-cause, bargained, and integrative. In vanguard coalitions, labor unions lead the
coalition and require other partners to subordinate their goals to labor interests. In
common-cause coalitions, two or more distinct types of organizations rally around a
common agenda that helps both types of organizations meet their individual goals. When
potential partners explicitly agree on the principles and parameters of a coalition before
formation, it is called a bargained coalition. Finally, an integrative coalition has the most
assimilation between participating organizations, as coalition partners (including unions)
adopt the goals of the other participating organizations as their own (Frege, Heery and
Turner 2003).
In the case of the SBI, there was only one organization that served as a sort of
host for labor-community coalition work: Jobs with JusticelEugene Springfield Solidarity
Network. The main issue on which this coalition had worked was creating a living wage
ordinance in Eugene, OR. Unfortunately, this campaign was not successful in Eugene,
and the Lane County Labor Council (LCLC) was not supportive of Eugene implementing
a living wage. The rationale for this lack of support stems from a narrow union vision for
equity, based on the fact that many union members already make over a living wage. In
this sense, the group acts more like a vanguard coalition because a living wage ordinance
is not a priority for labor unions in the LCLC. Thus, the LCLC unions are unwilling to
give full support for the campaign.
Community Organizing and Labor-Community Coalitions
In Pavel's assessment of successful labor-community coalitions for regional
equity, she found that each coalition went through the same four stages of community
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organizing efforts. First, mobilization is initiated by what some community organizing
theorists call a "waking up" period, in which the conditions in a community lead that
community to mobilize, sometimes resulting in a critical mass and an alignment of
interests between various community actors (Pavel 2009: 109). Second, the
organization(s) goes through a "getting grounded" period - grounded in time, place, and
community (Pavel 2009: 111). During this period, individual organizations or a coalition
of organizations may use a variety of methods to assess their current situation depending
on the type and scale of the issue they are confronting and the readiness of the
organizations, among other factors. For example, getting grounded may include gaining
a stronger understanding of the legislative or budgetary process, neighborhoods' varying
access to services like groceries, parks, etc. In the third stage, organizations assess
external factors to determine what they are up against and what possibilities exist for
collaboration with other organizations. In the final stage, coalitions articulate the vision,
which provides a framework for shared power among all the various organizations
participating in the campaign. Typically the vision mobilizes new action and draws in a
broader array of constituents. This framework allows a coalition to proactively pursue its
vision for the future. Pavel explains this stage: "They have learned how to learn as a
community, and they demonstrate this generative capacity through a variety of flexible
responses and practical actions. The capacity to 'say yes' through a positive program
enables breakthrough communities to consolidate short-term gains as well as longer term
policy victories that are part of a vision for sustaining enduring change" (2009: 112).
In Denver, CO, a new leader of the Central Labor Council (CLC) with deep ties to
community organizing and a broad commitment to social justice took over around the
same time that Colorado was on the verge of becoming a right-to-work-state if certain
Democratic seats in the House and Senate were lost. With the possibility of having a
Republican Governor as well as a majority Republican legislature, labor and other
progressive movements realized that their social and environmental priorities were deeply
threatened. Due to this immediate threat, the labor movement, community and faith
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organizations, and environmental groups all started working together to beat back a
Republican takeover of the state.
"And so the labor movement really started thinking a lot about our political
campaigns and what are we really doing, and how are we creating the
infrastructure within the labor movement to really hold politicians accountable.
We did some experimentation with member to member work in 1999 and then
really ramped that up in 2000 and had a huge political victory within the labor
movement, where people across the country all said that we could not take over
one of our legislative chambers. And then the labor movement partnered with
other groups to actually create that takeover and people all across the country
were calling it the Colorado Miracle" (Smith 2008).
After successfully preventing this Republican takeover, the CLC went on to form
a nonprofit organization, Front Range Economic Strategy Center (FRESC). FRESC's
core priority was to build power to meet the needs of working families by uniting the
labor movement with other organizations (FRESC 2010). FRESC has gone on to
complete all four stages of community organizing that Pavel (2009) identifies.
Unfortunately, I do not think the labor movement, the environmental movement,
or other social movements in Eugene, OR, have been brought together by a universally
threatening issue that would incite Pavel's so-called "waking up" period. While there are
numerous issues that community and environmental organizations in Eugene have
organized around, there have been few issues that have resulted in an alignment between
labor and community/environmental organizations. Certainly a contributing factor to this
situation is that labor unions and the CLC in Eugene havenot been enthusiastic about
tackling social justice issues that go beyond workplace matters like wages and benefits.
Likewise, the majority of environmental organizations in Eugene are purely focused on
environmental protection rather than environmental justice. Furthermore, the most
contentious political issues in Eugene over the last several years have centered around
development and have been framed as "anti-growth" versus "pro-growth." Examples
include the West Eugene Parkway, downtown revitalization, expansion of the University
of Oregon, expansion of the urban growth boundary, etc. In most of these cases,
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environmental organizations fall on the side of opposition to additional development and
labor unions support growth that may lead to job creation.
The Rise of Labor-Community Coalitions for Regional Equity
Several issues contributed to the recent emergence of labor-community coalitions
that take a comprehensive approach to social, environmental, and economic issues in a
region. Some of the most important issues are increasing environmental degradation and
social inequality and the accompanying convergence of social justice and environmental
concerns; the growing presence of the environmental justice movement; the labor
movements' interest in addressing broader social issues; and, finally, greater attention
being paid to the role of U.S. cities in our politics and economy.
Increasing environmental devastation and social inequality
Demographically speaking, for the first time in history over half the world's
population, about 3 billion people, live in cities (UN Habitat 2010; Mitlin and
Satterthwaite 2004). There is ample evidence that the process of urbanization is
intensifying, particularly in the Global South. Most startling is not that urbanization is
increasing so drastically, but that it is accompanied by exponential growth of the urban
poor (Mitlin and Satterthwaite 2004; U1\T Habitat 2008; Davis 2006). One-third of the
world's urban population (mainly women and children) is living in extreme poverty
today, and that figure is expected to double in the next 30 years (UN Habitat 2010).
In addition to an increasing urban population, changes in the global economy
have contributed significantly to growing inequality in many U.S. cities. A decline in
manufacturing and a concurrent rise in the service sector have created a highly unequal
economy (Sassen 1990,2001). A growing service sector creates new wealth, but not for
all people. Women, immigrants, and people of color are often excluded from these
benefits and instead are marginalized in low-wage, part-time, and contingent jobs within
the service industry (Sassen 1990, 2001). The shift to a service-sector economy has led
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to a vision for U.S. cities focusing on the needs and desires of privileged residents, rather
than the majority of urban residents who lack the wealth to enjoy the services offered
(Bayat 2000; Ruben 2001). An emphasis on real estate development often accompanies a
growing service- sector economy, increasing the cost of living, and, as a consequence,
exacerbating low-income residents' economic insecurity (Ruben 2001).
A larger urban population typically leads to increased consumption and ecological
degradation. As cities grow, they transform the natural landscape within and around
them: land surfaces are reshaped; water and air quality are degraded; natural resources
are extracted; and growing cities make highly concentrated demands for food, fuel, and
raw materials that can affect distant ecosystems (Mahadevia 2000). Cities in the United
States and around the world are facing the environmental and human health implications
of air and water pollution, "hot spots" (rising temperatures due to a lack of green space),
and more. As is now widely recognized, increasing attention is being focused on how
urban living can become less environmentally destructive (Ruben 2001; Evans 2001).
Social justice and environmentalism converge
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, with its $90 million annual lobbying budget,
lobbied heavily in 2008 and 2009 to stop the U.S. House and Senate from passing climate
protection legislation, arguing that the legislation would cause economic hardship and job
loss (Broder 2009b). This stance mirrors the view of most traditional businesses: that
profit is the most important factor to be taken into account, and the interests of working-
class people and the environment are secondary. Labor-community coalitions have found
that most business associations involved with economic development efforts are
primarily interested in reducing regulatory measures on businesses, streamlining
permitting procedures, or reducing taxes on businesses (Dean 2009:98).
The growing intensity of urban environmental and social problems presents an
opportunity for environmental and social justice advocates to build new and broader
alliances and to convince traditional business interests that the social and environmental
227
challenges we face today are on par with the economic challenges (Pavel 2009). Linking
environmental sustainability with development that meets the social needs of urban
residents forms the basis for new coalitions, which can lead to the achievement of both
social and environmental goals (Duncan 2009). As a result, there is growing interest in
finding solutions to these issues that address social and environmental concerns, not just
one or the other.
The growing strength and visibility ofthe environmental justice movement
The growing visibility of the environmental justice movement has contributed to
the convergence of environmental and social equity movements.31 The environmental
justice movement's "revision and expansion of environmentalism has developed the
foundation for understanding and implementing initiatives aimed at achieving regional
equity" (Shepard and Charles-Guzman 2009:35). This reshaping has been particularly
powerful in cities where the environmental justice movement has defined the
environment as a place where people "live, work, play, pray, and learn" (Shepard and
Charles-Guzman 2009:35).
In fact, one of the first environmental justice conferences was organized in 1976
by the United Auto Workers and Environmentalists for Full Employment to address
employers' arguments that pollution-control measures would cause economic difficulties,
including job loss. However, there has only been inconsistent collaboration between
environmentalists and social justice groups, such as labor unions, since their first
interactions in the 1970s (Obach 2004:47-81).
Unfortunately, the environmental justice movement does not have a strong
presence in Eugene, and there were no environmental justice organizations represented
31 Examples of the growing visibility of the Environmental Justice movement include Van Jones'
appointment to the White House; in 1994, President Clinton issued an Environmental Justice Executive
Order (12898); in 1996, in response to calls from the environmental justice movement to reform the
decision-making process around environmental issues, the EPA expanded the "Public Participation Rule of
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act" with the goal of getting communities more involved in the
RCRA permitting process (Shepard and Charles-Guzman 2009).
228
on the SBI TF. While the Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides (NCAP) was
represented on the TF and is concerned with the impact of pesticides on community
members, their work integrates economic justice in only limited ways (NCAP 2010).
Paying greater attention to cities
Some of the factors that motivated Mayor Piercy to initiate the SBI have played a
central role in the emergence of labor-community coalitions for regional equity. In the
last part of the 20th century, labor-community coalitions emerged as the result of four
central factors: 1) The growing strength of the environmental movement and public
interest in sustainability (Wheeler and Beatley 2004); 2) A greater awareness of suburban
sprawl and the connection between the spatial dimensions of cities and inequality
between urban residents (i.e. whites leaving the city for the suburbs played a significant
role in the decline of American cities (Beauregard 2003)); 3) A greater focus from city
governments and businesses organizations on creating cities that are economically
competitive on the global market (Sassen, 2001, 2006); and 4) The disproportionate
effect of immigration and other demographic trends on communities of color in cities
(Orfield 2009).
In terms of opportunity structure, unions may find more allies to build regional
power at the urban level than they will find at the national, sectoral, or workplace levels
(Turner 2007). Openings in the opportunity structure, namely weakness in state
authority, have created space for cities to lead and have been accompanied by the "loss of
legitimacy, policy failure, and/or divisions among the powers that be" (McAdam,
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 14-15). Labor unions and other social organizations are also
attracted to urban level campaigns because they cost far less than state or national
campaigns. Accessing elected city officials is also much easier at the city level, giving
organizations greater leverage to advance their interests.
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The Labor Movement Goes Beyond the Workplace
The increase in social inequality is correlated to the long decline of the labor
movement in the U.S., the only movement in this country dedicated solely to advancing
the interests of working families. In short, many within the labor movement are calling
for new union strategies to ensure its survival. Turner (2007) sees these new strategies as
marked by "social coalition building and grassroots mobilization at the urban level" (3).
As manufacturing disappears from many urban areas, or shifts from large-scale
operations to light manufacturing, or disperses into suburbs and exurbs, union
membership takes a beating while opportunities for new organizing are less
favorable. A corresponding expansion of service sector employment- in health
care, education, building services, domestic services, transportation- requires
innovative organizing strategies and confronts unions with new challenges
(Turner 2007:11).
As a result of their declining power and density, some unions are joining forces
with other organizations and social movements by building coalitions. According to
Luce (2007), there are three main reasons why labor unions have pursued coalition
building in the last ten years. First, they are doing so as a defensive measure to combat
their declining power and density. Sellers' survey of unions' politics at the local level
revealed that urban coalition building is very important to effectively move their political
agenda, and his research confirms what many case studies have been showing - that the
local has "emerged as a major element in the opportunity structure of union politics"
(2007:35). Sellers' study found that "regardless of how high the national rates of union
density were or how institutionalized the opportunities for local union influence, unions
benefited in the local process from the strength of other civil, political, and institutional
actors in the community. Unions in general benefited when other social justice groups
were also stronger" (2007:50-51).
In other words, coalition building with other community organizations - civic,
religious, or other social justice groups - helped enhance the political efforts and efficacy
of unions by building support from different bases in urban society, such as those based
on ethnicity, immigrant status, gender, religion, neighborhood issues, or other identities
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(Turner 2007:4). Coalition building with other organizations requires unions to reframe
their interests to include those ofother urban actors. This can be very difficult for some
unions, but it can also connect them with greater resources to advance their cause and
revitalize the labor movement overall (Turner 2007).
Second, unions choose to join or build coalitions for proactive reasons (Luce
2007). Particularly for labor leaders who were involved in new social movements in the
1960s and 1970s, they want to expand beyond labor's narrow focus on workplace
negotiations to address broader social issues that affect workers. Third, some labor
leaders come from a leftist political ideology with a commitment to justice and solidarity
that lends itselfto coalition building (Luce 2007).
There are several good examples of unions building alliances with other
organizations for both defensive and proactive reasons that expand their focus beyond the
workplace. These include SEIU's and UNITE's current organizing work, Jobs with
Justice's strategy, and the living wage movement, which numerous labor scholars argue
spurred many of the labor-community coalitions in existence today.
Returning to their roots to survive and rebuild, unions are targeting those urban
workers who are most exploited: women, people of color, immigrants, and low-
wage workers who cannot afford a car and are hurt the most by housing inflation
and the related necessity for long commutes (LeRoy 2009:209).
Change to Win (CtW) unions and others, such as UNITE HERE, have specifically
focused on urban-level organizing because their largest potential membership base is
urban. The service sector and other urban-tied industries, such as transportation and
construction, which these unions represent, are the most rapidly expanding sectors in
urban economies. The service sector generally includes health care, education,
hospitality, and building services, all industries that typically provide low-wage work and
disproportionately represent women, immigrants, and persons of color.
Unions representing these workers have realized that labor-community coalitions
are a great vehicle for organizing the unorganized - often the poor, women, people of
color and immigrants - and as a result, have been very willing to instigate the formation
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of these coalitions. In fact, CtW unions' involvement in coalitions occasionally has
caused problems between them and the CLC's to which they belong (Nissen 2004). This
is a less relevant issue today, as the 2005 AFL-CIO split has caused many CtW unions to
leave their CLCs, which mainly are affiliated with the AFL. In Nissen's Miami case
study, the CLC actually tried to stop SEIU and UNITE from bringing organizing and
contract battle requests directly to a coalition to which they all belonged, the Interfaith
Committee for Worker Justice (2004:75). My interviews with labor-community coalition
leaders revealed that many CLCs across the U.S. have attempted to control the
relationship between individual unions and their coalitions, as well as control the
activities of other coalition members. In essence, many CLCs were only interested in
participating in vanguard coalitions where they operated as the vanguard organization
(Nissen 2004).
The Living Wage Movement Spurs Labor-Community Coalitions
In the 1990s, Jobs with Justice emerged in the U.S. in response to the labor and
social justice movements' frustration over unions' narrow focus on wage and benefit
issues. With living costs rising, including housing, transportation, health care, food, and
more, working families needed to address other concerns besides wages and benefits.
Many individuals who have worked with labor-community coalitions since the early
2000's, attribute the emergence oflabor-community coalitions to the pioneering work of
Jobs with Justice, which was founded to address broader social issues. One labor-
community coalition leader said:
So Jobs with Justice was really formed to try to jumpstart and create some
solidarity among those unions that were doing organizing in the late 1980s and
early 1990s... Where the labor movement was kind of ho hum, you know,
business as usual, sitting back and dying...There were people who were starting
to organize. And I really think that it was the entry point for people like me and
people like Lisa to start to be a part ofthe labor movement. I think Jobs with
Justice created the space for that (Smith 2008).
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Typically, Jobs with Justice's greatest allies in the living wage campaign - the
campaign that has received the bulk of its support - are those unions with low-wage
members who suffer from these broad social concerns, like SEIU, UNITE, and AFSCME
(Nissen 2004). Many labor-community coalitions that still exist grew out of what labor
scholars call "the most successful sustained labor-community coalition movement in the
U.S. today" - the living wage movement (Nissen 2004:70,2001). The living wage
movement has been spurred on by significant growth of low-wage work in U.S. cities,
partly due to the privatization of government services and the growth of the service
sector?2 Many unionized, public sector jobs in cities were lost due to cash~strapped local
governments contracting out services. As a result, well-paid government jobs with
benefits were replaced by low-wage jobs with no benefits (Luce, 2007).
In response to these trends, the incidence of workers living in poverty grew, and
community and labor organizations looked for solutions. At the same time, labor
and community groups were feeling under attack more generally and looked for
avenues for local campaigns that would unite them with their allies and offer the
opportunity for winnable reforms (Luce 2007:22).
Eventually, living wage campaigns in U.S. cities were so successful that some
declared it a social movement (Nissen 2000; Merrifield 2000). Living wage campaigns
have been launched in thousands ofD.S. cities and passed in over 200 U.S. cities
(Dolnick 2009). A living wage is a natural alliance builder because it is popular with a
diverse range of organizations as well as the general population. The most common
partners of living wage campaigns are labor councils, unions that represent low-wage
workers, and "non-worker organizations" (NWOs) - organizations that fight on behalf of
working people but are not necessarily controlled by workers (i.e. Jobs with Justice)
(Luce 2007).
Many unions and central labor councils have joined living wage campaigns in
their cities in part to build alliances with other organizations. Change to Win unions have
32 Oregon had 59,000 more manufacturing jobs (mostly in the forest product industry) than service jobs in
1976. By 2000, there were 187,000 more service jobs than manufacturing jobs. In other words, the service
sector grew from 16% to 27% of the Oregon economy, while manufacturing declined from 23% to 15% in
this same time period (Oregon Center for Public Policy 2006).
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found their organizing efforts are more successful when connected to community
organizations that appeal to the social identities of workers. Such social identities can
include immigration status, ethnicity, religious beliefs, and more. Central labor councils
often join living wage campaigns in order to improve their visibility within their
communities (Luce 2007). The President of the Southern Arizona Labor Council, Ian
Robertson, said about Tucson's 1997-1999 living wage campaign: "I'm tired of being
called a labor boss, and that we're only interested in collecting dues. Here was an
opportunity for labor to be a community partner" (Luce 2007:26).
One leader ofLane County's Labor Council (LCLC), however, felt that
workplace negotiations and collecting dues were the main priorities of the LCLC, not
being a community partner (Doyle 2008). Accordingly, Eugene's living wage campaign
was a distraction from labor's core priorities (Doyle 2008). Many unions don't realize
the need to work in concert with community partners until it is too late. Events such as a
political loss can make unions and labor councils realize that a pro-labor agenda may not
be moved forward without the help of other organizations in the community (Luce 2002).
Luce uses Boston as an example of how living wage campaigns can cement
alliances and lead to further collaboration between labor and community organizations.
The 1997 Boston living wage campaign was mainly run by the Greater Boston Central
Labor Council (primarily representing white, working-class union workers) and ACORN
(primarily representing low-income, African-American residents). Leaders of ACORN
and GBCLC said their relationship was institutionalized when they successfully passed a
living wage ordinance and won seats for both an ACORN and a GBCLC representative
on the City's Living Wage Advisory Committee. Since this win, they have also
successfully raised the state minimum wage (in 1998), passed a statewide and Boston-
specific earned-income tax credit, and introduced a state corporate accountability law
(Luce 2007:27).
Similarly, Los Angeles' living wage campaign solidified the labor-community
coalition, and many participants agree that it inspired a citywide movement for
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community benefits. Since they won a living wage ordinance in 1997, they have also
achieved community benefit agreements on six economic development projects
(developers did not receive broad community support for their projects until they agreed
to meet specified community demands), elected labor-friendly candidates to city
government, and won large pay raises for city employees (Luce 2007).
In conclusion, unions' declining power, coupled with neoliberal policies'
detrimental impact on the working class, has driven unions to seek new methods of
organizing and community organizations to seek broader coalitions. Building alliances -
tapping into organizations' constituency bases - is a central aspect ofmany unions' new
strategy to deal with declining numbers and density.
The Main Factors Determining the Success of Labor-Community Coalitions for
Regional Equity
Given that labor-community coalitions in some U.S. cities have begun to
challenge the agenda of traditional business coalitions around development and to create
their own agendas that prioritize equity and environmental sustainability, it's important to
look at the main factors determining the success of labor-community coalitions for
regional equity. An examination of these determinants offers valuable insight into the
challenges and opportunities for labor-community coalition work in Eugene, OR, around
the Mayor's SBI.
Scholars that are studying newly formed labor-community coalitions for regional
equity in the U.S. have identified six components that are usually essential to the
successful creation and maintenance of these coalitions: (1) an initial issue to rally
around; (2) the position of CLCs and individual unions on building regional equity; (3)
organizational and movement bridge-builders; (4) adequate funding; (5) the status of
other social activism in the city; and (6) achieving concrete results. I will address each of
these issues in turn.
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An initial issue to rally around
Labor-community coalitions almost always require an initial issue to rally around
that spurs potential members into action. Labor unions and other civil society
organizations are unlikely to build alliances with each other based on a theoretical belief
in the importance of coalitions. Typically, the issue is of interest and importance to all
member organizations of the coalition, or is of such great importance to one organization
that it decides to recruit others to get involved. Highly visible incidents that often incite
the formation of labor-community coalitions include the closing of an important social
service in a community (such as a hospital), police violence against residents, or a toxic
facility malfunctioning or locating in a community (Pavel 2009: 113). Labor-community
coalitions that include environmental organizations and unions have most commonly
formed around campaigns addressing specific corporations that the unions want to
organize and that environmentalists want to make more environmentally responsible.
For many labor-community coalitions active in the regional equity movement
today, the initial issue that spurred their formation was the living wage campaign. As
real wages in cities declined with the growth of the service sector and the loss of
manufacturing jobs, attempts to establish a living wage ordinance emerged across the
U.S. The organizations involved in living wage campaigns realized that moving a
controversial political agenda required a broad base of support, and they often recruited
members from the labor, environmental, religious, and social justice communities. In the
process of pursuing a living wage, alliances were formed between these different
communities that, in some cities, led to more formal and established coalitions that
continue today.
In contrast, the Mayor's SBI did not provide an initial galvanizing issue to rally
around and incite cooperation between social movement groups. As a city-led process
with appointed members and limited decision-making power, it did not inspire deep
commitment and collaboration among labor and community organizations. There is
likely a deeper thread present in that failure, stemming from an earlier unsuccessful
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attempt in Eugene to pass a living wage ordinance. While there were many political
factors that contributed to that earlier defeat, as well, the lack of involvement from the
Eugene labor movement in the campaign certainly played a role, just as the lack of CLC
involvement in the SBI played a part in missing the boat on social equity.
Central labor councils J and individual unions' positions on building regional equity
Many studies on labor unions' collaboration with other organizations have shown
that "the choices and strategies pursued by union leaders and their organizations" largely
determines if and how unions work in coalitions (Turner 2007: 1). Problematic attitudes -
proprietary, monopolistic, or vanguard, to name a few - from the leadership of CLCs or
individual unions significantly challenge the success of labor-community coalitions
(Nissen 2004). As the regionally organized bodies of the labor movement, CLCs playa
pivotal role in regional equity movements. How a CLC relates to the new geography of
social, environmental, and economic sustainability movements determines the role that
working people will play in the development of regional economic strategy (Pavel 2009).
In most cases, unions participate in common-cause coalitions if they have a leader
who has "strong ideological motivations to connect their union with the coalition"
(Nissen 2004:78). Such ideological motivations can lead urban labor movements to ally
with various identity-based organizations that address a variety of worker interests,
including women, people of color, immigrants, consumers, and communities. In fact,
identity-based social coalition building is important to the "multijurisdictional unionism
of an increasingly service-based economy" (Nissen 2004:78). However, alliances with
these identity-based organizations often require a shift in a union's internal structure
and/or leadership because such efforts go well beyond the exclusively worker-based
campaigns that they typically organize. For some unions:
The institutional arrangements in which key local unions are embedded have
allowed those unions to choose the status quo over innovation, blocking a broader
pattern of mobilization and coalition building. In New York, a small number of
powerful locals have often been at odds with one another and have shown only
limited interest in central labor council coordination, while in Boston a few
1__-
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strategically placed locals have cuts deals with local and state governments that
have at times benefited their own unions at the expense of broader labor and
social interests (Turner 2007:7).
Heckscher and Palmer (1993) argue that U.S. unions cannot successfully
participate in mutually beneficial labor-community coalitions, mainly because they are
narrowly focused on employer-union relations (297-299). Or, if they do participate, they
only form "vanguard coalitions," where they play the role of the dominant partner with a
narrow focus on labor's interest and gaining other coalition members' support for the
labor agenda (Heckscher and Palmer 1993). In short, "unions are incapable of acting as
equal partners with others in multilateral coalitions working for broad social goals"
(Nissen 2004:71).
Similar to Lane County Labor Council's (LCLC) participation in the SBI, Nissen
documents that unions commonly take a top-down approach to coalitions, whereby only
one individual of a union, usually a CLC officer, participates in coalition meetings, and
there is little or no attempt to engage local union leaders or members (2004).
Also similar is the LCLC's engagement with Eugene's living wage campaign,
where Nissen notes a pattern of CLC's narrow interest in living wage campaigns. "If
union members weren't directly winning pay increases, organized labor had no stake"
(2004:74). In a case study of Miami's living wage campaign and organized labor's
involvement with it, Nissen found that the union leader and CLC officer serving on the
Community Coalition for a Living Wage "refused to concede that a broader, integrative
goal like raising the floor for all workers (and thus lessening the impetus for the county to
privatize AFSCME-represented county jobs) was desirable" (2004:74). This labor
leader's relation to the campaign mirrors exactly how a leader within Eugene's CLC felt
about passing a living wage. He felt that organized labor only had an interest in
supporting the aspects of the living wage campaign that benefited union workers' pay
(Doyle 2008; Nissen 2004). Beyond the particular individuals involved in these
campaigns in Eugene and Miami, even individual unions that supported a living wage
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ordinance did not play an active role in the coalition; they felt that one individual from
the CLC was enough support for the cause (Nissen 2004).
In their review ofunion interactions with regional coalitions, Greer, Byrd, and
Fleron (2007) found that Buffalo's manufacturing unions were not interested in social
movement unionism because they were already in coalition with their employers,
government, and other social actors to promote economic development in their region.
This was a strategy they had developed and used for many years, and they were not
interested in breaking with it. To join a community-labor coalition would likely
undermine prior coalitions between unions and pro-economic development organizations.
Similarly, in an examination of Miami and Nashville's labor coalition histories, Nissen
and Russo (2007) and Cornfield and Canak (2007), respectively, found that no unions in
those regions had been successful at building coalitions with other community
organizations. While both places are right-to-work states, which makes labor organizing
more difficult, both places also had growing immigrant workforces that traditional labor
union leadership had been reluctant to reach out to. While the abovementioned authors
concluded that the "growing ethnic minority workforce occupy a central position in
labor's prospects for successful organizing and political clout," still the unions did not
take the steps to build coalitions (Turner 2007:8; Nissen and Russo 2007; Cornfield and
Canak 2007; Milkman 2000).
In conclusion, the perspective and choices of individual CLC and union leaders is
perhaps the most critical piece of coalition building between unions and community
organizations for regional equity. However, the choices of CLC and union leaders are
based on many factors, including their personal views of how to address broader
workplace issues, the state of the union or CLC, their capacity to take on issues beyond
workplace negotiations, the history of relations between the labor movement and other
movements, and the union members' interest in engaging in coalition work. Nissen notes
that many rank and file members are not interested in coalition work because they see the
role of their union leadership as only related to contract negotiations for wages and
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benefits (Nissen 2004:78). With unions' power declining over the last few decades,
union leaders feel even more pressure to achieve short-term results for their members and
use their resources and time wisely (Nissen 2004). Nissen points out that coalitions do
not consistently win results for labor unions, so in this respect coalitions are not a sure bet
for short-term gain for unions. Given that CLCs and individual unions have an obligation
to focus on issues specific to wages and benefits, yet limited resources to do so, creating
labor-community coalitions allows these entities to involve themselves in broader equity
issues without being the primary drivers of that process. Their roles in the coalitions
leave them with adequate capacity to maintain focus on workplace issues, while
providing a mechanism for dialogue and collaboration on a much broader scale, with
implications far beyond workplace equity.
The role ofbridge-builders in labor-community coalitions
The third factor determining the successful formation oflabor-community
coalitions is having the organizations' "bridge-builders" eventually participate in the
coalition. Bridge-builders are individuals who operate in both labor and community
organizations and thus have an interest and knowledge ofthe issues, constituencies, and
methods of each type (Rose 2000). In his groundbreaking book, Coalitions Across the
Class Divide: Lessons from the Labor, Peace, and Environmental Movements (2000),
Rose found that bridge-builders were necessary to overcome the cultural differences that
often exist between working class organizations like unions and middle-class
organizations like environmental organizations.
In Nissen and Russo's case study of several of Miami's campaigns relating to
social justice, they found that bridge-builders played an instrumental role in forming and
maintaining the coalition (2007). The bridge-builders in his study had backgrounds in
multiple social justice issues, including organized labor. In general, they found that
bridge-builders have a broadly progressive political ideology: "Leaders with this
perspective see organized labor as part of a larger social movement for social and
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economic justice, so coalitions seem to be natural" (2004:79). In my interview with one
of the leaders of the largest labor-community coalition networks in the country today -
Partnership for Working Families - I found that this leader had a long history of working
on a wide variety of issues with community organizations prior to working with Denver's
CLC. Then, after working with the labor movement for more than a decade, she helped
form a coalition between a variety of community, environmental and labor unions in
Denver (Moody 2010). The importance of one environmental leader's work to build
alliances between the labor and environmental movement and establish a statewide
Renewable Energy Standard was described as follows:
I would say one ofthe key ingredients of that partnership and why we're really
still pretty successful now was that there was a leader within the environmental
community, urn, who ran one ofthe most powerful environmental groups here in
Colorado who is really respected by, urn, state-elected leadership and local city
leaders. And he really took an interest in trying to figure out why the labor
movement should care about the policies that they were running, and actually
worked his butt off to figure out how labor could win from the policies they were
promoting" (Smith 2009).
In short, having at least one individual, if not more, who is familiar with the
issues, constituency, and organizational style of other potential coalition partners is a
common ingredient for most successful labor-community coalitions. Often these
individuals also have a broad commitment to social justice that supersedes individual
organizations' issues and struggles. Bridge-builders are more likely to have access to
other organizations and movements, as well as the ability to smooth relations among the
various coalition partners by identifying "make or break" issues (Pavel 2009; Rose 2000).
Based on my interviews with SBI TF members, I did not identify people who
could act as bridge-builders between the social equity representatives and the business
representatives, or between the social equity representatives and the environmental
representatives. However, there were several SBI TF members who acted as bridge-
builders between the environmental and business communities. A few business owners
on the TF were truly concerned with environmental sustainability and had already begun
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implementing sustainable practices in their business operations. Thus, these business
owners were very keen to explore other ways to improve their sustainability practices..
There were also a couple of SBI TF members from the environmental community
who used their positions as nonprofit managers to relate to the business owners on a peer
level. In fact, one SBI TF member from the environmental community bonded with SBI
TF business representatives around the difficulty of paying employees higher wages and
better benefits. Unfortunately, besides the Mayor, there were not really any
environmental or business representatives who were well-respected among the labor
community, or vice-versa, at a level that would have enabled them to act as a bridge-
builder between the two communities. Most important, the coordinator of the SBI
process, who was essentially charged with balancing the various interests involved in the
SBI, had little to no experience with the labor movement. In contrast, most leaders in the
Partnership for Working Families network have worked in environmental, labor and
community organizations; thus, they are known and well-respected by all of the different
groups with whom they're working (Interviews, 2009).
Labor-community coalitions require adequate funding
The fourth factor oflabor-community coalition success is quite obvious but still
important to mention: Labor-community coalitions need adequate funding for high-
quality staffing and outreach. Most coalitions gain funding through donations from their
member organizations and individuals as well as grants from foundations. Without
adequate funding, coalitions may lack the staff and expertise to achieve concrete results.
Relationship to broader social activism
Fifth, the broader growth of social activism in a region fuels the success and
growth of labor-community coalitions and, overall, social movement unionism. The
tactics of social movement unionism - coalition building, grassroots mobilization,
aggressive organizing, demonstrations, and civil disobedience - occur outside of
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established, government-sanctioned channels, and thus are difficult to develop and utilize
if other social movements are not widespread in a region. Turner explains, "There are no
broad social movements to sweep unions along in their efforts at power building - which
is one reason why so many unions have resisted innovation" (Turner 2007: 15). Cities
like Eugene, OR, have strong environmental movements; but typically their goals and
membership are too distant from those of the labor movement to spur collaboration
without having a common target or numerous, highly-skilled bridge-builders present. In
short, having a variety of social movements in a city region often leads to successful
coalition formation and maintenance. For example, a thriving movement or organization
is more likely to have the ability, both in resources and time, to reach out to and
collaborate with other movements. Furthermore, a thriving movement or organization is
also more likely to have visibility to other movements and organizations; and this can
contribute to a cross-fertilization of ideas around political strategy and implementation.
Achieving concrete results
Finally, it is important that labor-community coalitions achieve concrete results
for their organizational participants. Achieving concrete results for participating
organizations assures their leaders and members that contributing time and resources to
the coalition is a good investment (Pavel 2009). Ifconcrete results are not achieved by
the coalition, organizations that are already strapped for resources and time may question
whether taking the time to build a broader agenda for change is strategic for them, or if
they should just focus on their own specific issues. For many labor-community
coalitions, concrete results are not achieved for years. While achieving those results
often solidifies relations among coalition members, in the meantime some partners may
drop out. The labor-community coalition Campaign for Responsible Development
coordinated by FRESC (Front Range Economic Strategy Center in Denver, CO) took
three years to win a community benefits agreement (CBA) at one development site in
Denver. In the end the CBA was a huge victory for the coalition, and they have now
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moved to gaining CBAs for other development projects. But, in the process of gaining
the first one, they struggled to maintain the interest and investment of coalition partners
and inevitably lost some completely (Smith 2009).
Labor-community coalitions are complex entities, and their successful formation
and maintenance usually requires all six of these factors to be present. In examining
these six factors, it becomes clear that Eugene lacks some of the ingredients necessary to
develop a strong labor-community coalition that could significantly influence city politics
and in particular the Mayor's SBI process. The Mayor's SBI didn't provide a
galvanizing issue for organizations to rally around; the CLC leadership was not interested
in addressing broader social issues (as was evident in the CLC's lack of commitment to
the living wage campaign); and the goals of non-labor organizations in Eugene were
primarily directed at environmental issues, which are often too distant from labor's goals
and membership to incite meaningful collaboration.
In the long-term, Turner evaluates the success of labor-community coalitions by
their ability to build a social justice infrastructure. Turner defines social justice
infrastructure in this way:
Based on active networks of social actors in ongoing relationships and engaged in
multiple campaigns, a social justice infrastructure includes both institutions and a
transformed local politics in which labor's influence as a progressive social actor
expands. In the best cases, labor-inclusive coalition building may contribute to a
revitalization of civil society and democratic participation (Turner 2007:3).
In places like Los Angeles, CA, and Denver, CO, labor-community coalitions
have reached a level of permanence that allows the coalitions to proactively execute their
visions for regional equity, as well as anticipate and respond to specific issues that arise,
such as individual development projects. Building a social justice infrastructure is not
only important to revitalizing the labor movement and other movements involved in
labor-community coalitions, but also to renewing progressive politics more broadly
(Turner 2007:13).
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Just Sustainability: Labor-Community Coalitions for Regional Equity
After exploring the key elements to building and maintaining coalitions, I tum
now to the opportunities and challenges faced by labor-community coalitions for regional
equity. On the positive side, the city-region scale of labor-community coalitions offers
an opportunity structure that does not exist at the state or national levels. A 40-year
decline in federal aid to cities and state budget cuts have resulted in less money for city
governments to provide important services and infrastructure to residents. Combined
with the growing lobby of traditional business coalitions, the city level is ripe for action
that addresses the social and environmental concerns of urban residents (Blackwell and
Pastor 2009: 16).
Movements for regional equity exist outside of formal government structure,
giving coalition members latitude in action not available within government.
Furthermore, with city governments responding more to the needs and desires of
traditional business interests under a neoliberal policy framework, impacting the debate
around development is more effective from outside the government structure.
Regional equity movements also benefit from their unique method ofcombining
tactics to create social change. Made up of a variety of organizations, regional equity
movements combine strategic research, union-style organizing, community development,
and social movement approaches in a broad-based multi-issue effort. "Because the
regional equity movement centers on an economic development agenda rather than a
purely distributive agenda, the combination of research, organizing, and action is critical
to its success" (Blackwell and Pastor 2009:20). The organizing aspect of regional equity
movements builds long-term civic engagement and public will for change. The policy
action solidifies the vision for reform, and then an informed and engaged public can hold
policy makers accountable to the policy shifts (Blackwell and Pastor 2009).
In the process of building power for regional equity, labor-community coalitions
use bottom-up structures and decision-making practices (Dean 2009). One of the first
regional equity labor-community coalitions, formed in San Jose, CA, in 1995 - Working
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Partnerships USA (WPUSA) - created a model for labor-community coalitions that was
based on these bottom up structures and practices. By using this inclusive approach,
WPUSA was able to create what they call "a shared understanding of the true conditions
in a local economy that impact working families" (Dean 2009:97). This shared
understanding guides the coalition's research about the region's social and environmental
status, producing data about its unmet social and environmental needs that can be used
for community education, to inform civic leaders, and most importantly, to bring
"economic development efforts into line with identified community aspirations" (Dean
2009:98).
Producing research and analysis of a region's social, cultural, and environmental
conditions has become a staple of labor-community coalitions (Blackwell and Pastor
2009:20). In fact, many labor-community coalitions have chosen to produce reports in
various formats that discuss the geography of opportunity for their regions' residents. 33
These reports inform the movement's work, and because they are based on quality
research, they build the coalition's legitimacy among politicians and other policymakers
(Blackwell and Pastor 2009). For example, WPUSA's report showed that despite an
"economic boom" of high-tech industries and record profits in Silicon Valley, the
region's workers suffered from poverty-wage jobs, the prevalence of temporary and
contingent work, a growing divide between the rich and the poor, and a lack of benefits
like health insurance and pensions (Dean 2009: 102). Based on the research and data
contained in their Community Economic Blueprint, a Sacramento Bee journalist wrote
that the Blueprint "reinforced the growing evidence that beneath the much-celebrated
boom in California's high-tech economy - behind each of those baby-faced Silicon
Valley millionaires and every billion-dollar initial public offering, there are a hundred
low-paid contingent workers with no job security, no benefits and only the most uncertain
future" (Dean 2009:103).
33 Some of these reports on the geography ofinequality include Community Economic Blueprint, WPUSA;
The Regional Equity Atlas: Metropolitan Portland's Geography ofOpportunity, The Coalition for a
Livable Future.
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Through elaborate GPS mapping exercises, Coalition for a Livable Future (CLF)
in Portland, OR, was able to demonstrate visibly and clearly the geography of inequality
in Portland. With the completion ofCLF's Equity Atlas, residents, policymakers, and
elected officials have used it to better understand the diverse economic, social, and
environmental reality of each neighborhood in Portland and accordingly develop policy
around the needs of each neighborhood.
Although they vary in their style and quality of production (among other
differences), the mapping of inequities in a city-region has become a staple of labor-
community coalitions' research, policy, and action agenda. The atlases are instrumental
in the formation and maintenance of coalitions, too, because they provide member
organizations with the data they need to develop a shared analysis, and, later, a shared
agenda for regional equity.
Community Benefit Agreements (CBAs)
To date, the most common tool used by labor-community coalitions for building
regional power and creating greater equality in a region is the Community Benefit
Agreement (CBA). A CBA is an agreement, signed by community groups, a developer,
and sometimes a government agency, that incorporates a range of benefits that a
developer must provide to gain community support for a project (Feingold 2009; Gross,
LeRoy, and Janis-Aparicio 2005). The success of a CBA mainly depends on the presence
of a multi-issue, broad-based labor-community coalition (Gross, LeRoy, and Janis-
Aparicio 2005). Table 1 provides a sampling oflabor-community coalitions in the U.S.
and components of Community Benefit Agreements that they have signed.
Table 6. Sampling oflabor-community coalitions' missions and achievements.
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Labor-Community Mission Sample Achievements
Coalition
Community Labor CLU's strategic campaigns $1.4 billion energy efficiency plan that
United (CLU), promote quality jobs, secure will bring jobs and home retrofits to
Boston, MA healthcare, affordable housing, Massachusetts' working class
and environmental justice. communities.
Central Coast Alliance CAUSE is working to create a Successfully led living wage
United for a sustainable economy that is just, campaigns; securing access to quality,
Sustainable Economy prosperous and environmentally comprehensive, and affordable
(CAUSE), healthy. universal health care and resolving
Ventura, CA health disparities.
East Bay Alliance for EBASE envisions an economy Achieved a groundbreaking agreement
a Sustainable where all workers earn enough to that requires local hiring for billions of
Economy (EBASE), live in dignity, have a voice on dollars' worth of construction at the
Oakland, CA the job and in policy making, and Port of Oakland and generates millions
live in healthy communities. of dollars in job training funds.
Garden State Alliance GANE builds power for working Bayonne Harbor Development:
for a New Economy families while holding GANE's proposed language was
(GANE), governments and corporations incorporated into the RFP that was
Newark, NJ responsible for the creation of released in 20 Io. Developers are asked
quality jobs, health care, to provide information about the
affordable housing, and quality of the jobs their proposals will
environmentally safe create and the affordability of the
communities. homes they will build.
Good Jobs and The GJLN Project of Citizen Successfully campaigned for the
Livable Action promotes economic 'Milwaukee Opportunities for Restoring
Neighborhoods justice in Wisconsin by Employment' (MORE) Ordinance:
(GJLN), supporting civic participation in prevailing wage requirement and
Milwaukee, WI the formation of economic increased apprenticeship, training, and
development policies and job opportunities for residents of
programs. Milwaukee's poorest neighborhoods.
Los Angeles Alliance LAANE promotes a new Port of Los Angeles Clean Trucks
for a New Economy economic approach based on Program, which improves conditions
(LAANE), good jobs, thriving communities, for more than 10,000 port truck drivers
Los Angeles, CA and a healthy environment for and mandates dramatic reductions in
everyone. harmful diesel pollution at the
country's largest port complex.
Puget Sound Sage Sage works to improve the lives Mitigation fee: downtown office
(SAGE), of working families: good jobs developers are asked to pay into a low-
Seattle, WA and workplace rights, affordable income housing fund, ranging from
housing, and a clean and safe $13/sq ft to $22.50/sq ft; funds target
environment. very low-income workers.
(Partnership for Working Families 2010).
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The Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) CBA, pursued by the labor-
community coalition Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), is financially
speaking the largest CBA in the country, as well as the first signed with a government
agency - the City of Los Angeles (Feingold 2009). Its monetary value, along with the
fact that it was an agreement with a government agency, opened up a whole new realm of
possibilities for labor-community coalitions in negotiating CBAs (Feingold 2009).
Signed by the City of Los Angeles and a coalition of 20 labor, environmental, and
community-based organizations, the LAX CBA, is worth $500 million: $230 million will
be used to soundproof classrooms and install improved windows on schools in the
shadow of LAX; $15 million is committed to job-training programs for local residents
who are covered under a local source hiring agreement for LAX contracts; tens of
millions of dollars are dedicated to reduce diesel emissions and to electrify the engines of
equipment used in airport gates; and minority and women-owned businesses are given
preference for LAX contacts (Feingold 2009).
For the coalition partners involved in this historic agreement, the CBA
represented a huge advance in relations between the labor and environment community
that in the past had so often been at odds with each other over land use and development
(Feingold 2009). This dynamic contrasts with the relationship between Eugene's labor
and environmental communities, in which they rarely converge around common issues,
particularly when related to land use and development. The LAX CBA was an important
victory for low-income communities of color that surround LAX and had never before
secured major quality of life guarantees from the city government:
The convergence of labor, environmental, community, and educational groups
marked a breakthrough in coalition building. While unions had generally
supported LAX development as a source of new jobs, environmental and
community organizations as well as the two school districts had opposed the
airport expansion, fearing more health and environmental problems. Indeed, in
communities around the country, the perceived tension between economic and
environmental interests has stood as a key roadblock to the formation oflarger,
more powerful social justice alliances (Feingold 2009:202, emphasis mine).
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Prior to the LAX CBA, LAANE had negotiated six CBAs since 2000 for various
private development projects. Those CBAs have addressed the concerns of nearby
communities, typically low-income people of color, and have included legally binding
commitments to living wage jobs, local source hiring, affordable housing, green space,
child care centers, and traffic mitigations. Besides these concrete results, Feingold
explains that CBAs have:
Brought about a fundamental change in the dynamics of development, giving
residents a real voice in shaping the future of their communities. This new model
has put parents, clergy, activists, and other neighborhood leaders across the table
from developers, rather than relegating them to the sidelines or leaving them with
no option but litigation to oppose harmful projects (Feingold 2009:200).
A labor-community coalition that led a CBA negotiation for three years described the
intensity of asserting social and environmental demands within the economic
development agenda:
I mean, we were the smelliest people in town when our coalition first kicked off
and when we started getting press around what we were asking for. People said
we were gonna kill development. And tried to discredit us. And we had, you
know, the Mayor's head of economic development telling the developer that they
could not talk to us and that the city wouldn't work with them if they were
working with us .. .It was really a, I mean, we were taking on a sacred cow in
Denver. And we were taking on all the fears that Denver has, that it's still a cow
town and that people aren't gonna want to develop here (Smith 2008).
This is an important step for communities because other means of asserting their rights,
such as litigation, are often hardly available; business organizations and private
developers often can far outspend these coalitions in litigation fees.
The CBA model overcomes the false dichotomies between business success and
good wages and between economic growth and a healthy environment. One of the main
ways through which CBAs challenge these dichotomies and transform economic
development is by balancing the needs and desires of communities, businesses, and the
general public, instead of pitting business and city government against community. Plus,
city governments must walk a fine line between advocating for community health and
being portrayed as anti-business or as creating a bad business climate (LeRoy 2009).
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Most U.S. city officials worry that businesses and developers won't locate in their city if
they don't provide financial incentives to do so (e.g. tax breaks). LeRoy argues that after
decades of declining U.S. cities, many city officials suffer from a "low level of civic self-
worth" (2009:210). CBAs can help combat this low self-worth and assist city officials
and residents in obtaining the respect and basic quality of life they deserve (LeRoy
2009:211).
Since the Carter Administration (which ended in 1981), federal aid to cities has
been declining - notwithstanding a slight improvement during President Clinton's terms.
And, with a ballooning federal deficit due to other federal priorities like the War in Iraq
and Afghanistan, Homeland Security, and Hurricane Katrina, it is unlikely that cities will
see an increase in funding anytime soon. Local governments have suffered greatly from
state budget cuts, losing a significant amount of their funding for job and housing
assistance programs (LeRoy 2009). CBAs are an effective way of ensuring that local
social needs are met and that economic development continues despite shrinking city
budgets. Given the decline in government money to spur economic development, city
governments leverage more private funding for economic development. Private
developments, however, do not provide as many opportunities for public involvement in
influencing the goals and outcomes of a project. As cities rely more on private
developers to do major urban projects, CBAs are an effective way for community groups
to have their needs and desires balanced with those of business and government (LeRoy
2009:205).
Politically, CBAs are possible and even beneficial for City Councilors and
Mayors because the politicians generally win praise for bringing new development
projects to their community, plus they leverage the development to win benefits for their
constituents (LeRoy 2009). ''CBAs are helping businesses to succeed. Indeed, in a few
cases, developers are even seeking out CBAs to help facilitate the approval process for
their projects" (LeRoy 2009:209). However, because labor-community coalitions'
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leverage to create CBAs is public subsidies, the CBA model has thus far been limited to
projects and developments that receive these subsidies (LeRoy 2009).
CBAs can also help address tensions between middle-income people moving to
cities and low-income residents who've always lived there. The U.S. has started to see a
"back to the city" trend rather than the "white flight" that occurred for decades prior to
the 1990s. During the 1990s, eight ofthe ten largest cities in the U.S. saw a population
increase. In fact, Eugene, OR's population has been growing at 2% per year. This urban
revival is attributed to a few factors: the baby boomers no longer have children at home
and as a result are choosing to live in cities, where they are close to work and other
amenities; culturally and socially, many young people are more excited about living in
urban cores rather than in suburban or rural areas; and many new immigrants to the U.S.
choose to live in older neighborhoods that have traditionally been immigrant
neighborhoods (LeRoy 2009:206).
CBAs are an important complement to unions' urban-based organizing drives
(such as CtW's, the AFL-CIO's Union Cities program34, and Jobs with Justice), because
the same workers they are attempting to organize also benefit from many ofthe
agreements that CBAs secure, such as affordable housing, improved transit options, and
investment in low-income areas (Ibid). CBAs are one specific strategy through which
labor-community coalitions can redefine the entrepreneurial vision created by successful
businesses, linking that vision with social justice and environmental commitments that
have driven powerful community-improvement campaigns (LeRoy 2009:211).
Winning the City Council
In addition to CBAs, labor-community coalitions for regional equity also rely on
electing labor-friendly politicians to City Council. Getting a majority of labor- and
34 Under John Sweeney's leadership of the AFL-CIO, the Union Cities campaign was launched in 1995.
The campaign was based on the belief that to counter corporate power, unions needed to mobilize and build
organization and capacity in local communities. "The goal was to create a sense of urgency about
organizing, to build real coalitions, to change local politics, and to inspire and motivate workers by starting
to win again" (Sneiderman and Eckstein n.d).
252
working family-friendly city councilors elected to the Council is part oflabor-community
coalitions' larger strategy for redefining development and building power to advance
their regional equity agenda. San Jose, CA, and FRESC in Denver, CO, are among the
best examples of labor-community coalitions gaining political power to pursue their
agenda. Between 1993 and 2003, a labor-community coalition in San Jose helped elect a
majority oflabor- and working family-friendly councilors to the City Council. This
majority on the Council ensured the passage of several pieces of legislation that solidified
labor-community goals that otherwise would have to be secured through individual CBAs
(Dean 2009:99). Electing a labor- and working family-friendly city council often comes
at a later stage in labor-community coalition development. Electing this type of council
requires a well-established coalition with a cohesive agenda for regional equity.
Leadership Development Institutes
Leadership development institutes are another unique aspect oflabor-community
coalition strategy for advancing a regional equity agenda. The Silicon Valley WPUSA,
for example, created a leadership development institute that "bring[s] together civic
leaders, academic experts, union leaders, community activists, clergy, and elected
officials in a nine-week course that examines the Silicon Valley economy through a
social justice lens." The intent is to provide emerging leaders with an inclusive, long-
term counter to the economic development agenda of business leadership groups (Dean
2009:103).
WPUSA's leadership institute works with local leaders to build three main skills
and knowledge areas: 1) Increase their use and knowledge of policy analysis tools so
they can base their organizational strategies on a "shared analysis of regional economies
and social needs"; 2) Identify a common language that local leaders from diverse parts of
the social justice and environmental communities can use to discuss their disparate
issues; and 3) Develop relations among individuals and groups in the coalition that
supersede single-issue campaigns. "By using policy analysis tools to identify issues of
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mutual concern and potential allies, WPUSA built new, ongoing broad-based alliances
that cut across class, race, ethnicity, and occupational groups within Silicon Valley's
highly fragmented economy" (Dean, p. 103-104). For example, through building policy
analysis skills and a common framework to discuss their issues, the leadership institute
assisted coalitions in moving beyond a living wage campaign to envisioning a much
broader strategy for a region.
Challenges for Labor-Community Coalitions
While labor-community coalitions' broad agenda for equity is a highly effective
model for obtaining large-scale victories for working families in U.S. cities, there are also
real challenges to this method of social change.
In terms oflabor-community coalitions' internal politics, it is an arduous process
through which organizations and movements can overcome their diverging goals,
members, and tactics, and agree to work together in cooperation. While many labor-
community coalitions include environmental organizations and incorporate their issues in
the agenda, it's particularly difficult for environmental and social justice movements to
move beyond their myopic viewpoints. Resource conservation and ecosystem protection
are primary to the environmental movement and occasionally come into conflict with
improving people's living and working conditions, which are primary to the social justice
movement (Duncan2009:31). Neglecting the reality of how certain groups are socially
impacted by environmental issues is a longstanding criticism of the mainstream
environmental movement. Similarly, the labor movement has been criticized by the
environmental movement for pursuing job and workplace gains irrespective ofthe
environmental implications. These coalitions for regional equity also have to confront
other issues that may separate potential partners, such as race, class, and gender.
Blackwell and Starrett (2009) describe it as a process of recognizing collaborators'
different perspectives, and then identifying and focusing on their common agenda rather
than their differences. They go on to warn, "We cannot make the mistake of fighting over
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crumbs while supporters of the status quo divide the whole loaf' (Blackwell and Starrett
2009:313).
The external politics of labor-community coalitions are also a challenge, as their
agenda for reframing economic and urban development is up against powerful urban
business lobbies and government inertia. In essence, labor-community coalitions are
attempting to separate economic growth and other traditional measures of business
success from a healthier and more economically secure community. The dominant
paradigm pushed by traditional business organizations is that first businesses have to be
successful before communities are. In fact, attempts to address a community's unmet
social needs or to implement environmental standards, are met by the simple argument
that such measures cause job loss and a decreased tax base. A major challenge for labor-
community coalitions in attempting to redefine the regional economic development
agenda is to question the assumption that successful businesses, measured by increased
corporate sales, profits, or productivity, alone creates a healthy and economically secure
community. Instead, these coalitions are arguing that business success by itself does not
guarantee job creation, good paying jobs, benefits, access to critical social and public
services, or a healthy environment (Dean 2009:99). While the original goals of the SBI
stated that business success and community health could be met simultaneously, as the
SBI process evolved and the structure of the TF bent towards dominance by the
traditional business community, the final results focused almost entirely on achieving
social and environmental health through business success.
Besides challenging urban development to be more socially and environmentally
centered, labor-community coalitions are pushing back against traditional business
groups and city officials during a time of fiscal crisis (Dean 2009). Most U.S. cities have
been making major cuts in their social and public spending for the last decade in order to
meet budget deficits. This fiscal environment complicates any challenge to the dominant
economic paradigm, especially when such a challenge is commonly associated with
increased funding for environmental and social concerns and less funding for businesses.
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Furthermore, during these times of fiscal constraint, traditional business interests push
even harder to implement policies and programs that reduce their tax burden (Klein
2007). In short, labor-community coalitions are calling for local governments to change
the way they prioritize public and social services and economic development at a time
when city officials barely have the money to staff these programs (hence their move to
turn economic development over to private interests).
Finally, even in the context of labor-community coalitions' victories for working
families, their communities, and the surrounding environment, there are shortcomings to
be examined. Thus far, CBAs have only been achieved on a project-by-project basis,
otherwise known as site fights, and project-specific agreements are limited in what they
can do for working families on a broader and long-term scale. First, the individuals and
organizations involved in labor-community coalitions that sign CBAs are the first to
admit that it's an extremely time- and energy-consuming process. Most CBAs require
constant work for more than two years before the final agreement is reached. That is a lot
of work for typically low-budget organizations and movements, and it only scores a win
for one project. This begs the question, for how long are these coalitions sustainable?
Even after a CBA is signed, some entity needs to monitor and evaluate whether all bodies
are meeting the standards set out in the agreement. Given the fiscal constraints of local
governments, city staff are unlikely to play this role, while self-monitoring is out of the
question. This leaves the coalition in a position where if it wants to ensure that all of the
CBA criteria are met, it would need to commit its own resources and energy for long-
term monitoring.
Many of the individuals and organizations involved in these coalitions and CBAs
agree that achieving a citywide CBA is the ideal. However, signing a citywide CBA is
much more complicated than just signing an individual agreement. A citywide initiative
would require a public vote or perhaps City Council approval, as well as far greater
resources and commitment from coalition members to wage the campaign. Traditional
business groups would fiercely resist such an effort, and they might even garner national
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support for such a fight because it would affect every development in the city, and then
could spread throughout U.S. cities.
Conclusion
Labor-community coalitions for regional equity are one of the few ways that
social equity and environmental sustainability are being addressed within a framework of
economic development in the U.S. In essence, labor-community coalitions are the
counterweight to traditional business groups like the Chamber of Commerce. There are
many political and economic barriers that impede a city-led process like the SBI in being
able to address social equity concerns. The traditional business coalition lobbies to avoid
policies that regulate social and environmental standards, and the city government is
caught between appeasing the business community by regulating less or the social and
environmental communities who call for greater regulation. In the end, the business
coalitions typically have much more political and financial power to pursue their policy
and election candidate preferences. Even with proponents for social equity working from
the inside, as the SBI TF representatives did, their power to influence the TF's final
recommendations around social equity were very limited. Labor-community coalitions
may not have the financial resources to match traditional business, but they have the
legitimacy and the strength in numbers. Traditional business coalitions call for less
regulation and more financial support in the form oftax incentives. Labor-community
coalitions demand that city governments take responsibility for meeting the needs and
desires of a city's residents, which includes regulating for social and environmental
health.
Labor-community coalitions are the result of bridge-building work that has
already happened among the various member organizations and movements of the
coalition. Accordingly, the difficulties around differing goals, visions, strategies, etc., are
worked out within the coalition rather than within the city-led decision-making process.
In other words, the labor, environmental, and social justice organizations involved agree
upon a compromise that meets all of their needs in some respects. The purpose of the
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coalition is to be able to advance a common, agreed-upon position in the city-led process
as a collective force, rather than having each individual organization or movement
advance their particular positions without the support of other social and environmental
organizations and movements.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION: RECLAIMING SUSTAINABILITY
As environmental concerns increase, such as climate change, and social problems
grow related to jobs, health care, housing and transportation in the United States,
sustainability and sustainable development have emerged as a dominant framework for
addressing society's main social, environmental and economic issues (Whitehead 2003).
Finding solutions that reduce one's impact on the environment, create greater social
equity, and build a healthy economy, has become a guiding light for many political
leaders, policy makers and citizens. For many cities, sustainability is a top priority
(Living Cities 2009).
Building on the momentum of urban sustainability nationwide, both as a concept
and as a movement,35 and its aim to integrate social, environmental and economic goals,
Mayor Piercy initiated the SBI in 2005. Mayor Piercy wanted to use the framework of
sustainability to address some of Eugene's most challenging issues - high
unemployment, the decline of family-wage manufacturing jobs and the rise of low-wage
service sector jobs, a widening income gap, lack of access to health insurance, and high
food insecurity and hunger rates (Oregon Center for Public Policy 2006; Oregon Food
Bank 2009). The economic situation in Oregon mirrors similar trends in other U.S. cities,
where the high-wage manufacturing sector is being supplanted by the low-wage service
sector, at the same time that the adoption of neoliberal policies draws funds away from
critical social services. Consequently, the framework of urban sustainability, which seeks
to simultaneously address social, environmental and economic concerns, resonates with
35 The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) definition of sustainability is the
most commonly used. It defines sustainability as "development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs" (WCED 1987).
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residents struggling to achieve a good quality of life and with city officials looking to
build a healthy and thriving community.
It is within this context that Mayor Piercy introduced the idea of creating a
Mayor's SBI and implemented it during her first term as Mayor. Like so many elected
officials, policy makers and citizens around the country, Mayor Piercy had high hopes for
building an initiative that would "make Eugene one of the nation's most sustainable mid-
size communities" by 2020, and "strengthen the economy by finding ways to support
businesses and expand quality jobs that use sustainable measures" (SBI TF 2006a:4).
Setting the SBI in motion was an admirable and important undertaking, not just for
Mayor Piercy, but for all city officials, policy makers and residents concerned with their
city's wellbeing. Moreover, beginning in 2008 with the election of President Obama, the
sustainability discourse, largely in the form of greenjobs and a green or clean energy
economy, has become widely popular on the national level. This draws even greater
attention to the idea of sustainability, the triple bottom line and, in essence, the balancing
of social equity, environmental health and economic prosperity.
While the rise of the urban sustainability discourse is fairly recent, in many ways,
the issues surrounding social equity and sustainability are age-old. The struggle
regarding social equity as a component of sustainability efforts, and the relationship
among the three components of sustainability, is at the core of economic development
discourse. It determines who bears the costs of economic growth, and it touches on who
has the power to dictate the development of our communities. In short, the push for
environmental and social sustainability often directly contradicts the push by influential
urban business coalitions for cities to be more entrepreneurial, or economically
competitive, with other locales.
In the end, my study of the SBI is an extremely cautionary account of the trade-
offs related to balancing social equity, economic prosperity, and environmental health
under the rubric of sustainability. Previous studies had shown that the "social leg" of the
stool is often neglected, particularly related to gender, race, and class (Agyeman and
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Evans 2003; Dobson 1999; Daley 1996). Indeed, at the end of the Mayor's SBI process,
no substantive proposals or recommendations for addressing the social equity component
of sustainability were made. This is despite Eugene being a city that has been highly
recognized for its sustainability work and, generally, its progressive politics. Instead, the
SBI TF's Final Report (2006a:9) stated that "the TF found it much easier to identify
mechanisms to promote the economic and environmental aspects of the Triple Bottom
Line than the social equity components ... the TF encourages Eugene City Government
and the community at large to pursue additional actions to address social equity issues."
If Eugene cannot develop a comprehensive sustainability program, then other officials
and citizens in other cities must engage in a thorough and honest discussion about the
possibilities in their own cities. Furthermore, the final outcome of the SBI, in terms of
social equity, confirmed that among politicians, activists, and academics committed to the
pursuit of sustainability, there is a lack of understanding of the challenges city officials'
face when attempting to pursue comprehensive urban sustainability policies and
programs. Krueger and Savage (2007) assert that while sustainability has professed a
tripartite commitment to social justice, environment and economy, "as a development
discourse and incipient set of policies [sustainability] has yet to live up to its progressive
potential: to bring together these issues in a holistic way" (216; Dobson 2003; Gibbs and
Krueger 2007; Krueger and Agyeman 2005; Aygeman 2005).
Indeed, I found that the SBI TF's "weak" approach to sustainability - aligned
with traditional economic development discourse and policy strategy -led to the
marginalization of social sustainability and to some extent, environmental concerns (SBI
TF 2006a). There are several characteristics of the SBI that define it as a "weak"
approach to sustainability and cause a significant contradiction between achieving the
economic prosperity component of sustainability and the environmental health and social
equity components.
Regarding the politics of the SBI TF, the social equity representatives on the TF
tried to keep social equity issues in play throughout the SBI process, but because their
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focus was primarily on labor issues, progress was difficult. Once the TF process began
and TF members recognized one another's stake in the process, it was apparent on all
sides that moving the social equity representatives' issues forward would be contentious
because their focus on workplace equity - a living wage, support of unionization,
employer provided health benefits, etc. - presented a challenge to traditional economic
development strategy. Rather than providing businesses with assistance, through tax
abatements, technical assistance, and cost reductions through environmental measures, as
ecological modernization proposes, the social equity TF members proposed measures that
would help redistribute wealth through workplace and community equity (SBI TF
2005a). Complicating this difficult ask, the social equity representatives on the TF did
not feel they had sufficient support from the externa11abor or social justice communities
to be able to apply the necessary pressure to push their issue forward. Many social equity
and labor advocates "self-selected" out of the SBI process before it even started because
they were skeptical of any city-led, environmentally-oriented sustainability effort
addressing equity. As Agyeman (2005) described, sustainability's background in formal
policy making arenas is off-putting for many socially marginalized residents and their
advocates. This is ironic given that these marginalized members of our community are
the same people who have the most at stake when it comes to all three legs of
sustainabi1ity: jobs, a healthy environment, and equity both in the workplace and in the
community. One of the labor representatives to the SBI Technical Advisory Committee
limited his investment in the process after attending a few meetings, as he saw little hope
of equity being included in the final recommendations of the SBI due to the "weak"
sustainabi1ity approach of the SBI coordinator and many of the TF members (Doyle
2008). There is also a general anti-environmental attitude within the labor movement that
needs to be addressed in order to garner wider labor support for such initiatives.
In addition, like most members of organized labor today, the labor representatives
to the TF had very little experience designing and advancing a socially just sustainabi1ity
agenda. The relationship between the labor movement and the environmental movement
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has been so rocky over time that most labor leaders and members have very little
experience identifying and developing a common agenda between labor and
environmental advocates. Even though the environmental justice movement has an
explicit justice focus that would seemingly resonate with the labor movement, many
issues keep them distanced, including the labor movement's historical exclusion of
people of co'lor. Plus, there are only a few, if any, environmental justice organizations in
Eugene, if one applies Agyeman et al.'s (2003) commonly accepted definition of the
terrn.36
The social equity representatives to the TF attempted to join forces and build a
common agenda with the environmental representatives to the TF, but with little success.
None ofthe environmental representatives to the TF had explicit equity dimensions in
their environmental work outside the SBI TF. Indeed, one such member aligned with the
business representatives on most social equity issues because, as a leader of a nonprofit,
she felt that she faced similar financial challenges as for-profits related to wages, health
benefits, and the right to organize. Outnumbered on the TF, lacking outside support, and
unable to build an alliance with environmental representatives on the TF, the proposals
for social equity in the SBI were destined for failure.
The labor movement has work to do going forward. It needs to develop its
thinking around a union vision for sustainability that is grounded in workplace and
community equity, including good, green jobs, opportunities for training and support for
union organizing. And ultimately, it is only through joint efforts between the labor,
social justice, and environmental movements that we can overcome the false dichotomy
between jobs and the environment. Without the environmental and labor/social justice
movements working together, it is easy for wealthier and more politically connected
36 The environmental justice movement seeks to end the inequitable distribution of environmental "bads"
and to link social justice and environmental issues (Cole and Foster 2001; Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans
2003; Stein 2004). Environmental justice organizations are typically led by low-income people and/or
people of color (Agyeman 2005; Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans 2003). Environmental justice organizations
work on a range of issues including race and the environment, civil rights and human rights, facility siting,
land use planning, brownfields, transportation equity, suburban sprawl and smart growth, energy and
climate justice (Agyeman, Bullard, and Evans 2003).
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business and elite interests, described as the "urban growth coalition" by Logan and
Molotch (1987), to perpetuate an economic growth model based on ecological
modernization. This approach to development in which economic growth will lead to
improved social and environmental well-being, leaves environmental, social justice, and
labor advocates scrambling for the crumbs left by economic development. Accordingly,
the argument that environmental protection and workplace equity undermine job creation
effectively divides the various interest groups, who then are unable to advocate as a
united force (Obach 2004). Additionally, the labor movement often fails to work closely
not only with the environmental movement, but also with other social justice movements
that address issues that are broader than traditional wage and benefit issues (Turner
2007). The supposedly divergent interests of these various movements, as well as the
economic development arguments that are intended to keep these movements divided,
must be overcome.
. Although addressing social equity was one ofthe Mayor's goals at the beginning
of the SBI process, pushing it forward became problematic when contrasted with her goal
of finding common ground among the different communities in Eugene. She did not
want the relationships among these communities to fracture further, particularly between
the business and environmental communities. In addition, because she had gone out on a
limb to get the SBI going, she did not want it to suffer any irreparable setbacks and
thereby tarnish her legacy as a "Mayor for All Eugene." In the end, Mayor Piercy felt
that while the SBI did not result in the perfect alignment of the triple bottom line, it was
indeed an important step for Eugene's future as it heads down a path toward continued
dialogue over meeting social, environmental and economic goals (Piercy 2008). Yet,
Piercy's goals for the SBI facilitated the marginalization of social equity in a few ways.
Piercy did not appoint someone to coordinate the SBI process who had a strong
background in social equity or social sustainability. The choice ofBob Doppelt to the
lead the SBI was a smart one, given her goal of uniting the environmental and business
communities in Eugene, as Doppelt had demonstrated significant expertise in the
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technical, environmental and business aspects of sustainability. Yet this choice also
signified a "weak sustainability" approach to the SBI, as Doppelt did not see a significant
role for equity in the SBI. The fact that Doppelt proposed the TF adopt the WCED
definition of sustainability (absent explicit equity language), and provided background
materials and guest presentations that were largely devoid of equity dimensions,
demonstrated this weak approach to sustainability. Plus, even ifDoppelt had wanted to
address equity issues through the SBI, it would have been nearly impossible to do so
given the tiny budget for the SBI ($5,000) and the short time frame for producing the
SBI's final recommendations.
Compounding the marginalization of equity was Mayor Piercy's selection of two
members of the business community to co-chair the TF. Although one of the co-chairs
was quite progressive and supportive of addressing social equity issues, he did not have
enough experience advocating for social equity to lead the the social equity agenda.
Moreover, two business representatives on the TF in particular had significant experience
and skill shaping city policy that was unmatched by any of the other representatives on
the TF. These members were able to drive dialogue and decision making, while at the
same time representing the well-aligned interests of the Eugene Chamber of Commerce.
There are several broader political-economic forces that pushed the Mayor's SBI
towards a "weak" approach to sustainability, aligning it with traditional economic
development strategy, and ultimately, marginalizing equity issues from the SBI discourse
and recommendations. Over the last couple of decades, responsibility for urban
economic development strategies has largely been shifted from public agencies to
partnerships between the public and private sectors (Bassett 1996). This shift is
attributable to a broader shift in urban governance, pushed primarily by business
interests, in which the demand is for city governments to become more entrepreneurial, to
exploit competitive advantages in order to attract investment, and to playa role in the
global economy similar to a nation-state. This shift in the role of urban governance is
related to "the rolling back of national state regulation, the cutting loose of localities from
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centralized fiscal resources and controls, and the triumph of a neoliberal 'growth first'
ideology" (White, Jonas and Gibbs 2004:549). This shift means that city government has
altered its role from "the local provision of welfare and services toward outward-oriented
stances aimed at encouraging local growth and economic development" (Gibbs
1997:205). Furthermore, the proliferation of public-private partnerships to encourage
economic development has provided a vehicle for local business leaders and coalitions to
influence urban politics and economic growth without the accountability inherent in
public office (Bassett 1996). As a result, business coalitions have become highly
involved in influencing urban-level politics (Bassett 1996). Yet many businesses, despite
the shifting terrain of a globalized economy, remain locally dependent. As a
consequence of their local dependence, gaining power at the local level is very important
to these firms. The goal of such power is to create a "business-friendly climate."
Businesses often claim that without a business-friendly climate, economic development
will falter, and new jobs will not materialize (Cox and Mair 1988). This is obviously a
strong argument, especially in communities that suffer from high rates of unemployment.
The strength of this argument is buoyed by the absence of any corollary to business
coalitions within progressive social movements.37 Labor unions would be the natural
corollary, but they have too often sided with business coalitions when jobs and the
environment are pitted against each other (Cox and Mair 1988). As a result, the
dominance of the "business-friendly climate" is assured.
On the other hand, due to a decentralization of power from state and national
levels of government to local government, the roles and responsibilities of local
governments have expanded (Beaumont and Nicholls 2004). According to Beaumont
and Nicholls, more administrative and service provision by local governments, a shift
towards consolidating local governments into metropolitan level governing bodies, and
an increase in interest group involvement in city politics, have led to "an expanded and
more perforated urban political opportunity structure" (2004:123). This transformation in
37 Citizens for Public Accountability (CPA) was a coalition alternative in Eugene, although it lacked strong
labor backing and was relatively inactive during the SBI.
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local governments spurs urban interest groups and movements to organize and make
demands of city government (Beaumont and Nicholls 2004). As a result, many cities
today face contradictory forces that greatly influence and shape their policies and actions.
In the case of Eugene, OR, there is both the push from traditional business
coalitions to encourage economic growth, but there are also demands from various urban
stakeholders and social movements to be more responsive to the needs and desires of the
community at large. Yet local governments are limited in their capacity to follow
through on many of the demands of constituents. The decentralization of power towards
local governments has not been accompanied by a corresponding decentralization of
funds towards local governments, which is a consequence of neoliberal policy. This
means more of a burden is placed on city government to maintain the economic health of
the city with little assistance through federal and state funding (Logan and Molotch
1987). At the same time, various urban stakeholders, including social, environmental and
labor movements, are recognizing that the political opportunity structure is opening at the
city level, and therefore are forcing city governments, often against their will, to be more
responsive (Agyeman and Evans 2003). Yet there is no easy answer for cash-strapped
local governments. Given that these social, environmental and economic challenges will
only increase as more and more people move to cities (Eugene has a growth rate of2%
per year) the future of urban politics and economic development is uncertain.
Based on this political-economic context - cities "charged with being good
entrepreneurial cities" and "regulating environmental and social health" - it is clear why
Mayor Piercy proposed the SBI, and more generally, brought the concept of sustainability
to bear on Eugene's future development. Piercy was looking for a development
compromise that appeased the traditional business community but also touched on
Eugene's significant social and environmental issues. And thus Eugene's SBI was not
only caught in a web of political interests, traditional business interests, environmental
interests, and social justice interests, is was also caught in a web oflarger political-
economic issues: declining federal spending to urban areas; the rise oflow-wage, service
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sector jobs; increased pressure on city governments to regulate social and environmental
concerns; and an increasing urban population marked by growing social inequality. This
complicated landscape upon which the SBI conducted its public hearings, Roundtables,
TF meetings, and decision making processes, shaped the composition of the TF, their
perceptions of sustainability, and the final outcome of the SBI.
The SBI is embedded in difficult conversations occurring in cities around how to
develop. In the case of the SBI, I argue that the Mayor hoped to use the SBI as a type of
alternative economic development tool that focused on attracting and maintaining
businesses and jobs, but also used social and environmental criteria to evaluate
businesses. In other words, Mayor Piercy was attempting to overcome what Cox and
Mair (1988) call city official's dual local dependence on the electorate and the local
economy. Elected city officials, like Piercy, must provide for community well-being and,
at the same time, ensure that jobs are being created through economic development and
that the tax base is expanded to fund projects related to community well-being. Given
their dual allegiance to the electorate and the economy, city officials are often tom
between meeting popular demands for improved quality of life (housing, transportation,
services, jobs, clean and healthy environment, etc.) and business demands for a friendly
business climate. This balancing act is highly political and involves many different urban
actors and interest groups with varying needs and desires, including some very powerful
interest groups, such as traditional business coalitions, which have a high stake in the
outcomes of the discussions.
Given the difficulty that city officials like Mayor Piercy face in balancing or
negotiating these contradictory forces of social and environmental quality and economic
growth and development, is it possible for an initiative like the SBI to truly address
equity concerns? Based on my case study of Eugene Mayor Piercy's SBI, I do think it is
possible for an initiative like the SBI to address the real equity concerns and desires of
residents. However, such an event would require the presence of a few key factors that
were absent from Eugene's SBI.
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The Mayor would need to be willing to expend political capital, which she lacked
at the time, to challenge traditional businesses' argument that economic growth leads to
greater social and environmental well-being. More specifically, the Mayor would need to
appoint someone to coordinate the TF that had a solid grounding in social equity issues, a
demonstrated commitment to balancing social, environmental and economic issues, and
that was respected within the community. The Mayor would need to select TF co-chairs
who represented a more balanced position on equity and sustainability, and at least one
co-chair with the knowledge and skill to advance an equity agenda. The composition of
the TF would need to look different to better address all three components of
sustainability - economic prosperity, social equity and environmental health. In the
Mayor's SBI, none of the TF members were directly accountable to any specific interest
group, as they were not elected into the position by those groups. To enhance the
diversity ofthe TF, the Mayor would need to identify those interest groups that are
essential to participation in a SBI, and solicit involvement by those groups. However, the
individual who ultimately represents these various groups would be selected by the
respective group and accountable to that constituency. Such a framework for community
involvement would increase buy-in from the community by creating a more participatory
atmosphere that is not dictated by any particular interest group.
Incorporating equity into the SBI would also have required significant changes by
the labor and social justice advocates involved in the SBI. The lack of existing ties
between the labor movement, the broader social justice movement, and the environmental
movement severely inhibits the chances of advancing a broad equity agenda alongside an
environmental agenda. When these positive relations do exist, labor, community and
environmental organizations can build a common agenda grounded in familiarity with
each other's interests. On the SBI, there was hardly any collaboration between the social
justice and environmental representatives to the TF. Therefore, each respective group
was advancing an isolated agenda. Given that the business representatives to the TF had
access to a well-organized network of businesses and financial resources through the
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Chamber of Commerce, it was an uphill battle for social equity and environmental
representatives.
The politics of sustainability and the political-economic context of U.S. cities
today create a situation where it is extremely difficult to create a city-led sustainability
initiative that seriously challenges economic growth and business interests and instead
develops policy that gives significant weight to social and environmental concerns. Yet,
there are few other institutions that can house a sustainability process that will bring such
diverse stakeholders to the table and realistically allow for any far-reaching results. After
extensive research on sustainability initiatives and programs in U.S. cities, I have found
that one of the few methods for addressing social equity in sustainability efforts is
through labor-community-environmental coalitions working for regional equity. These
labor-community coalitions offer successful examples of how sustainability/alternative
economic development efforts in the United States can include labor-focused, social
equity components, while also addressing some of the needs of the business community.
While a traditional strategy for labor unions is to intervene and reshape the
economic development process in the workplace, in industry, or at the national level, it is
only recently that labor unions have intervened in economic development efforts to
ensure equity and broader community benefit at the city/locallevel (Applegate 2007:53).
Unions' and other community organizations' recent interest in influencing economic
development at the local level is a response to neoliberal policies in which local
governments have retreated from coordinating economic development programs, handing
over this responsibility to business coalitions that drive development based on the pursuit
of profit rather than the public interest. "In addition to sacrificing the governance role of
unions and communities to that of businesses, the government's retreat from 'mixed'
governance since the 1980s has also entailed abandoning economic equality as a public
policy priority" (Applegate 2007:54).
In the last decade, amidst waning political power, cuts in social spending, growth
in low-wage jobs, and a worsening urban ecological environment, unions and other
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community organizations have begun to see the potential of working together to
challenge the growing power and influence of business coalitions at the local level. As
an alternative to the business coalitions' vision for development, labor-community
coalitions are forming and advocating for a development agenda focused on creating
regional equity. A focus on the regional level does not negate the value of city level
coalitions; however, a regional focus transcends issues of interurban competition and
allows for a truly comprehensive approach to inequality that leaves no one behind. Issues
such as public transportation, job creation, air quality, and poverty are not limited to a
city's boundaries and must be addressed as such. Labor-community coalitions for
regional equity are intentionally broad to allow for larger and more powerful coalitions.
An agenda for regional equity can include a multitude of environmental, social and
economic issues, including good jobs, health benefits, affordable housing, accessible
public transportation, a healthy work and living environment, access to green space, and
much more. Labor-community coalitions and the regional equity movement also
transcend a scarcity perspective in economic development to devise ways to meet social
equity, environmental, and economic goals simultaneously. In other words, the
development of a city and its surrounding region is not viewed as a zero sum game.
Instead, development is viewed within a framework of abundance and with the
perspective that there's enough economic, environmental, and social wealth to meet a
whole community'S needs (Blackwell and Pastor 2009).
Another alternative to a city-run and city-based sustainability program is having a
community-based sustainability program. A community-based sustainability program is
initiated and run by civil society and/or community organizations. In a process very
similar to the SBI, but run outside the city government, Urban Agenda, a nonprofit in
New York City, conducted a two year process gathering input from businesses, citizens,
city officials, and community groups on how to build an equitable, environmentally
sustainable New York City economy (Urban Agenda 2009). While my study does not
examine this case in detail, it is clear from the Final Recommendations of this Green
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Collar Jobs Roundtable that basing such an effort within a social justice and
environmentally focused organization allows these themes much greater presence than
did the SBI. On the other hand, because this process was not established within the city
government, it must now engage in another phase of work that aims to get the
recommendations adopted by the New York City Council. Because this process was
developed and led by a labor-community coalition and was not dominated by business
interests, it contains more controversial material than the SBI recommendations related to
social equity. Many of the recommendations seek the regulation of the City economy to
ensure the creation of good jobs, rather than the creation ofjust any job.
My study ofEugene's SBI is unique in its concentration on the broader social,
political and economic forces shaping urban sustainability efforts, including the role of
key actors, and the social and political struggles that mark how sustainability is conceived
and defined. Most other studies of urban sustainability efforts focus on the technical
issues associated with pursuing and achieving urban sustainability (Dobson 1999).
However, I think the technical issues posing barriers to achieving sustainability can be
overcome; the political issues surrounding sustainability and social equity offer the real
challenge to achieving sustainability.
In the past, cities were characterized as unnatural places to live, and a return to
rural forms of living posited as the best solution to environmental degradation (Dunlap
and Michelson 2002). Today, however, after years of continual urbanization, there is a
renewed focus on designing cities in a way that addresses environmental and social issues
(Haughton and Hunter 1994; Bugliarello 2006). Cities in the United States are finally
being recognized as places of opportunity for individuals looking for a high quality of life
that has less impact on the natural environment. Cities, in fact, are the locus of the
sustainability movement, as they house all the components of sustainability in an
extremely compact area, creating an incredibly rich space for this dialogue (Owen 2009).
As labor-community coalitions mature and these relationships deepen, the capability of
these coalitions to offer a counter-balance to traditional business alliances may increase.
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Therefore, future city-led sustainability initiatives may offer more promising ground for
')ust sustainability." Yet, it is clear that for a comprehensive sustainability effort to
proceed, it requires a constellation of factors to enter into alignment. I hope that my
study of Eugene, Oregon's Sustainable Business Initiative offers insight into the factors
that are necessary to implement just sustainability, and that community groups, city
governments, and individual advocates might take some of the lessons learned by
Eugene's pioneering effort and apply them to future sustainability endeavors.
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APPENDIX
SBI TECHNICAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Sustainable Business Initiative Technical Advisory Committee members and professional
affiliations.
581 TAC Members I
Anne Arden Lunar Logic, Knowledge Metrics
Bern Johnson E-Law
Betty Snowden Betty Snowden Real Estate
Brian McCarthy Cameron/McCarthy Landscaping
Cary Thompson Helios
Charles Biggs Neighborhood Leaders Council
Chuck Forster Lane Workforce Partnership
Dave Hauser Eugene Chamber of Commerce
David Lively Organically Grown Company
David Parker Advanced Energy Systems
Doug McClaughry Sheet Metal Workers Local #16
Eben Fodor Fodor & Associates, Community Planning Consulting
Gavin McComas Sundance Natural Foods
George Russell Eugene 4J School District
Hank Hoell Liberty Bank
Harry Battson Lane County Food Coalition
Ian Hill Sequential Biofuels
James Bean University of Oregon Lundquist School of Business
Jan Fillinger Solarc Architecture and Engineering
Jan Spencer Citizens for Public Accountability
Jane Holloway Lane County Fair
Jessica Chanay Food for Lane County
Jill Hoggard Green PeaceHealth
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Jim Lindley Lane Community College Small Business Development Center
Jim Maloney Eugene Water and Electric Board
University of Oregon Environmental Resource and Recycling
Karyn Kaplan Manager
Kate Davidson Davidson Strategies
Kathy Ging Realtor
Kevin Jones Full Circle Community Farm
Kevin Matthews Friends of Eugene
Laurie McClain Socially Responsive Financial Advisors
Lou Christian Lane/Coos/Curry/Douglas Building Trades
Maeve Sowles Lane County Audubon Society
Marie Matsen Lane Community College Small Business Development Center
Mel Bankoff Institute for Sustainable Ethics and Economics
Mel Pyne Peace Health Oregon
Mitch Hagstrom Pacific Continental Bank
Paul Thompson Active in l\Jeighborhood Association
Randy Hledik Wild ish
Rick Wright PC Market of Choice
Roy Orr McKenzie-Willamette Medical Center
Rudy Berg Eco-Building Guild
Sarah Bennett Bennett Management Company, LLC
Stephan Ostrach Teamsters Union Local #206
Steven Musser Energy Services Company
Sue Gorham Convention and Vistors Association of Lane County Oregon
Tim Keeley Bethel School District
Tom Bowerman Down to Earth
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